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INTRODUCTI ON
Over the past fifteen years unionism in public
employment has become a very volatile and controversial
issue. Sam Zagoria refers to this movement as “a quiet
revolution.”1 Indeed this “revolution” has been and
still is a complex challenge at all levels of government.
Not since the surge of unionism in the 1930’s has the
labor movement experienced anything comparable to the new
phenomenon. Union membership among federal, state and
local government employees has tripled in the last decade.
This increase in numerical strength has been accompanied
by a greater militancy. The public employee unions have
become new centers of power on the urban political scene,
and, with increasing frequency, they have exercised this
new power by effectively disrupting essential municipal
services.2 Thus, balancing the demands of municipal em
ployee unions without endangering the interest of tax
payers, who are recipients of municipal services, has
been a difficult task for government officials.
1-Sam Zagoria, ed., Public Workers and Public Unions
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, p. 1.
2Hugh O’Neill, “The Growth of Municipal Employee




Public employee unions date back to the beginning
of the American labor movement. Craft-type units of me
chanics, workmen and laborers were organized in municipal
public works and federal shipyards as early as the l830’s.
Before the Civil War the National Education Association
(NEA) as well as the local police societies and fraternal
groups were organized, but these groups were limited and
relatively ineffective. During the l880’s and 1890’s
the first serious wave of municipal organizations devel
oped mainly in the form of police and fire fighters
benefit societies and fraternal groups. However, it
was not until the early twentieth century that these
organizations turned to activities designed to advance
and protect their interests as workers. After the pas
sage of the Pendleton Act in 1883 and various state laws
introducing the merit system, these organizations tended
to work with existing political party machines. They
confined their efforts to lobbying at state capitols
and city halls and focused on abolishing restrictions
on political activities by public employees.3
The first decades of the twentieth century found
organized sanitation workers, police and firemen striking
and demanding increased wages and better working conditions.
p. 2-5 and Sterling D. Spero and John N.
Capazzola, The Urban Community and Its Unionized Bureau
cracies (New York: Dunellin Publishing Company, Inc.,
r973), p. 1.
3
Massachusettes Governor Calvin Coolidge’s reaction to striking
police officers in Boston was typical of government officials.
“There is no right to strike against public safety by anybody
anywhere at any time.”4 President Wilson’s characterization
of the strike was more pointed: “an intolerable crime against
civilization.”5 This hard line anti-labor reaction and the
pervasive anti-communist Red scare almost suffocated the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) the International
Association of Firefighters (IAFF) and Police unionism.
Public-employee unions shared in the rapid growth of
organized labor during the 1930’s. With the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the Wagner Act of 1935, the
legal obstacles to union expansion in private industry were
removed. However, these laws did not apply to public em
ployees. In defiance of legal barriers during the 1930’s
and 1940’s, unions like the AFT and IAFF grew. However the
most important development during this period was the emer
gence of the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME).
AFSCME evolved out of the Wisconsin State Employee
Association under the leadership of Arnold Zander in 1933.
At first the organization was an autonomous union operating
within the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE).
4lsadore Vogel, “What About the Rights of the Public
Employee?” Labor Law Journal 1 (May l950):6l2.
5lbid.
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AFGE was primarily interested in organizing federal employees.
Thus, it allowed AFSCME to have jurisdiction over employees
of state and local governments.6 As time passed, conflict
developed between AFSCME and the parent body AFGE over
AFSCME’s right to charter locals directly. However, by
1936 the dispute was over and the AFL granted a separate
charter to AFSCME.7 In 1964 the membership was a mere
250,000, but by 1974 the Bureau of Labor reported that AFS~ME
had 648,160 members.8 AFSCME is now considered one of the
fastest growing unions in the AFL-CIO.
The general labor movement in the United States peaked
in the 1950’s. Between 1956 and 1962 the trade union move
ment lost almost 900,000 members in the private sector.9
Thus the affiliate unions of the AFL-CIO began to direct
their energies toward organizing municipal employees. In
the decades since the Great Depression, all levels of
government have had a phenomenal increase in employment.
These workers were viewed by some unions as “good pickins,”
and organizing efforts were led by the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, the American Federation of City,
6Michael H. Moskow, J. Joseph Loewenberg and Edward
Clifford Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment
(New York: Ramdon House, 1970), p. 89.
70’Neill, p. 7.
8U. S. Department of Labor, News, August 2, 1975.
9Allan Weisenfeld, “Public Employees - First or Second
Class Citizens,” Labor Law Journal 16 (November l965):687.
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County, and Municipal Employees, the Laborers International
Union and the Service Employees International Union.1-°
In 1956 there were more than 7~ million government
employees and only 915,000 were affiliated with a labor
organization.~-~- In 1975 the Labor Department reported that
2,907,000 federal, state and local government employees
were members of unions and 2,426,000 were members of associ
ations. Three unions, AFSCME, AFGE and AFT memberships
tripled between 1964 and 1974.12 This tremendous growth
can be partially attributed to low salaries paid in the
public sector, inflation, and the effect of President
Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 which allowed federal em
ployees to negotiate collectively. Many states have taken
their cue from the Federal Government and begun to do like
wise.
Some states have general public employee collective
bargaining laws which apply to several groups of employees.
However, other states have legislation which does not allow
public employees to engage in collective bargaining.
Wyoming has a collective bargaining law which applies specfi
cally to firemen. Kentucky and Texas have collective bar
gaining laws for policemen and firemen, and Maryland’s
10Spero, p. 14.
11Weisenfeld, p. 687.
S. Department of Labor, News.
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statute allows collective bargaining for public school em
ployees only. The state of Georgia is no exception; it
likewise has passed legislation restricting various em
ployees.13
The only Georgia statute authorizing public employee
bargaining is the Fire Fighter’s Mediation Act (1971)
granting fire fighters in cities that elect coverage and
have 20,000 or more population the right to bargain collec
tively and be represented by a labor organization as to
wages, rate of pay, hours, working conditions and all other
terms and conditions of employment. However, consolidated
city-county governments with over 150,000 populations are
excluded from the legislation. The statute also forbids
strikes and job actions.14 It should be pointed out that
this exception presently applies only to Columbus-Muscogee
County because it is the only city-county consolidation
political juristiction in the state.
Aside from the Firefighters Mediation Act there are
no statutory provisions for collective bargaining for
13Public Personnel Administration Labor Management
Relations Volume 2 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc.), p-. 15, 505; 23, 301; 25, 401; and 16, 401.
~Georgia, Fire Fighter’s Mediation Act, Georgia Laws
(1971)1:565-571.
15A May 12, 1977 telephone interview with Charles
Broadwell, Affirmative Action Officer and Employee Counselor
for Columbus, Georgia, indicated that the consolidated city
county government was probably excluded because the new
government in early 1971 was having difficulty getting or
ganized and the new legislation would have been a “hardship.”
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public employees. Due to the absence of a special statute,
the state court declared the state’s position in Interna
tional Longshoreman’s Association v. Georgia Port Authority,
Local 574 International Association of Firefighters v. Floyd
and Chatham Association of Education Teacher Unit, et al. v.
Board of Public Education for the City of Savannah and the
County of Chatham.16 The Supreme Court of Georgia in:each
of these cases concluded that neither the state nor its
agents could be forced to engage in collective bargaining.
To do so, they argued, would be contrary to the state’s
public policy. In order to stimulate the public policy,
the state passed a law in 1970 which stated that the Per
sonnel Board shall have the power to establish and maintain
classification and compensation plans for its employeesJ7
A 1962 statute had clearly stated that all municipal govern
ments had the
power to establish municipal officers, agencies
and employments, to define, regulate and alter
the powers, duties, qualifications, compensa
tion and tenure of all municipal officers,
agents and employees. •l8
In the case of the Georgia Port Authority, the court
ruled that the State Port Authority is a
16217 Georgia Report 712-719 (1962), 222 Georgia Report
625-629 (1969), 231 Georgia RepQrt 806-808 (1974).
17Georgia, Georgia Code Annotated (Harrison, 1975).
18Georgia, Municipalities-Powers of all Municipal
Governments, Georgia Laws 1:140-144.
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Creature of the State and in the operation of
the Savannah Port Terminals acts as an instru
mentality of the State for governmental pur
poses and is not an “employer” subject to the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. 19
The defendants in the case had engaged in picketing the port
facilities. The court ruled that although the picketing was
peaceful, it was used for unlawful purposes and thus should
be enjoined. The picketing was unlawful because it was
viewed as an attempt to force the Port Authority to sign a
collective bargaining agreement.2° The court ruled further
that it was against the law for state employees to strike.
The court cited the March 3, 1962 Georgia Law which states:
No person holding a position by appointment or
employment in the government of the State of
Georgia or any agency, authority, board, com
mission, or public institution thereof shall
promote, encourage or participate in any strike,
.The word “strike,” as used herein shall mean
the failure to report for duty, the willful ab
sence from one’s position, the stoppage or
deliberate slowing down of work, or the with
holding, the whole, or in part, of the full,
faithful and proper performance of the duties
of employment, for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or coercing a change in the condi
tion, compensation, rights, privileges or
obligations of State employment; ... .Any person
not a State employee who shall knowingly incite,
agitate, influence, coerce, persuade or picket
to urge a State employee to strike shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.2l




The ëourt then asserted the position that bargaining
by the state is an illegitimate delegation of the sovereign’s
power:
We therefore, hold that the State Ports
Authority in the operation of the docks and
warehouses at its Savannah terminals was
without authority to enter into an agreement
with any third party fixing the terms and
conditions of the employment of personnel
working for the authority. It appeared
from the petition that the purpose of the
strike by its employees and the subsequent
picketing of the terminals by its employees
and others was to force the authority to
enter into a bargaining agreement with the
defendants. Such action being against the
public policy of the State was unlawful
under the act of 1962.22
In Local 574, International Association of Firefighters
v. Floyd, 1969, the court once again relied on the unlawful
delegation of sovereign power. In 1968 the General Assembly
passed the Chatham County Employee-Management Cooperative
Act.23 The act stated that employees of all political sub
divisions of Chatham County and the City of Savannah had
the right of self-organization, to join, form or assist any
labor organization, “to bargain collectively through repre
sentatives of their own choosing on questions of wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment.” The law further
stated that
the public employer and such labor organization
as has been designated as exclusive representative
22Ibid
23Georgia, Chatham County Employee-Management Coopera
tion Act, Georgia Laws (1968) 2:2953-2957.
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~f employees in an appropriate unit, through
appropriate officials or their representa
tives, shall have the authority and the duty
to bargain collectively.24
The law also provided for written agreements reached by nego
tiations, dues checkoff, suits for violation of agreements,
etc.25 The court ruled in the case of Local 574 that the
1968 special law attempted to restrict the powers granted
in the 1962 General Law which vested in each municipality
the power to “define, regulate and alter the powers, duties,
qualifications, compensation and tenure” of its employees.
According to the Court,
These powers are full and complete. They may
be executed by the City in any manner it
chooses, in the exercise of its nondelegable
discretion; the City is not required to bar
gain collectively with any person or organi
zation as to these powers.2b
The 1968 law stated that the city has the “duty to bargain
collectively: with the Union on questions of conditions of
employment, wages and hours. The effect of the 1968 special
legislation would be to place restrictions in the form of
mandatory collective bargaining upon the unlimited powers




26225 Georgia Report, p. 628 (1969).
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In Chatham Association of Educators, Teacher Unit
et al. v. Board of Public Education for the City of Savannah
and the County of Chatham 1974, the court once again relied
on the illegitimate delegation of power theory. The Board
of Education had negotiated a contract with the Chatham
Association of Education. The court ruled that
Without specific legislative authorization, a
school board has no authority, by contract or
otherwise, to delegate to others the duties
placed on the Board by the Constitution and
laws of Georgia.28
The contract was considered void because it was an illegal
attempt by the board to delegate its powers and authority.
The Georgia public employees policy is vague. It ap
pears that all employees enjoy a common law right as well
as a constitutional right of self-organization. However,
the Georgia Supreme Court has constantly upheld the General
Law of 1962 by evoking the theory of unlawful delegation
of power. According to James R. Beaird, the right of
self-organization appears to be meaningless because state
employees may not utilize it to deal with the employer col
lectively through a bargaining agent.29 Arthur K. Bolton,
the Attorney General of Georgia, expressed the opinion that
“unless and until the General Assembly authorizes them to do
28231 Georgia Report, pp. 807-808 (1974).
29James R. Beaird, “Labor Relations Policy for Public
Employees: A Legal Perspective,” Georgia Law Review (Fall
1969) :132.
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so, public employees in Georgia cannot enter into valid
collective bargaining contracts with labor unions.”3°
However, he also said
that if called upon to pass on the matter the
courts of Georgia would probably uphold the
right to bargain collectively in the sense of
meeting and consulting with union officials
about wages, hours and the conditions of em
ployment of public employees.31
The Office of the Attorney General of Georgia in an unofficial
opinion in 1966 stated that local units of government have the
right to allow their employees to bargain collectively if they
“chose to do so.”32 In 1974, the Office of the Attorney
General of Georgia issued a paper on the status of collective
bargaining in Georgia.33
Clearly, Georgia’s public emloyee policy violates
the spirit as well as the theory behind Executive Order
10988. The policy states that all employees have a right
to contribute to the effective conduct of public business
and the process of collective bargaining to the best means
available to fulfill this right. Despite the vagueness of
30Arthur K. Bolton, Labor Organizations in Georgia,
Atlanta, Georgia, 1975, pp. 13-14, (Mimeographed.)
p. 12
32Ibid.
33me Attorney General of Georgia, Arthur K. Bolton
admits that the current legal status of public unions in the
state involves uncertainties. However he has summarized the
legal status of public employee labor unions in the following
manner:
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the Georgia public employee policy, the city of Atlanta
has had a relationship with organized public employees
for decades.
Public employee organizations have existed in
Atlanta, Georgia, since December 1905. However, organi
zing efforts were not significant until the 1920’s when
the city’s firefighters and other non-uniformed employees
associated themselves with various groups. The techniques
1. Organization and Membership - This would ap
pear to be one of the certainties. The right of
a citizen to organize or to join a labor union
is protected by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and it is well settled that a
state cannot require an individual to waive or
forego this federally protected right as a con
dition of public employment.
2. Union “Recognition” - This is one of the un
certainties. While tEe term has a rather precise
meaning and triggers various legal obligations
in the general industrial context of the Labor
Management Relations Act, it has, so far as we
are able to ascertain, no fixed meaning outside
of the purview of that Act (as, for example,
with respect to public employment).
3. Collective Bargaining - This is another un
certainty since the answer depends on how the
term is defined. If the term is used solely in
the limited sense of meeting with and talking
to union officials to obtain their views or
recommendations on the wages, hours or other
employment conditions of public employees, it
is unquestionably within the discretionary
power of the affected State agency to do so if
it wants to.
4. Collective Bargaining Contract - The Supreme
Court of Georgia has spoken, see Chatham
Association of Education v. The Board of Public
Education for the City of Savannah and the County
14
used by these groups to achieve their goals were per
suasion and joint lobbying efforts through the Atlanta
Federation of Trades. In 1939 the Atlanta public em
ployee unions won a significant victory when civil
service legislation was approved for the city of Atlanta
and Fulton County. The American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees helped write the civil
service bill. The new legislation established a fairly
consistent method for hiring, promotion and paying city
employees and rid the city of the infamous “spoils
of Chatham, 231 Ga. 806 (1974), and there would
appear to be no questions as to the fact that
public employers in Georgia cannot enter into
valid collective bargaining contracts with
labor unions.
5. Strikes - Strikes by the employees of State
departments and agencies are prohibited by
statute in Georgia.
6. Picketing - The question of peaceful picket
ing by public employees raises unsettled legal
issues which will probably have to be resolved
on a case-by-case basis. It is possible that
peaceful picketing which is purely informative
and does not interfer in any way with the per
formance of the public function in question may
be protected by the First Amendment.
7. Closed Shop - Although Georgiø’s “right to
work” legislation does not by its express term
apply to public employees, there would seem to
be little doubt but that any attempt to provide
for a closed shop arrangement with respect to
public employees would be stricken by the courts
as contrary to public policy.
8. Union Dues Checkoff - In the absence of
clear legislative authorization it would not ap
pear to be lawful for a State department, board
or agency to deduct union dues from an employee’s
paycheck.
15
system” tactics previously used. The legislation also
provided for a Personnel Department and a Civil Service
Commission for the City.34
On August 22, 1945, the sanitation truck drivers
represented by Local 450 Chauffeurs and Teamsters’ Union
of the AF of L went on strike to protest the failure of
the city authorities to grant white drivers a pay increase
at the same time an increase was granted to “Negro help
ers.” The Sanitation Department Chief stated “This is
the fifth consecutive year in which Atlanta has had to
endure a garbage strike.”35 Mayor Hartsfield was furious
because he felt the strike was a violation of “a solemn
agreement” and a threat to the public health of the city
of Atlanta. The solemn agreement he referred to was the
fact that in January 1945 the union officials, who repre
sented the truck drivers, had negotiated a 7 1/4 per cent
base pay increase with the city and had promised the
mayor and the finance committee that they would make no
further demands during the year.36 The city reacted to
the strike by declaring the truck driver positions vacant,37
34Research Atlanta, Governmental Labor Relations in
Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, 1975, pp. 6-7.
35Atlanta Journal, August 22, 1945.
36Atlanta, Journal, August 23, 1945.
37Ibid.
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and the Personnel Board upheld the decision.38 Thus, new
truck drivers were hired and the strikers lost their jobs.
Throughout the 1940’s, 1950’s and early 1960’s the
city, and the unions appeared to have enjoyed an amicable
relationship. In 1959 AFSCME was granted dues check-off
and was considered the representative for non-uniformed
employees. Some of the workers represented by AFSCME
were blue collar employees in Water Works, Sanitation
Maintenance and white collar employees in city hall. The
city also continued to deal with IAFF Local 134.
By 1976 the city of Atlanta had had dealings with
two unions: IAFF and AFSCME. The city has had to deal
with these unions since the 1960’s and the only city em
ployees who have utilized the strike in the last ten years
in Atlanta are members of these organizations. Both
unions claim 51 per cent of the employees that the city
allows them to represent as members with AFSCME Local
1644 Public Work Chapter claiming 1,344 members and IAFF
Local 134 claiming 369 members. However, the city of
Atlanta boasts approximately 8,853 regular employees.
This number excludes part-time seasonal workers and
elected officials. This number includes 2,400 white
collar employees, 3,611 trade and labor employees, 1,000
38Atlanta Journal, October 5, 1945.
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fire department employees, and 1,842 police department
employees.39 Allowing for the fact that the Georgia
public employee policy is vague and that Atlanta has had
dealings with organized public employees for decades, a
significant question has not been answered. What has
been the nature of the relationship between the city
and the above-mentioned recognized unions? In this re
search project the writer will present an exploratory and
descriptive analysis of that relationship from 1966 to
1976.
The major questions are as follows: (1) What has
been the character of the relationship between the city
of Atlanta and the two recognized labor unions from 1966-
1976?, and (2) Has the relationship during this period
been one of sub rosa or discreet collective bargaining?
As stated previously, this study will be necessarily
descriptive and exploratory since no major research has
been done on this specific topic in Atlanta as compared
to cities like Miami, New York, Memphis, Milwaukee and
Philadelphia where the topic of public unionism has re
ceived extensive attention. It is imperative that the
research zero in on specific aspects of this relationship
and deal with them under three different administrations.
After a careful survey of the literature, there appear to
S. Department of Labor, Municipal Government
Wage Survey, Regional Report 34 (Atlanta, Georgia, May
~I976) p. 1.
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be specific stages in any developing city-labor relation
ship that must be gone through. Therefore, labor rela
tions under each administration will be examined in the
following framework: organization and membership, repre
sentative status, dues checkoff, collective bargaining,
strikes and job actions and administrative machinery.
This research should lead to the development of certain
hypotheses and provide suggestions for further research
in the fixed areas.
Each category to be used will now be listed and ac
companied by a statement or definition and some questions
that will be addressed in the research.
Organization and Membership - The procedure used
by the city to determine which employees will be allowed
to organize and become members of labor unions. How has
the issue of the right of public employees to organize
and become members of labor unions been treated? What
employees have been allowed by the city to be represented
by the union?
Representative Status - When exclusive representa
tion is given to a union to represent all employees in a
bargaining unit in negotiating on wages and working con
ditions, the union is considered to have representative
status. Another term for representative status is union
recognition. How have employee unions been certified or
selected? What procedures were used to arrive at recog
nition of a particular union?
19
Dues Check-off - City ordinances grant labor union
check-off privileges. The city employee who is a member
of the selected union is allowed to authorize deduction
of union dues from his wages. The administration then
sends these funds to the union. How has the dues check-
off instrument been used by the city government? What
is th.e significance of dues check-off for the unions?
How have the unions waged their battles to get, as well
as keep, this privilege?
Collective Bargaining - This term is controversial
and will be extensively defined later in the introduction.
What has been the procedure for dealing with issues re
garding labor under each administration? What are the
justifications for these procedures? How effective have
these procedures been?
Strikes and Job Actions - A strike is when employees
refuse to report for duty or when they engage in a work
stoppage in concerted action for the purpose of influencing
or coercing a change in working conditions or wages. A
job action has taken place when employees engage in a slow
down in work effort in order to force the employer to make
concessions. How has the city responded to these crises?
Administrative Machinery - The mechanisms set by the
city administration to deal with labor problems. What
mechanisms were set up by the various administrations to
deal with labor problems? How has the machinery functioned?
20
Although the above categories are necessary aspects
of this topic, another dimension of this research includes
the opinions and attitudes of the rank and file union mem
bers. The researcher will attempt to assess the attitudes
and opinions of the rank and file regarding the following:
their conception of the relationship that exists between
their union and the city; their desire to see other unions
recognized by the city; their views on labor unity among
city employess; their feelings about the city’s collective
bargaining policy, their position on the strike issue;
and their opinion of the city’s labor administrative
machinery.
Hopefully, an assessment of the attitudes of the
rank and file will allow the researcher to develop hypo
theses for further research, develop generalizations
about the future trends of public unionism in the city
and make recommendations to enhance the city-rank and
file relationship.
There is some confusion concerning the meaning of
the term “collective bargaining” as it relates to the
private and public sectors. Despite the varied usages
and definitions of the term, there is one. common denomi
nator: collective bargaining is a process or the act of
negotiating. W. D. Heisel and J. D. Hallihan maintain
that the process is applicable to the public and private
sectors. Nevertheless, the results of bargaining may
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differ in the public sector. In industry the process al
most invariably results in a legally enforceable contract,
whereas in the public sector wages and employment condi
tions usually are set by ordinance with some input by em
ployees or their union representatives.40 The question
of whether the public sector is sufficiently different
from the private sector to justify avoiding private sector
precedents in collective bargaining has been addressed at
length by many labor relations experts. Harry Wellington,
Ralph Winters and Clyde Summers have been prolific writers
on the subject.41 Harry T. Edwards, however, views the
entire controversy over usage and applicability of the
term collective bargaining as a moot question; moot in
light of the current growth of unionism in the public
sector, and the widespread enactment of legislation which
does provide a framework for collective bargaining among
government employees ~42
40w. D. Heisel and J. D. Hallihan, Questions and
Answers on Public Employee Negotiation (Chicago, Illinois:
Public Personnel Association, 1967), p. 14.
41-See Harry Wellington and Ralph Winters in “Limits
of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment.” Yale Law
Journal 78(May l969):llO7. Also see Clyde Summers in
Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective,” Yale
Law Journal 83 (May 1974) :1156-1200.
42Harry T. Edwards, “The Impact of Private Sector
Principles in the Public Sector: Bargaining Rights for
Supervisors and the Duty to Bargain,” in Union Power and
Public Policy, ed. David Lipsky (New York: New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1975), p. 53.
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The term as it app1ies~ to the private sector is
clearly defined in Section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act.
For the purpose of this section, to bargin
collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representa
tives of the employee to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agree
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and
the execution of a written contract party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a pr9~osal or require the making of
a confession.~~
The definition of the term has also been set forth
for federal government employees in Executive Order 10988
issued January 17, 1962. According to Section 6(b), after
an employee organization has been given exclusive recog
nition then
The agency and such employee organizations,
through appropriate officials and representa
tives, shall meet at reasonable time~ and con
fer with respect to personnel policy and
practices and matters affecting working con
ditions, so far as may be appropriate subject
to law and policy requirements. This extends
to the negotiations of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, the determination
of appropriate techniques, consistent with
the terms and purposes of this order, to
assist in such negotiations, and the execution
of a written memorandum of agreement or under
standing incorporating any agreement reached
by the parties.44
43Heisel and Hallihan.
44u. S. President, Executive Order 10988 in The
Crisis in Public Employee Relations in the Decade of the
Seventies, eds. Richard J. Murphy and Morris Sackran
Washington, D. C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970),
p. 170.
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This meaning of collective bargaining was restated in
Executive Order 11491 Section 11(a) issued October 29,
1969, by President Richard Nixon and is present policy.45
Despite the clear federal government position on
the term, many states and municipalities are in a situ
ation of experimentation. Most are still debating whether
the private sector definition can be applied to the public
sector? Neil Chamberlain sees two fundamental differences
which will probably have a tremendous effect on how the
public sector will define and implement collective bar
gaining. First, there are peculiar restraints imposed on
the sources of revenue for the government that are not
imposed on the private sector. Second, is the availability
of the strike.46 Most government units whether they engage
in bargaining or not with their employees ban the strike.
The strike issue is absent from collective bargaining
discussions in the private sector because the right to
strike is not questioned. The strike controversy will be
thoroughly discussed in the theory portion of this study.
45U. S., President, Executive Order 11491 in The
Crisis in Public Employee Relations in the ‘Decade oFThe
Seventies, ed. Richard Murphy and Morris Sackran (Washing
ton, D. C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970), p. 178.
46. . .
Neil W. Chamberlain, Public vs.. Private Sector
Bargaining,” in Collective Bargaining in Government, ed.
J. Joseph Loewemberg and Michael H. Moskow (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 16.
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The definition of the term “collective bargaining”
that will be utilized in this research is similiar to
the definition presented by Ricard F. Dole, Jr.
The gist of collective bargaining is negotiation
of the terms and conditions of employment by
management and employee representatives. Public
employer collective bargaining thus invariably
involve consultation between a public employer
and a representative of its employees.47
In this study the terms meet and confer, collective bar
gaining and labor organizations will be defined as follows:
Meet and Confer - Discussions between employer and
labor representatives on wages, working conditions, griev
ances and other matters affecting the working conditions of
the employees. Decisions regarding these matters are made
unilaterally by the employer.
Collective Bargaining - Negotiations between employer
and labor representatives on wages, working conditions,
grievances and other matters affecting the working condi
tions of the employees culminating in bilaterally arrived
at oral or written agreements which may or may not be
i~inding.
Labor Organization - An organization of any kind in
which employees participate and which exist for the pur
pose of representing city employees concerning grievances,
personal policies and practices, wages or other matters
affecting the working conditions of the employees.
47Richard F. Dole, Jr. “State and Local Public Em
ployee Collective Bargining in the Absence of Explicit
Legislative Authorizatioii,” in Collective Bargaining in Government,
eds. J. Joseph Loewenberg and Michael H. Moskow (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p. 47.
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Public employee unionsism is a fertile field for re
search. Several case studies regarding public employees
in urban centers have been written. 48 However, urban cen
ters in th.e South have generally been neglected. The most
significant research is David Stanley’s Managing Government
Under Union Pressure. Stanley analyzes the impact of union
strength on nineteen governments. However, only two south
ern governments are analyzed, Dade County, Florida, and
New Orleans, Lousiana. Thus, due to the paucity of material,
it is believed that this study of Atlanta and public em
ployees unionism from 1966-1976 will be a significant con
tribution to the literature.
Three techniques were used to analyze and evaluate
the designated categories. First, questionnaires were
mailed to the rank and file members of IAFF~ and AFSCME and
John B. Lansing and James N. Morgan’s advice on selection
of sample size was adhered to. “The penalty for too large
a sample is economic.. .The penalty for too small a sample
is that the results of the project may be inconclusive.”49
48See Raymond Horton, Municipal Labor Relations in
New York City: Lessons of the Lindsay-Wagner Years (New
York: Praeger, 1973). See Arvid Anderson, “The U.S. Exper
ience in Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,” in
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and
Practice, ed. by Kenneth 0. Warner (Chicago: Public Person
nel Association, 1967), pp. 21-45. See also Charles Redenius
“P~articipant Attitudes Toward a Judicial Role in Public
Empooyee Collective Bargaining, “Labor Law Journal 25
(February 1974) 94-113.
49John B. Lansing and James N. Morgan, Economic Sur
vey Methods (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan
Institute for Social Research, 1971), p. 90.
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Thus, the Lansing and Morgan dictum was the rationale for
using one hundred per cent of the population. The question
naires were followed by interviews conducted with approxi
mately ten per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire.
Secondly, in-depth interviews were conducted with two of
the three mayors who governed Atlanta from 1966 to 1976
and other appropriate officials. In-depth interviews were
also conducted with union officials. Thirdly, city records,
union files, the Southern Labor Archives, the Southern
Regional Council, Newspapers and other pertinent materials
were thoroughly analyzed.
This study is presented in six chapters. In chapter
one an overview of the major contributions to the literature
in the area of public employee unionism is discussed.
Chapters two, three, and four consist of a critical analy
sis and description of public unionism in Atlanta during
Mayors Ivan Allen Jr., Sam Massell and Maynard Jackson’s
Administrations. Chapter five focuses on the perceptions
of the rank and file toward the city’s labor relations
policy. Finally chapter six, includes the major findings,
recommendation and suggestions for futher study.
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC UNIONISM
The literature regarding public employee unionism is
diverse and covers a range of topics. However, in this
chapter, the literature review will be limited to decision-
making models that are used in employee-management labor
relations. Thus, the literature survey will be restricted
to a discussion of the following models and the controversy
which surrounds them: the Traditional Approach or the
Unilateral Model; the Private Sector v. Public Sector
Bilateral Model; Other Models of Decision Making; and the
No-Strike v. the Strike Models.
Traditional Approach: The Unilateral Model
At the turn of the century public employers took
the opportunity to resist the development of unionism in
the public sector. The theoretical framework used to re
sist public unionism was the concept of sovereignty.
Sovereignty in theory is exercised by the “supreme
repository of power in a political state.” Thus, sover
eignty may be exercised by a person or by a body politic.
In a narrow legalistic sense the sovereign power stands
above the law, simply because it make the law; thus the
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statement “the king can do no wrong.”1- The traditionalist
argues that the state occupies a sovereign relationship
to its employees. Government employees must not be affili
ated with the labor movement in any way because their
loyalties will be divided. The public employee owes his
allegiance solely to the state.2
Proponents of the sovereignty theory, who viewed
the theory as a tool to control public employees, were
given further support by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and
Taft. An executive order which forbade federal employees
from seeking to influence legislation in their own behalf
“individually or through associations, save through heads
of their departments” was issued by Roosevelt. This
order became known as the “gag rule.” President Taft
supplemented the “gag rule” with an order which forbade
government employees and officials of the government from
responding to any request for information from Congress,
Committees of Congress and/or members of Congress except
through and authorized by department heads. These measures
1Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessy, Public
Management at the Bargaining Table. (Chicago: Public Per
sonnel Association, 1967), p. 248 and Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, Commission Report: Labor-
Management Policies for State and Local Government (Washing
ton, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, September,
1969) :54.
2Sterling D. Spero, Government As Employer (New York:
Remsen Press, 1948):9.
3Sterling D. Spero and John M. Capazzola, The Urban
Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies (New York: Dunellen
Publishing Company, 1973), p. 5.
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curbed organization efforts until the passage of the Lloyd-
La Follette Act in 19l2.~
According to Sterling D. Spero, the concept of sov
ereignty has also been used to rationalize unilateral
authority over public employers. Propon~its of the tradi
tional view state that unilateral authority is necessary
to “preserve the integrity and legitimate powers of govern
ment.”5 If public employees are allowed to utilize the
same means as those used by private employees to pressure
the private employer, this would represent a degradation
of the sovereigi~ integrity of public authority. Thus,
public officials can arm themselves with legal opinions
to argue that they lack the authority to agree to union
programs. Thus, the traditionalist literature views the
“whole issue of union recognition and collective bargain
ing. . . . as a question of law rather than an issue of public
policy. “6
The traditional literature is further buttressed
by a letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Mr.
Luther C. Stervard, President of the National Federation
of Employees.
4Spero, p. 17. The Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912
nullified the so called “gag rules” and allowed the right
of association and other civil rights to government workers.
5Spero and Capazzola, p. 5.
6Warner, p. 248.
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The process of collective bargaining as
usually understood, cannot be transplanted
into the public service. It has its dis
tinct and unsurmountable limitations when
applied to public personnel management.
The very nature and purposes of government
make it impossible for administrative of
ficials to represent fully or to bind the
employer in mutual discussions with govern
ment employee organizations. The employer
is the whole people who speak by means of
laws enacted by their representative in
Congress. Accordingly, administrative of
ficials and employees alike are governed
and guided, and in many cases restricted,
by laws which establish policies, procedures
or rules in personnel matters. Particularly,
I want to emphasize my convictions that mili
tant tactics have no place in the function of
any organizations of government employers.7
The above statement has been used by public employers to
prove that it is improper for them to negotiate with em
ployee organizations.
In 1969, the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental
Relations Commission issued a report which was sympathetic
to unilateral decision-making by the government. The
Commission recoimnedned that “Meet and Confer” statutes
be enacted in the public sector in order to balance manage
ment rights against employee needs. The Commission held
7Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
p. 54. Accordingtospero, p. 346 most sources who use the
Roosevelt statement fail to mention that in August 1940, the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) signed a series of agree
ments with 15 AF of L unions representing its construction
and operating employees and with the TVA Trade and Labor
Council composed of all these unions, President Roosevelt
at the dedication of the Chicamauga Dam Project one month
later praised this “splendid new agreement between organized
labor and the TVA,” and declared “collective bargaining and
efficiency have preceded hand in hand.”
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that while both the “meet and confer” system and collective
negotiation involve continuous communication between employer
and employee representatives, it was opposed to collective
negotiations because in the collective negotiation system
both parties meet as equals and decisions are made bi
laterally. The Commission favored the “meet and confer”
system because the outcome of the employer-employee dis
cussions depends more on “management’s determination than
on bilateral decisions by equals,” and is thus protective
of public management’s discretion.8 The Commission’s posi
tion is best stated in the following quote:
To a greater extent, it seeks a reconciliation
with the merit system since agreements reached
through the discussional process and actions
taken as an implementary follow-up cannot con
travene any existing civil service statute. . . it is
candid and squarely confronts the reality that
a governmental representative cannot commit his
jurisdiction to a binding agreement or contract,
and that only through ratifying and implementing
legislation and executive orders can such an
agreement be effected.. . . it avoids detailed
statuorily prescribed procedure applicable to all
situations, and this lack of specificity in some
degree and in some areas permits greater flexi
bility and adaptability in actual implementation
it recognizes--indeed, is rooted in--the
vital differences existing between private and
public employment, and does not make the mistake
of relying heavily on the National Labor
Relations Act as a blueprint for action in
public service.9
Opponents of the sovereignty concept have been quite
vocal. Neil W. Chamberlain believes that the traditional
8Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, p. 100.
9mid., pp. 101-102.
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belief that public service must remain fully vested with
sovereignty if society is to survive is as specious as
any of the older myths in industrial relations which we have
relegated to some cobwebby historical attic.”1° Chamberlain
argues that it is possible to distinguish between those acts
of government that involve policy making or legislative
functions.
If sovereignty is an attribute of the latter
it need not automatically be extended to the
former. The managing of the public establish
ment can surely be differentiated from a
determination of what the public establishment
shall manage.13-
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
in its report Labor - Management Policies for State and
Local Government, published in September 1969, was quite
clear on its position regarding sovereignty even though it
favors unilateral decisions regarding employees. The report
states:
The traditional doctrine of sovereignty has been
modified through practice; obviously, if fovern
iment allows itself to be sued and if it signs
contracts with private contractors which contain
provisions for the binding arbitration of disputes,
then acceptance of certain restrictions on its
discretion in dealing with public employees does
not undermine its sovereign status.lL
1-0Neil W. Chamberlain, “Public vs. Private Sector
Bargaining,” in Collective Bargaining in Government, eds.
J. Joseph Loewenberg and Michael H. Moskow (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 13.
11 ~ d.
12Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
p. 10.
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Richard F. Dale succinctly states his position in
“State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in
the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization.” Dale
feels that the belief that public employer bargaining is
impermissible because it involves an improper delegation
to private persons of the sovereignty of the government
is
specious. . .because a public employer does not
have to agree to an employee representative’s
proposals, a public employer delegates no
authority to a representative by attempting to
negotiate a collective bargaining contract.13
Futhermore, any agreement that results “is an exercise rather
than a delegation of authority by the public employer.”14
The theoretical framework embodied in the concept of
sovereignty will probably be argued for sometime to come.
However, most academicians and courts have modified their
views on the doctrine and the “ghost of sovereignty” is
rapidly delcining. Most believe that one of the major
tenets of sovereign power is the authority to make public
policy decision. Sterling D. Spero probably sums up the
prevailing view best when he states: “A policy decision
by government to establish collective bargaining procedures
13Richard F. Dole, Jr., “State and Local Public Em
ployee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit
Legislative Authority,” in Collective Bargaining in Govern
ment, eds. J. Joseph Loewenberg and Michael H. Moskow
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972),
p. 48.
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in its service is itself a sovereign act.”15 Nevertheless,
Moskow, Leowenberg and Koziara state that many government
officials still wish to continue to make unilateral de
cisions regarding conditions of employment because they
fear that collective bargaining will
Infringe on management perrogatives, weaken
authority. . . affect adversely_the efficiency
of government operations.. .LandT inevitably
lead to strikes against the go~ernment.16
So to the few diehards that survive Moskow, Loewenberg and
Koziara give the following advice: There is
no unwritten “law of sovereignty” which pro
hibits the state from participating in bar
gaining. . . . it may be said that in so doing
~bargainin~J the state is exercising its
sovereign power.l-7
David Stanley, however, goes a step further and declares
“the era of unilateral, of unquestioned sovereignty, is
about over. The age of bilateralism--consultation, negoti
ation and bargaining--is already hereJ8
15Sterling D. Spero, “Collective Bargaining in the
Public Service,” Public Administration Review 22 (Winter
1962) :2.
‘6Michael H. Moskow, J. Joseph Loewenberg and Edward
Clifford,Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment
(New York: Random House, 1970), p. 18.
18David T. Stanley, “What Are Unions Doing to the
Merit System?” in Collective Bargaining in Government, eds.,
J. Loewenberg and Michael H. Moskow (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 88.
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Public Sector v. Private Sector
Bargaining: The Bilateral Model
Aside from conflicting views regarding the interpre
tation of the doctrine of sovereignty, the literature teams
with differences in the interpretation of the application of
collective bargaining. Is the private sector different from
the public sector? Should the private sector bargaining
process be transplanted into the public sector? The major
differences between the two, as expressed in the literature,
is that collective bargaining in the private sector is pri
marily shaped by market place focus and bargaining in the
public sector is primarily shaped by political forces.
The research efforts of George H. Hildebrand have led
him to conclude that there are four differences or special
features of collective bargaining in the public sector.
First, the right to strike or to lock out is usually taken
away by law, force or public opinion. Second, most of the
government services are supplied without a direct charge
being made to the citizens. Rather, these services are
financed by taxes and appropriations. Unlike the private
sector, there is no loss of revenue following a work stop
page. This is viewed as an advantage which lowers manage
ment’s cost of disagreeing with the union. Furthermore,
if the services affected are felt to be essential by the
community, public opinion can become a factor of major
importance as both sides consider the cost of their dis
agreement. Also, taxes and subsidizes allow cost to be
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shifted to a third party without fear of the losses resulting
in rising prices. Thus, the risk takes the form of possible
reprisal at the polls. Third, the employer directly involved
in collective bargaining may lack the authority to reach an
agreement. Usually consent must come from higher levels of
political authority, the executive, and ultimately the law
making body. In the private sector the profit motive sup
plies the necessary unity of interest in the power structure.
However, in the public sector the aim of the final decision
makers is usually re-election. Fourth, in the United
States legislative bodies have historically sought to re
tain as much of their rule-making jurisdiction as possible.
Thus there is a strong tendency to treat the “legislative
process that governs the employment relationships in the
public service as reserved territory, to be excluded as much
as possible from collective bargaining.”19
Nevertheless, Hildebrand does accept the bilateral
model of collective bargaining in the public sector. His
definition is the same as that of most academicians and
practitioners.
The essence of collective bargaining is the
joint negotiation between management and a
union of a set of terms under which the members
of the bargaining unit will consent to work...
19George H. Hildebrand, “The Public Sector,” in
Frontier of Collective Bargaining, John T. Dunlop and Neil
W. Chamberlain (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 126-
127.
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What makes it operative is a set of conditions:
the right to organize, the right to obtain recog
nition, the opportunity to bargain over at least
some substantive matters, the possibility of
reaching a viable understanding or even a written
agreement prescribing at least some of the rules
of the employment relationship and provisions of
some procedure for resolving questions of inter
pretation and application of the terms negotiated.2°
Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr.’s paradigm
for the private sector model pictures an industry that pro
duces a product that is not “particularly essential to those
who buy it and for which dissimilar products can be substi
tuted.”21 The social cost imposed by collective bargaining
in the private sector are economic costs which are usually
limited by commanding market restraints. However, the
authors warn that they do not mean that private sector col
lective bargaining is free of social cost. Rather, they
maintain that the social cost is necessarily limited by the
discipline of the market.22 Further, they state four claims
that are made for private sector bargaining. First, it is
said to achieve industrial peace. Second, it is a way to
achieve industrial democracy. Third, unions that bargain
collectively with employers represent workers in the politi
cal arena as well. Fourth, because of the belief in the
unequal bargaining power of employers and employees, col
lective bargaining, which will prevent monopsony, is a
20Ibid., pp. 127-128.
21Harry T. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The
Unions and the Cities (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1971), p. 15.
22Ibid p. 17.
38
a needed substitute for individual bargaining.23 The
first three claims for bargaining in the private sector
are accepted as being transferrable because the delimiting
effects of markets and other forces which constrain the
powers of unions do not come into play nearly as quickly
in the public sector as they do in the private sector.24
The authors clarify this conclusion in their public sector
paradigm.
The public sector paradigm developed by Wellington
and Winters includes a municipality with an elected
council, and an elected mayor who bargains through their
representatives with unions who represent city employees.
However, the model also includes bargaining between city
officials and other permanent and ad hoc interest groups.
Wellington and Winters clearly indicate what they view
as differences in collective bargaining in the public
and private sector in the following statement:
Those skeptical of the value of collective
bargaining in private employment will hardly
press its extension. But even if one accepts
collective bargaining the private sector...
the claims that support it there do not, in
any self-evident way, make the case for its
full transplant. The public sector is not
the private, and its labor problems are
different, very different indeed. . . .Collective
bargaining in public employment, then, seems
distinguished from that in the private sector.
To begin with, it imposes on society more than
a potential misallocation of resources through




cost imposed by private sector unions. Col
lective bargaining by public employees and
the political process cannot be separated.
The cost of such bargaining, therefore, can
not be fully measured without taking into
account the impact on the allocation of poli
tical power in the typical municipality. If
one assumes, as here, that municipal politi
cal processes should be structured to ensure
“a high probability that an active and legi
timate group in the population can make it
self heard effectively at some crucial stage
in the process of decision,” then the issue
is how powerful unions will be in the typical
municipal political process if a full trans
plant of collective bargaining is carried out.2
The authors conclude that the transplant would in
stitutionalize the power of public unions in such a manner
as to leave competing groups in the political process at
a “permanent and substantial disadvantage.”26 They give
three reasons as to why this is possible. First, some of
the services in the public sector are such that if there
is any prolonged disruption the health and safety of the
community would be endangered. Second, the demand for
most governmental services is relatively inelastic, and
“relatively insensitive to changes in price.” Third, the
extent to which the disruption of a government inconven
iences municipal voters is a reason to feat a private
sector transplant.27 It is a fact that politicians have
made concessions to unions in order to prevent a strike
25Ibid pp. 7-8, 29-30.
26Ibid p. 30.
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which would inconvenience voters. This has been particu
larly true of politicians seeking re-election who felt
vulnerable and feared possible retribution from voters at
the polls. These concessions, sometimes extravagant,
particularly in the case of New York City, have helped to
bring about major financial problems. Wellington and
Winters also adamantly claim that it is not simply the
strike weapon that cannot be transplanted into the public
sector. It is a combination of the strike and the typical
municipal political process which also includes the usual
methods of raising revenue. Allowing for the possibility
that there are particular cases which make their model
invalid, they do maintain that “the law regulating munici
pal bargaining must be flexible and tailored to the real
needs of a particular municipality.”28
The major differences in public and private sector
bargaining, as viewed by Thomas M. Love and George T.
Sulzner, are enterprise structure and pressure tactics.
In terns of enterprise structures, effective power and
authority in private enterprise are vested in management.
In the public sector management shares its power with
the legislature and judiciary. Also in the public sector
some officials are elected and some appointed, politics
may be partisan or nonpartisan, and several agencies may
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share in managerial decisions that affect workers.29
Love and Sulzner express extreme difficulty when trying
to determine which political structure, council-manager
form or mayor-council form, allows unionized public em
ployees to exert the most influence. Edward C. Banefield
and James Q. Wilson claim that city employees are likely
to exert most influence in communities where reformed
structures exist. Reformed political structures would
include a council-manager form of government, nonparti
san elections and an at-large election system. On the
other hand, they argue that city employees are likely to
exert the least influence in communities which have un
reformed structures, meaning, the structures include a
mayor-council form of government, partisan elections and
a ward electoral system. However, the effect of unre
formed and reformed structures upon the political in
fluence of city employees is not subject to agreement
among political scientists. Robert L. Lineberry and
Edmund P. Fowler pose opposite hypotheses from Banefield
and Wilson. They maintain that city employees exert most
influence in areas where the political structure includes
a mayor-council form of government, partisan elections,
29Thomas M. Love and George T. Sulzner,”Political
Implications of Public Employee Bargaining,” Industrial
Relations 11 (February 1972) :18-21.
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and a ward election system; and city employees exert
least influence in communities where the political
structure includes a council-manger form of government,
nonpartisan elections and an at-large election system.3°
Love and Sulzner indicate that an accurate determination
of these views would be a significant finding. However,
they do maintain that in private enterprise, decisions
regarding bargaining and the authority for making these
decisions are vested at the level of professional manage
ment, the experts on bargaining, and these decisions are
not usually overturned at higher levels, whereas in
government the decision structure is varied. Love and
Sulzner maintain that in government, labor decisions may
be made by the legislature, an agency in the executive
branch, an elected official, a professional manager, a
top executive officer or by a lower level labor expert.
However, they indicate that it is not unusal for the
locus of decision making to shift in response to politi
cal pressure from one level to another.31
This shifting locus of authority in the decision
structure of government is what the author see as the




In the private arena the bargaining authority is generally
fixed.
Another area of concern for Love and Sulzner is
the problem of making collective bargaining efficient in
government particularly in the absence of considerable
expertise, and lack of a stable locus of decision-making
authority. Although ultimate policymaking authority re
garding labor matters rests with the legislature, collec
tive bargaining according to Love and Sulzner would seem
certain to be inefficient if conducted by that group.
They argue that the legislators usually lack the expertise
and the time needed to devote to this important task.
Thus, they support the move toward professionalizing the
bargaining function in the public sector by hiring a
skilled negotiator or developing skilled negotiators among
existing government staff.32. However, they warn that al
though bargaining may become professionalized, the existence
of a higher authority is a constant temptation to unions
to circumvent the expert negotiators and attempt to deal
directly with elected officials. This attempt to use
32John F. Burton, “Local Government Bargaining and
Management Structure” Industrial Relations 11 (May 1972):
130-131. Burton is in agreement with Love and Sulzner.
He states that “bargaining requires a sophisticated nego
tiator who is aware of the forms and rituals of the bar
gaining process.” He also calls for centralization of
bargaining authority and he warns against superimposing
collective bargaining or prebargaining management structures
because of the problems of fragmentation.
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political pressure on elected officials in order to under
mine the position of the management negotiation is some
times called “end run” lobbying. Love and Sulzner also
warn that if either side is insincere the situation can
easily be exploited. The union can play one element of the
government against the other and government can disclaim
authority and responsibility at all levels.33
Aside from the structural differences between the
public and private sector, major differences, according
to Love and Sulzner, exist in the pressure tactics used
to support bargaining positions. Both sectors utilize the
strike, the threat of strikes, publicity and threats by
management to eliminate jobs or change working conditions.
However the
pressure tactics--lobbying, support for particular
candidates for public office, and control over
patronage- -are either unique to the public sector
or are not very directly related to the bargaining
activities of private labor organizations.34
The authors maintain that a public employee in connection with
a bargaining demand for better wages could engaged in a job
action and lobby at the same time. They argue that only
33Love and Sulzner, pp. 23-27. “End run” lobbying was
coined by Michael H. Moskow, J. Joseph Loewenberg and Edward
C. Koziara in Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
Random House, 1970. They also coined the term “caron” lobbying
which is similar in all respects to “end run” lobbying except
it takes place after tentative agreement has been reached with
the management negotiators.
34Love and Sulzner, pp. 20-21.
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job action would be available to a private sector union
during th€ bargaining period. They axe~not saying that
private sector unions do not engage in politics. From a
political view, since the locus of decision making may
shift during bargaining from one level to another as a
result of political pressure, the public employer could
use this tactic successfully to negotiate a better agree
ment. The author concedes that for reasons that are not
clear the most significant pressure tactic available to
workers is viewed by many as the strike, perhaps because
it is visible and dramatic. However, they argue that
other pressure tactics are available and are more fre
quently used. Such tactics include news conference,
placing advertisements in the media, conducting mass
meetings and strike votes, threatening to strike, re
fusing to abide by the rules and slowing down the pace
of production by strictly adhering to the rules. They
maintain that the issues involved in public sector bar
gaining are usually central to the pub.lic interest and
usually controversial, thus
the publicity generating techniques available
to public labor organizations are likely to
create greater :pressure than they do when used
by private sector unions. This means that there
is a dual system of pressure tactics available
to public employees--political and econmic.35
35Ibid., p. 26.
46
Love and Sulzner are also critical of Wellington
and Winter for giving what they consider to be oblique
recognition to the dual system of pressure tactics avail
able to public employees. They admit that the authors
are indeed at odds with other academicians over the scope
of sanctioned strike activity.36 They do allow the poli
tical system to enter into their considerations. However,
they argue that the major flaw in their presentation is
their view of “political pressure tactics as givens” and
the fact that they see the strike as the major public
policy variable. The authors contend that
this structures the analysis in a manner which
is inconsistent with the existence of a dual
system of pressure tactics. Such an analysis
takes explicit account of the cost of strikes,
but leaves out the cost or gains of lobbying
electioneering. We contend, therefore, that
the public sector analytical model should
treat political pressure tactics as variables
and that efforts should be undertaken to
develop better data on such tactics.37
The scope of collective bargaining has been scruti
nized by Paul F. Gerhart in terms of “real” and formal.”
36Wellington and Winters hold that strikes in the
public sector should be banned until steps are taken to
protect the “normal” political process; They view the
“normal” political process as being pluralistic, which
assums that political power is evenly distributed among
all groups that compete in the political process. Thus,
to allow one group to strike will put the other groups in
the political arena at a competing disadvantage. The
strikers would be allowed to strike and engaged in an
additional method of political pressure denied to other
competing groups. To support this view is to deny the
fact that some groups do indeed enjoy a positional ad
vantage to others in the political process.
37Love and Sulzner, p. 25.
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“Formal” scope involves the issues actually covered by the
agreement and the “real” scope are those issues upon which
there is joint decision making. According to Gerhart,
most of the factors which influence the scope of bargain
ing in the public and private sectors are the same.
These factors are: public policy (legislation pertaining
to unionization); channels of influence and strength of
the union vis-a-vis management. Gerhart, however, main
tains that the application and relative importance of
these concepts in the public sector are definitely at
variance from the private sector. The greatest difference
appears in cities without public policy guidelines. In
these cities the informal channels of influence play a
tremendous role. Gerhart believes the development of
public policy or legislation pertaining to unionization
on the local and state levels probably leads to greater
similarities between the public and private sectors.38
He maintains that unions will always have access to poli
ticians sympathetic to their views in the public sector.
The public union’s acess to these sympathetic ears causes
unions to rely more on informal “politics” or
higher level legislation when formal negoti
ations at the lower level appears less fruit
ful. This independence on legislation will
38Paul F. Gerhart, “The Scope of Bargaining in Local
Government Labor Negotiations,” in Collective Bargaining in
Government, eds. J. Joseph Loewenberg and Michael H. Moskow
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972),
p. 134.
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prevent the scope of bargaining at the local
level from achieving the breath or depth of
the private sector.J9
Clyde W. Summers’ thesis is that public employee
bargaining is a method of governmental decision making
and should be viewed as a political process.4° In the
private sector collective bargaining is a process shaped
primarily by market forces and in the public sector col
lective bargaining is shaped primarily by political
forces. Summers feels that the introduction of collec
tive bargaining into the private sector restructures the
labor market and in the public sector restructures the
political process. He maintains that the choice for the
public employers is
not whether public employee’s wages and other con
ditions of employment are to be decided through
the political process, but how that process
should be structured to make the decision.41
It is true that decisions regarding terms and conditions
of employment, whether they are made unilaterally by govern
ment officials or bilaterally by collective agreement, when
made for public employees are political decisions. Although
collective bargaining requires the development of new struc
tures and procedures in the public sector, the decision
making process remains political. Collective bargaining
39Ibid.
40Clyde W. Summers, “Public Employee Bargaining: A
Political Perspective,” Yale Law Review 88 (May 1974):ll99.
p. 1200.
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is good in the public sector because it provides struc
ture and a forum for rational discussion and accommodation
by competing interests. It allows representative from
government and the employees to make bilateral decisions
regarding working conditions. However, the task to be
accomplished is the restructuring of
not only collective bargaining but also the
other governmental institutions and proce
dures so as to make them all fit together
as an integrated political process.
One example of structural changes alluded to by Summers
would be the need for local governments to develop a pro
cedure which would allow input by union representatives
in the budget-making process to the point where agreement
or impasse is reached. Summers also reminds the researcher
that the public employer is the public, the voters to whom
elected officials are responsible. The public employer is
made up of purchasers and users of city services and is
motivated by economic considerations such as the desire
to maximize services and minimize cost. On the other hand,
the public employees’ interest in higher wages and lighter
workload conflicts with that of his employers’ interest
which is more services and lower taxes. Thus, as in
private employment, the economic interests of the employee
and employer are conflictual.43
43Thid., p. 1159.
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In summary, the bilateral model would restrict the
exercise of management’s prerogative to unilaterally arrive
at decisions regarding wages and working conditions of
employees subject only to the approval of the legislative
branch. Instead, decisions regarding wages and working
conditions of employees would be arrived at bilaterally
by the union and city management in an orderly, rational
manner. Academicians agree that the major difference
between bargaining in the private sector and bargaining
in the public sector is that private sector bargaining
is privaily shaped by market places forces and bargaining
in the public sector is primarily shaped by political
forces.
Multilateral Model
Although decision-making regarding working condi
tions in the public sector are usually determined by the
unilateral or bilateral models, the literature on collec
tive bargaining reveals a third model for decision making,
the multilateral model. Collective bargaining is con
sidered to be multilateral when more than two groups are
involved in the process. Mediation and appeals for re
straints do not constitute multilateral bargaining. Multi
lateral bargaining takes places when additional parties or
groups participate usualy on the fringe of the bargaining.
Kenneth McLennan and Michael H. Moskow, two early
propoents of the multilateral model, point out that
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multilateral bargaining varies among public employment
jurisdictions and among different services within a
jurisdiction. The extent of multilateral bargaining is
dependent upon
the existence of an interest group struc
ture, the scope of the bargaining, the
perceived impact of work stoppage and, to
some extent the bargaining tactics of the
parties .44
When the public places considerable importance on the
quality of service they receive, McLennon and Moskow in
dicate that well-defined interest groups develop. How
ever, in order to influence bargaining, these groups must
be in a position to impose a cost on the other parties
trying to come to an agreement. The authors state that
interest groups are more active in negotiations when the
topic to be negotiated relates to their major goals. It
behooves employer-employee groups to get the support of
the interest group in an effort to garner community sup
port.
The authors’ theoretical model is divided into
three stages: the Initial Probing Stage, the Hard Bar
gaining Stage and the Strike Stage. They view the interest
group activity in the initial probing stage as being con
cerned mostly with the quality of the service. In the
44Kenneth McLennon and Michael H. Moskow, “Multi
lateral Bargaining in the Public Sector,” Industrial
Relations Research Association, Proceedings of the Twenty-
First Winter Meeting (Chicago, Illinois, December 1968),
pp. 32-33.
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case of a conflict between teachers and government, one
of the concerns of the interest group which they feel
might have an impact on the quality of education for
example would be class size. In the hard bargaining
stage the interest group motives begin to shift to con
cern of possible interruption of services. Once the
strike stage begins the interest group activity focus
is generally directed toward ending the work stoppage.45
McLennon and Moskow predict that in the future when gov
ernment officials rely on support from interest groups
in the community to legitimize their position, “col
lective bargaining procedures established are likely to
be transformed from bilateral to a multilateral process.”46
The multilateral model has also been discussed by
Love and Sulzner. They feel if public structures con
sistently favor organized public employees, enormous
pressure could be placed on “shadow parties.” “Shadow
parties” is the term coined by Love and Sulzer to refer
to third party pressure groups who represent workers and
other groups who are not included in the bargaining unit.
By this they mean that these groups may become informally
involved in the bargaining but not sign the agreement. An




organization of principals not included in the bargaining
unit which might be consulted during negotiation between
a teachers’ union and the school board over proposed
change of the transfer rights of teachers. These shadow
parties if pressured, could be provoked into requesting
a more formal role in the collective bargaining process.
Love Sulzner indicate that this “would undoubtedly com
plicate the bargaining process, as well as substantially
change the nature of government itself.”47
The most elaborate of the multilateral models is
presented by Thomas A. Kochan. Kochan presents a be
havorial theory of the bargaining process in city govern
ment. He examined 228 cities that bargain with locals of
the International Association of Fire Fighters to test the
theory empirically. The basic thesis of his model is that
“political and organizational characteristics of city gov
ernment lead to the development of a multilateral bargain
ing process.”48 In other words, collective bargaining in
the public sector often departs from the traditionally
accepted bilateral model as various segments of the leg
islative and the executive branches, and sometimes citizen
47Love and Sulzner, p. 22.
48Thomas Kochan, “A Theory of Multilateral Co1lec-~
tive Bargaining in City Government,” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 27 (July 1974) :526.
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groups, become involved in the process. This is not to
say that the multilateral process does not exist in the
private sector. According to McLennon and Moskow the
bilateral process in the private sector may become multi
lateral. They indicate that the use of the Taft-Hartley
eight day injunction in some instances may have changed
bilateral bargaining to miltilateral bargaining.49
Kochan maintains that multilateral bargaining is
most likely to occur when there is conflict among city
officials involved in the bargaining decision-making,
when management has a weak commitment to collective bar
gaining, when the political activities of the unions are
intense, and when the unions use strike substitutes such
as work slowdowns and picketing.5° According to Kochan,
in order for bargaining to be bilateral, management of
ficials who share in the decision-making process must
act as a single unit “vis a vis” the union. When internal
conflict exists within management, the officials can re
solve their difference or present their interest separately
to the union. When procedures exists which allow all rele
vant decision makers to commit themselves to a common
position, Kochran argues that multilateral bargaining is
less likely to occur. This procedure, which allows the
49McLennon and Moskow, p. 33.
50Kochan, pp. 525-542.
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decision makers~ to develop a position concerning the
procedural and substantive issues related to bargaining
before the bargaining process is begun, is referred to
by Hildebrand as the process of obtaining a “family under
standing.” When this coalesced position is not arrived
at, internal differences are carried into the bargain
arena. It is at this juncture that the conditions for
multilateral bargaining have been fulfilled. Typically
you can expect one faction of management to be favorable
to the unions’ demands or they may support a position
which is counter to the union and to the designated
management negotiators 51
Kochan also maintains that when management has
weak commitment to collective bargaining, multilateral
bargaining is more likely to occur. Although most cities
have developed channels through which bilateral negoti
ations are to take place, this does not mean that all
city officials will be equally committed to using these
channels. Kochan agrees with Hildebrand when he suggests
that the major reason for this aversion is that many
elected officials are faced with role conflicts when
they are confronted with the task of representing their
constituents’ interest and acting as a member of the
management team negotiating with, a union. Kochan also
51-Ibid., pp. 528-530.
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indicates th.at the introduction of collective bargaining
into government or any organization requires some shifting
of the locus of decision-making which always bring about
resistance.52
According to Kochan, political pressure tactics by
unions can also produce situations of multilateral bar
gaining. Unions may induce government officials, whom
they believe to have interests similar to their own, to
actively represent their position in the management
policy-making process. Unions need ready or easy access
to city officials in order to apply political pressure.
The most common way of gaining such access to politicians
is to be instrumental in putting and keeping them in
office. Hence, Kochan maintains that the more the local
union is involved in the municipal electoral process and
the greater its access to city officials, the more likely
it is that multilateral bargaining will occur. Another
concern of Kochan is the effect of pressure applied by
unions when an impasse is reached in negotiations. Some
of the tactics used are in the form of slowdowns and
sickouts. Kochan states that the ~pressure to assume
their role as political leaders motivates city officials
to respond by becoming active participants in bargaining
when a visible impasse is reached in negotiations.” This
p. 529.
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takes place despite the fact that other channels may have
been set to deal with the impasse.53
The literature on decision-making in labor relations
indicates that the bargaining process whether it is uni
lateral, bilateral or multilateral, is reflective of the
nature of the relationship that exists between or among
the varied groups involved in the bargaining issues. A
major participant in decision-making in the public sector
is the mayor. This is particularly true or the mayor-
council form of government. Whether decisions are arrived
at unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, the process
is influenced by the top administrator’s agenda setting
policy.
Agenda setting is simply the process used to de
termine what is going to be done. In the case of mayors,
John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence state that the agenda
setting behavior may vary along one continuum. The agenda
setting process at one end of the continuum may be “reac
tive, short-run oriented, individual, or part-oriented,
continuous and sometime ‘irrationally’ unconnected.”54
This description is very much akin to the “muddling
through” model of decision-making described by Charles
53Thid., p. 530-531.
54John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, Mayors in
Action, (New York: John Wiley and Son, 1974), p. 49.
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Lindblom and David Braybrooke. Lindbloin and Braybrooke’s
definition of the disjointed-incremental process of de
cision making called “muddling through” is as follows:
It is decision making through small or incre
mental moves or particular problems rather
than through a comprehensive reform program.
It is also endless; it takes on the form of
an indefinite sequence of policy moves.
Moreover, it is exploratory in that the goals
of policy-making continue to change as new
experience with policy throws new light on
what is possible and desirable. In this sense,
it is also better described as moving away from
known social ills rather than moving toward a
known and relatively stable goal.SS
Kotter and Lawrence contend that at the other end of the
spectrum or continuum the agenda setting process is “pro
active, middle to long range oriented, city-wide or
holistic oriented, periodic and logically interconnected.”56
This agenda setting process is said to be rational-deductive
planning. The authors determined that a mayor who uses the
muddler model follows a number one agenda setting process by
concentrating on short-term goals and reacting to crises.
By contrast, a number two agenda setting process tended to
focus less on daily kinds of activities and more on monthly
and yearly activities. Concentration however, is usually
focused on projects that can be completed within a month
to a few years at most. The number three agenda setting
55David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A
Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963, 1970),
p. 107.
56Kotter and Lawrence, p. 58.
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process goes further in the direction o~ proactive, long-
run, holistic, logically interconnected processes. Hence,
this type of agenda setting process does not eliminate
short run agendas. The number four agenda setting process
is the other extreme of the continuum previously mentioned.
Kotter and Lawrence, in their study on mayoral behavior
found no one to fit this pattern.57
In order to evaluate the actions of the three mayors
which have helped to shape and determine the kind of re
lationship that has existed from 1966-1976 between the
city of Atlanta and the unions, the Kotter-Lawrence models
of agenda setting will be utilized.
No-Strike Model v. Strike Model
Another area of concern expressed in public employee-
management labor relations literature is whether public
employees should or should not be allowed to strike. George
W. Taylor, a well known arbitration and labor relations
expert and the 1966 chairman of the New York State Gover
nor’s Committee on Public Employee Relations, expresses
the intent of the no-strike model in his declaration that
“Strikes are not the answer, new procedures are.tt58
Wellington and Winters vehemently support the no
strike model. They believe that if unions in the public
57mid., p. 50-51.
58George W. Taylor, “Public Employment: Strikes
or Procedures,t’ Industrial Labor Relations Review 30
(July l967):636j
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sector are able to withhold labor, as well as to employ
the usual methods of political pressures, they may indeed
possess a disproportionate share of effective power in
the process of decision-making. The authors are also at
odds with John F. Burton and Charles Krider’s view of
essential services and their strike model. Education is
considered to be a non-essential service according to
the Burton-Krider strike model. However, Winters and
Wellington view a service to be essential in terms of
the extent to which the deprivation of the service in
conveniences the voters. For example, they argue that
a teacher strike may not endanger public health or wel
fare; however, it may seriously inconvenience parents
and other citizens., who as voters, have the power to
“punish one of the parties--and always the same party,
the political leadership to the dispute.”59
In summary, Wellington and Winters maintain that
in the cities, counties and states there are other
parties with needs as pressing as those of public em
ployees.
Such claimants can never have the power the
unions will win if we mindlessly import into
the public sector all the collective bargaining
practices developed in the private sector.
59Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
More on Strikes by Public Employees,” in Collective
Bargaining in Government, eds., J. Joseph Loewenberg and
Michael H. Moskow (Englewood.Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 290.
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Make no mistake about it government is not
“just another industry.”~O
George H. Hildebrand also supports the No-Strike
Model. He believes that the banning of strikes in the
public sector does not remove the possibility of disputes.
Therefore, mechanisms should be devised by which disputes
can be solved. Hildebrand recommends “Fact-Finding with
Recommendations” as the technique that should be used to
avoid a strike once an impasses has been reached in the
negotiations. Fact finding is a means of airing the basic
issues. Fact finding with recommendations is a “way to
redirect the pressure of opinion while providing LTaw
makers withf the guidance they need.. ,,6l Hildebrand
also considers fact finding with recommendation to be
desirable because it allows lawmakers to remain respon
sible and accountable for the final decision which is
“in keeping with the principles of representative demo
cracy. “62
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela
tions Report also adamantly opposed the strike model.
However, it does provide many other methods for solving
disputes than the Hildebrand proposal. The Commission
states:





To condone strikes is to facilitate disruption
of essential public services which ultimately
could bring government to a standstill. To
condone strikes is to sanction putting the
government employer. . . at the mercy of his or
ganized workers. To condone strikes is to
permit undermining the authority of government
at a time when a growing majority of the
American electorate feels that the symbols of
government authority--4f not the substance--
are tattered and in need of mending. To con
done government employee strikes is in the
final analysis, to reduce government to the
level of just another corporate unit within
our pluralistic society, and this is not con
ducive to a meaningful assessment of the nature,
purpose, and basic functions of gov~rnment in a
democratic, representative system. 6i
Responding to those who argue that in the area of strikes
the experience of the private sector is wholly relevant,
the Commission argues that bans on strikes do not make
public employers “second-class citizens.” The bans simply
recognize the T’unique character and mission of the govern
ment.’t Meaningful dialogue is not produced by threat of
strikes but rather is based upon procedures which effec
tively guide labor-management talks and produce peaceful
resolutions of disputes. The Commission recommends that
State labor relations laws provide for an “arsenal of
weapons” such as mediation, fact-finding and advisory
arbitration in order to avoid deadlocks. The “procedural
mechanisms and strike are different means of acquiring
the same ends, and the Commission is opposed to the latter.
63Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela
tions, p. 97.
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The ends are improvement of terms and conditions of em
ployment t’64
The Commission also took issue with the question
of a limited right to strike for “nonessential employees,”
by arguing that “objective criteria to determine the oc
cupational categories which are “essential” and “non
essential” would be difficult to develop and next to
impossible to implement. How would one go about speci
fying the conditions by which an occupation is “non
essentialt’ and determining how long a strike by such
employees could be tolerated? Another consideration is
the “adverse psychological impact an employing agency
would create when it tells certain groups of its employees
that since they are nonessential they may strike.”65
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Labor
Disputes in Public Employment was divided on the question
of the strike. Some members felt that there should be a
blanket prohibitionwritten into law barring strikes of
any kind by public employees. According to this group,
employees of the government had committed themselves to
government services which should not be interrupted be
cause of their dissatisfaction with working conditions.
Moreover, to permit public employees to strike and dis




government. In this regard, those persons opposed to the
strike weapon believed alternatives to the strike should
be used to solve disputes. Suggested alternatives were:
the solving of disputes by negotiations, mediation and
fact-finding. This group supported the use of prohibitive
penalties to discourage strikes.66
Those members of the Commission sympathetic to the
strike model maintain the following:
Equity and fairness require that public em
ployees have the opportunity to strike when
the government authority with decision-making
power refuses to accept the recommendations
for settling a dispute that have been made by
fact-finders. 67
If public employees strike after fact-finding recommenda
tions have been rejected by the employer, then a strike
can occur and the courts would decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the strike has created an emergency and
whether it should be enjoined. Penalities would be meted
out if the injunction was defied.68
Raymond Horton maintains that arbitration which
has been suggested as the solution to prevent strikes may
be less objective than is generally assumed. In point of
66Report and Recommendations of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Em
ployment, Pickets at City Hall (New York: Twentieth




fact, arbitrators are “political actors.” The arbitration
profession is dominated by lawyers who are seldom trained
in economic analysis which is often a requirement in in
terest arbitration cases. In order to meet these problems,
Horton recommends limiting the use of interest arbitration
in the public sector. He advocates the proscription of
strikes by firemen, policemen and other public employees
who are subject to the injunction process in emergency
situations. In these cases his proscription is that “in
terest arbitration be provided as a final step in the
impasse process.”69 However, in situations where there
are no threats to health or safety, “public employees
should be permitted to strike and impasse procedures short
of binding arbitration, such as mediation, may be de
sirable. “70
Sterling D. Spero firmly believes that the slogan
“one cannot strike against the government” should be
questioned. It is not logical for the government to
guarantee the right to strike to certain workers who are
private employees and deny it to public employees.
If it is not the convenience and welfare of
the community but the continuous functioning
of the public services which justifies anti-
strike policy for public employees then it
should be noted that strikes by private
69Raymond D. Horton, “Arbitration, Arbitrators, and
the Public Interest,” Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 28 (July l975):507.
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utility or transport workers could inter
fere with theoperations of government as
directly as strikes by government employees.7
However, Spero does not view the strike as the most signif
cant weapon in the American public service. The most ef—
fective substitute for the strike in government service
is the use of political power by employees.72
Jack Stieber’s strike model supports the use of
mediation and fact-finding. However when these procedures
have failed, the strike can be implemented.
Too often the strike in public employment
has been treated as an unmitigated evil to
be exorcised rather than the symptom of a
malady which needs treatment.7-~
In regard to the “essential services” dispute,
Stieber believes that the
essential service argument is indisputable
with respect to policemen, firemen and
prison guards. However the question of
what other services are “essential” runs
into a problem. 74
Stieber quotes a statement made by Professor Myron Liberman:
Schools are closed for summer, Christmas,
Easter, and Thanksgiving vacation, for
7~-Ster1ing D. Spero, “Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment: Form and Scope,” p. 4.
73Jack Stieber, “Collective Bargaining in the Public
Sector,” in Challenges to Collective Bargaining, ed.,
Lloyd Ulman (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1967), p. 80.
74mia., p. 81-82.
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football games, basketball tournaments,
harvesting, teachers’ conventions, in
clement weather. . . and for a host of other
reasons without anyone getting excited
over the harm done to children. 75
I.f this is true, Stieber argues, why not for strikes to
protest teacher grievances or to achieve legitimate de
mands in collective bargaining. He fails to indicate
that the aforementioned school closings are always short
term and time bound. This obviously would not be true
for a teacher strike which in some cities have lasted
for months. Stieber feels that there are too many dif
ferences in opinions in terms of essentials with regard
to garbage collection, water works, public utilities,
hospitals and other government services. Therefore, he
concludes that the best way to put the argument to rest
would be for a “few states to prohibit strikes in certain
specified ‘essential’ services, but not in others.”76
Thus he fails to indicate specifically who will decide
what criterion should be used to determine essential and
nonessential services.
Summary
Despite the dispute over whether collective bar




place, most states have followed the direction of the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and
established relevant statutes in order to bring a sem
blance of order to the seeming chaos in their labor-
management relations. Hopefully, those states like
Georgia that cling to the unilateral theory of decision
making will choose to enter the twentieth century.
In regard to strikes by public employees, there
is still strong public support for the non-strike model.
Scholars are still at odds regarding the issue. Never
theless, an increasing number of strikes are taking place
without benefit of legal authorization and with minimal
penalties. This may possibly indicate a developing
public tolerance for strikes or a greater disrespect for
the law. In 1970 states like Hawaii and Pennsylvania
enacted statutes which allow certain public employees to
strike. Whether this will be a trend or not will depend
upon whether the legal strike provisions prove to be
disastrous. If they do not, it may be reasonable to
expect expansion of the right of certain employees to
strike after impasse procedures have been exhausted.
Moreover, the status of collective bargaining in
the public sector is also dependent upon the methods of
raising revenue. The American taxpayer is about to
revolt, The case of New York City, and the belief by
many that part of its financial crisis was brought about
69
by unreasonable union demands, will probably be used by
many public dfficials in the future to deny public em
ployee unions certain benefits. In all certainty, the
health of the economy will determine the progress of
collective bargaining in the public sector.
The research in the following chapters addresses
the questions posed in the introduction by analyzing the
decision-making models used by the various Atlanta admin
istrations between 1966-1976 to deal with their employee-
management labor relations. Since Georgia has not adopted
a legal model which would make for an orderly approach to
labor relations, the Atlanta policy of decision-making
could be expected to focus on the traditional or unilat
eral model. However, due to the nature of the relation
ship over the years with public employee unions, at times
aspects of the bilateral and multilateral methods of
arriving at decisions will be used.
CHAPTER II
THE IVAN ALLEN, JR. ADMINISTRATION
1966—1969
Ivan Allen, Jr. served Atlanta as mayor from 1962—
1969. However, his involvement in politics began as early
as 1936 when he campaigned for the election of Ed Rivers
as Governor of Georgia and became treasurer of the State
Hospital Authority. Born the only son of a successful
Atlanta businessman, he became president of his father’s
company, Ivan Allen Office Equipment Company, and by
1960 was considered a “typical member of the Atlanta
establishment.”1 Politics in the city was dominated by
businessmen and the view that in Atlanta “men of inde
pendent decision’ are few and, almost without exception
businessmen,!’ was becoming an accepted interpretation of
Atlanta politics. Thus it was by design that the Allen
administration sought to carry out programs that he de
veloped when he was Vice-President of Atlanta Chamber of
Couirnerce from 1959-1960. The program was based on six
points: expansion of the expresswway system; urban
1John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, Mayors in
Action (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp.l43-lLi4,
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renewal; the construction of an auditorium-coliseum and
a stadium; planning of a large-scale rapid-transit sys
tem; keeping the public schools open and “Forward Atlanta,”
a program which was initiated to spread the story of
Atlanta to the nation.2 Despite th.is grand design, the
Administration had to face the unexpected racial strife
which struck most cities during this era, as well as
labor problems involving municipal employees.
In their analysis of mayors, Kotter and Lawrence
found Ivan Allen to be a mayor with a number three agenda
setting process, meaning that he engaged in long-range,
holistic planning. However, their analysis does not
consider Allents labor relations policy which was crisis
oriented and involved short-range planning. His policy
in this area actually fits Lindblom’s “muddling throughT’
model.3 Allen has stated that labor relations were not
among his priorities. In his book, Mayor! Notes on the
Sixties, Allen chronicles the events of his Administra
tion, and scant attention is given to labor matters.
His only reference to labor is included in a paragraph
that he casually refers to the 1966 firefighters strike.4
2Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), quoted
in Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics
(New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 273.
3Kotter and Lawrence, pp. 143-174.
4lbid.
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In spite of the low priority given to labor, Allen and
members of his Administration had opinions about public
unionism. They dealt with three strikes by municipal
employees between 1966 and 1968, and participated in
discussions with the unionized employees regarding wages
and working conditions.5
Allen has expressed the view that he was, and is,
a Ttstrong supporter of collective bargaining. . . it is a
genuine right and a protected right.”6 However, during
his Administration, he did not initiate legislation
which would set up guidelines for an orderly bargaining
procedure with the union. Instead he engaged in what
John F. Burton, Jr. considered to be a common initial
response made by most local governments to public union
ism. He simply imposed “a system of collective bargaining
on the existing structure of authority with little or nor
modifications.”7 This thesis will be further developed
elsewhere in the chapter.
The Administration also expressed strong views about
which city employees had the right to strike. According
to Allen:
Protective forces of a city have to accept
an obiligation in which they sacrifice certain
5lvan Allen, Jr. and Paul Hemphill, Mayor: Notes on
the Sixties (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 180.
6lnterview with Ivan Allen, Jr., Former Mayor of
Atlanta, Georgia, 25 January 1977.
7John Burton, “Local Government Bargaining and Man
agement Structure,” Industrial Relations 11 May 1972, p~ 128.
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personal rights in order to sustain that
position, definitely they have to give up
the right to strike..8
Allen was specifically referring to the firemen and the
police. His views reflect those expressed in labor re
lations literature that fire and police services are
essential and persons engaged in providing these services
should not be allowed to strike. These views underlay
Allen’s labor relations policy.
In a 1968 speech at a meeting of the Directors of
Personnel, in Jacksonville, Florida, Carl T. Sutherland,
longtime Director of Personnel for Atlanta, presented
the view of the city regarding labor matters. He noted
this was a day of organization.
Because Atlanta’s relations with its organized
employees for the most most part have been so
satisfactory, and since the unions already
have most of the benefits for which they
customarily strike, many of which are locked
in by our Civil Service Law, we have not felt
the need for formal bargaining procedure.9
Essentially, his message was that the city officials of
Atlanta listen to and welcome the recommendations of the
“enlightened” union leadership. 10
8lvan Allen Interview.
9Carl T. S~itherland, “Public Employee Labor Relations,”
Paper presented at the Directors of Personnel Meeting,





AFSCME has existed as an organization in Atlanta
since 1936. In August 1936, a temporary charter was
granted to a small group of city employees. This group
was chartered as Local No. 1117 of Government Employees,
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. In
October 1936, the American Federation of Labor set up an
international union known as the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, and this local
came under their jurisdiction. Local No. 1117 was re
chartered as the Atlanta City Employees Local No. 4•hi
By 1966, AFSCME had several locals which represented
city employees. According to an intraunion memorandum
the names and the jurisdictions of Atlanta Employee
groups were as follows:
LOCAL 4
NAME: Atlanta, Georgia, City Employees, Local 4
JURISDICTION: All those employees of the City of Atlanta,
Georgia in the following city departments:
City Hall, Auditorium, Library, Aviation,
Building Inspection, Personnel, Planning,
Pensions, City Clerk, Tax Assessor, and
Traffic Court, except those within the
jurisdiction of Locals 20 and 359.
LOCAL 20
NAME: Atlanta and Fulton Counties, Georgia; BoardsT of
Education Employees, Local 20
11Facts about Atlanta City Employees Local No. 4.
(Atlanta, Georgia, 1941), AFS~ME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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JURISDICTION: All non-instructional employees of the
Boards’ of Education in Atlanta and
Fulton County, Georgia.
LOCAL 359
NAME: Greater Atlanta, Georgia, Metropolitan Area Water
Department Employees, Local 359
JURISDICTION: All Water Department employees in Fulton
DeKaib, Cobb, Clayton and Gwinnett Counties,
Georgia, except those employees within the
jurisdiction of Local 1376.12
LOCAL 797
NAME: Greater Atlanta, Georgia, Metropolitan Hospital
Employees Local 797
JURISDICTION: All hospital employees in Fulton, DeKalb,
Cobb, Clayton and Gwinnett Counties, Georgia.
Notwithstanding, only three of these, Locals 4, 850 and
359, were directly affiliated with the city. In November
1968, AFSCME reorganized and Locals 850, 359 and 797 became
Local 1644. Local 1644 was divided into three Chapters:
Grady Memorial Hospital Employees; Atlanta/Fulton County
Boards of Education; and Atlanta Maintenance, Sanitation and
Water Department Employees. Local 4, composed of employees
in City Hall, remained independent.
The International Association of Fire Fighters Local
134 received its charter in 1918.13 Since that time it
12”Clarification of Names and Jurisdiction of Atlanta,
Georgia Area Local Unions and Council,” June 1966, AFSCME
Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
13lnterview with William Hunter, President of IAFF
Local 134, Atlanta, Georgia, 22 March 1977.
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has continuously represented those members of the city’s
Fire Department who choose to be members.
The Allen administration never questioned the right
of city employees to join the union. It was a policy
dating back for decades and each Administration continued
some kind of relationship with organized labor. According
to Carl T. Sutherland, Director of Personnel 1939-1970,
the relationship could usually be described as one of
“mutual respect.”1-4 In spite of the fact that there was
no formal policy, within the Fire Department it was in
formally assumed that union membership was available to
firemen between the ranks of private and captain. It was
generally accepted that AFSCME could represent all other
city employees except supervisors and above, and police.
Despite the “common law,” there were examples of people
being promoted to supervisory positions who were allowed
to continue their union membership because the city’s
“policy” was not enforced. 15
Dues Checkoff
In order for a union to build a financial base,
dues checkoff is necessary. Dues checkoff is considered
to be the life blood of a union. Never before nor during
14lnterview with Carl T. Sutherland, Former Director
of Personnel, Atlanta, Georgia, 31 January 1977.
~-5Interview tih Carl Paul, Peput~y Director of Per
sonnel, Atlanta, Georgia, 5 April 1977. Most of these persons
were members of the union bebore they were promoted to
supervisory positions.
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the Ivan Allen, Jr. administration had IAFF Local 134
asked for dues checkoff. Local 134 members were appar
ently satisfied to pay their dues by hand monthly to
station captains when house dues were collected.’6
AFSCIYIE had requested and received dues checkoff in an
ordinance passed by the Board of Aldermen March 18,
1959, and the ordinance continued in effect throughout
the period of the Allen administration. The ordinance
was very general. It simply authorized th.e city comp
troller to deduct from the salaries and wages of each
city employee such sums as may be authorized by the
employee to cover monthly dues of the Atlanta Federation
of City, State, County and Municipal Employees1 local
unions. 17 This. was the general procedure as spelled
out in the ordinance. There were no stated restrictions
as to who could request checkoff it was simply limited
to AFSCME members.
Representative Status
The city had no procedure for certifying or selecting
unions. Nor were there any formal procedures for recog
nizing a particular group. The city’s position under
16Hunter Interview.
1-7Atlanta, Georgia, “An Ordfr~ance Authorizing the
Comptroller to Deduct from the Salaries or Wages of Each
City Employee Such Sums as May Be Authorized by Such
Employees to Cover Monthly Dues of the AFSCME Locals to
Pay the Sum So Deducted Over to the Treasury of the Coun
cil of City Employees’ Local Unions,” (18 March 1959).
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Ivan Allen was that it was always willing to talk to any
group which claimed to represent employees or talk to any
individual who had a problem.18 Thus in the case of
firemen the only procedure used to arrive at informal
recognition of a particular union was a claim by that
union to represent the firemen. This was evidenced in
the Allen administration by the relationship which
developed between the city and the rival fire fighters
union, Local I Atlanta Fire Fighters Independent.
Other than the dues checkoff ordinance and authori
zation cards signed by AFSCME members which allowed dues
deduction, no other formal procedure between AFSCME and
the city existed. On June 15, 1966, Joseph Jacobs, at
torney for District Council 14, AFSCME, informed Mayor
Allen in a letter dated June 15, 1966, of the union’s
desire for a collective bargaining agreement. The Council
requested that the city appoint an “authorized committee
to commence bargaining sessions with the District Council
14 of AFSCME as early as possible.”3-9 The letter refers
to the relationship between the city and the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees of
over a twenty year period as “pleasant” but stated there
were “problems” yet to be solved. This”problem” was the
3-8lvan Allen Interview.
19Joseph Jacobs to Ivan Allen, Jr., 15 June 1966,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia
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desire of the union to develop a “contractual relationship”
with the city.
A city the size of Atlanta no longer can
afford to resolve differences which might
arise between the city and its employees
without developing and orderly procedure
that would be spelled out in a collective
bargaining agreement. 20
The Mayor responded to Joseph Jacobs’ request in a
letter dated June 29, 1966. The Mayor indicated that he
had been with the city the entire twenty years referred
to in the letter, and noted that the union had “had a
pleasant relationship with the city for a long time.”21
The Mayor also stated that the
resolving of differences between the city
and its employees has been difficult in
the past. The Mayor and Board of Aldermen
have always been sympathetic to the salary
needs of city employee benefits.22
The Mayor then reaffirmed the city’s position which implied
a willingness, on his part, to preserve the existing sys
tem and avoid innovation and change: “We shall be pleased
to continue to work as we have in the past with AFSC & ME,
L~i~J AFL-CI0.”23 As a result of the persistent agitation
21Ivan Allen, Jr. to Joseph Jacobs, 29 June 1966,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
22 i d.
80
by AFSCME officials and Joseph Jacobs, AFSCME’s attorney,
the city issued a statement regarding the status of the
Union. Carl T. Sutherland on August 19, 1966, said that
he had received the permission of the Personnel Board to
issue the following statement relating to the union which
the union was “privileged to use in any way” it saw fit.
The city of Atlanta Personnel Board has dealt
with representatives of the American Federa
tion of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO, for more than 27 years.
This Union through its local unions represents
employees throughout the City government. In
their efforts in behalf of City employees they
never have sou~jt benefits for their members
alone but always have worked for the welfare
of all City employees.
The relationship between the Personnel Board
and this union always has been maintained at
a high level. The Board will continue to
recognize this Union and its affiliated local
unions as representatives of City employees,
exclusive of firemen and policemen.24
AFSCME interpreted this declaration as a formal recognition
because it was in written form and it stated that the Union
was recognized as a representative of city employees. None
theless, the city interpreted its policy to be one of in
formal recognition because no contractual or binding agree
ment existed between the two parties. The city also con
tended that is relationship was informal because it gave
24Carl T. Sutherland to Joseph Jacobs, 19 August 1966,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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all employee organizations or groups the right to consult
with mangement regarding the terms and conditions of em
ployment.
Collective Bargaining and Formal Administrative
Machinery IAFF
The mechanisms used by the city to deal with labor
problems in the Fire Department could best be described
as ancient. Before 1969, firemen were not privy to griev
ance procedure. Unilateral decision making without labor
or employee input was standard procedure. A rank and file
fireman was supposed to take his grievance to the captain
in command of his station. If he found no relief there,
hr could appeal to his batallion chief. If no satisfac
tion was available at that level, he could petition for a
redress of his grievances to the Chief of the Fire Depart
ment. The last step involved an appeal to the Aldermanic
Board of Firemasters which set policy for the Fire Depart
ment.25 If a fireman was dissatisfied with the Board of
Firemaster’s decision, he could appeal through the court
system. This procedure appears on the surface to be
workable and functional. Nevertheless, it posed problems
for the firemen who were supposed to utilize it because
the procedure was not put in writing. Those who were
aware of the procedure were prevented from following it
25lnterview with Chief James I. Gibson, Atlanta Fire
Department,Atlanta Georgia, 8 February 1977. See also
Hunter Interview.
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because of both fear of the supervisors26 and racial dis
crimination which was practiced by most white firemen and
officers toward Black firemen.27
The Allen administration’s position was that labor
matters should be solved at the department level. But in
practice the locus of authority constantly shifted from
one committee to another. The procedures used did not
allow for the development of a holistic labor policy be
cause of fragmentation in authority. No one person or
group was responsible for labor matters. The non-financial
labor—related matters in the Fire Department were to be
handled by the Aldermanjc Board of Firemasters, while
financial concerns were to be handled by the Aldermanic
Finance Committee. Hence, the decisions regarding firemen
in terms of working conditions and wages were made by the
Department, the Appropriate Aldermanic Committee and, if
ordinances were necessary, by the Board of Aldermen and
the Mayor. As part of the ongoing process, Local 134 IAFF
was allowed to make suggestions and present formal pro
posals (See Table 1).
Between 1966 and 1969, the relationship between Local
134 and the city can be characterized as follows: the
local was loyal to the city and the city was paternalistic
26lnterview with an Atlanta fireman, Atlanta, Georgia,
8 February 1977.
27lnterview with William Hamer, Atlanta Fireman and















toward the local. The basis for the nature of this re
lationship is grounded in the 1966 stikes involving the
firefighters and discrimination within the department
toward Black firemen. 28
In 1966 the firefighters went on strike in June
and September. In both instances one hundred or more of
the men (25 percent of the membership) in Local 134 re
mained on their jobs. The strikes caused a grave split
in the firemen’s ranks and local 134 almost disentegrated.
To this extent, the unions close relationship with Chief
28Chief Gibson Interview.
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Hildebrand and later Chief P. 0. Williams could probably
be attributed the Union’s weakness as well as its need
to Survive.
From 1967 to 1969, the Local requested increases
in wages and restoration of “senority rights” lost in
the September 1966 strike. They never broached the sub
ject of grievance procedure which the more viable unions
were requesting. This demand was left to the Black fire
men who had virtually been excluded from membership in
Local 134 and had formed their own organization, the
Brothers Combined Social Club.29 In 1969 the Black fire
men began to push for changes in the department.
In 1969 the Fire Department was charged with dis
crimination in its operation and promotion practices.
The Black firemen made this charge and their grievances
were presented to the Board of Firemasters by the Reverend
Sam Williams, Chairman of the City’s Community Relations
Commission.3° Their stated grievances were:
1. There are no black officers in the Fire
Department.
2. Discrimination has been practiced in the
selection of black drivers.
3. The hiring practices show discrimination
against Negroes.
4. Sleeping accommodations in the Fire Stations
are being maintained on a segregated basis.
5. Various Captains are enforcing different
rules at some of the Fire Stations for
Negro Firemen as against white Firemen.
29Hamer Interview.
30Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 12 May
1969. (Typewritten.)
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6. Some Captains are complaining about per
sonal appearance such as uniforms and
Afro-American haircuts.
7. Negroes are being denied membership in the
recreation club.
8. Discrimination is being practiced in pro
motion. 31
The first or immediate reaction by the Fire Depart
ment to these grievances was the introduction of a “sug
gestion” form which Chief P. 0. Williams began to dissemi
nate with the approval of the Board of Firemasters. This
form was circulated throughout the Fire Department in
order to provide an avenue of communication directly to
the chief from the employees on “worthwhile matters.”32
Simultaneously, Chief Williams informed the Board of
Firemasters that he had personally looked into each
grievance and found no justifications for the complaint.
However, he would continue to give special attention to
the issues raised despite the fact that the organization
was supposed to be dedicated to the improvement of working
conditions for all firemen.33
Although Chief Williams had earlier denied any dis
crimination, in a letter to Mayor Allen dated August 15,
1969, he conceded the fact that he had been dealing with
the Community Relations Council and had “accepted some of
32Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of




their suggestions relative to eliminating some problenis.”34
It is evident that he was also attempted to smooth things
over by making superficial changes when he stated:
We are in the process of re-writing the Rules
and Regulatio~5 of the Atlanta Fire Department
to eliminate any Possibility of discrimination
or the Possibility of any officer over-reacting
with authority.. . We would like to stress that
any fireman who has grievances, has three methods
by which to air them in this office: by com
pleting a Form 52 (Special Request), go through
the Company Officers and Battalion Chief or by
use of a SuggestiOn Form available in all sta
tions. Any justifiable grievance will be
straightened out. 35
Notwithstanding the lack of support from organized
labor in the Fire Department and the cosmetic changes in
stituted by Chief Williams, the Brothers Combined organi
zation continued to press for substantive change with
legal assistance. At the September 29, 1969, Board of
Firemasters meeting, the attorney and spokesman for the
Brothers Combined Social Club appealed to the Board to
accede to an impartial investigation of the charges of
discrimination within the Fire Department. The Board
members present were: W. T. Knight, Q. V. Williamson
and Cecil Turner. A motion made by Q. V. Williamson and
seconded by W. T. Knight, to take certain steps regarding
34P. 0. Williams to Ivan Allen, Jr., 15 August




the aforementioned grievances, was unanimously adopted
by the members present (Jack Summers, the absent member
of the Board, concurred later). The agreed upon proce
dures were:
1. /Th~eT promotions L~houl~J be deffered.
2. 7Th~7 adoption of anew set of Rules and
Regulations Lshould/ be deferred —
3. LTh~i Community Relations Council Lshoul~T
be requested to make a thorough investigation
of all complaints of the black Firemen and
present their findings to the Board of Fire-
masters for their consideration and action.36
On December 29, 1969, Reverend Samuel Williamson
presented to the Board the Community Relations Commission
Report, The Grievances of Black Firemen. The Board ac
cepted the report and passed it on the new Board of
Firemasters (1970) for implementation. Among the Com
mission’s findings and recommendations were the following:
The Department was making progress in the recruitment of
black firemen; however, these efforts needed to be “sub
stantially increased” (emphasis is by the Commission).
The Department had 234 white officers; however, the city
was in critical need of Black officers. The Commission
discovered that in 1968 certain white firemen were per
mitted to attend special school for officers and had
access to information not available to other firemen.
or these reasons the Commission recommended that “the
present registry be discared and there be no other firemen
~Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Deprtment, Minutes of Meetings
of the Firemasters, meeting of 29 September 1969. (Typewritten.)
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~ from the present registry!? (emphasis is by the
Commission) Moreover, personal indignities directed
toward black firemen and segregated sleeping arrangements
should cease and all department personnel should attend
a course in human relations Black firemen should also
be assigned in pairs, as a minimum, to each shift to pre
vent isolation treatment In order to achieve some func
tional means by which firemen can express their concerns,
a seven person grievance committee should be set up com
posed of three white and three black firemen and a seventh
disinterested party from outside the department.37
In an attempt to solve the grievance procedure prob
lem in house, Chief Gibson hurriedly initiated and issued
a Preliminary procedure in an attempt to form a Grievance
Committee which was reported to the Commision October 28.
Chief Gibson, when testifying before the Commission,
stated:
we are moving to set up a grievance committee,
and this committee will be composed of all our
people, and we are going to give the black
firemen representatives on this grievance com
mittee whereby anybody who has a grievance can
come by and let this grievance be known, and
something will be done.38 (See Appendix A).
These efforts were not considered adequate. In early 1970,
as a direct result of the Brothers Combined agitation, a
37Community Relations Commission, “Rt on the
Grievances of Black Firemen, Atlanta, Georgia, December
1969. (Mimeographed.)
38Ibid See Appendix A for the Fire Department’s
attempt to develop a procedure.
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Grievance Procedure was implemented in the Fire Depart
ment (See Appendix B). The procedure was modeled after
the suggestions of the Commission. Hence, the process
was unilaterally drawn up by officials in the Fire Depart
ment, without input from Local 134 or Brothers Combined.
The Commission had played the role of the third party in
the multilateral discussion, and had succeeded in placing
pressure on the Administration to initiate change. The
Administration was obviously split on the question of
discrimination in the department with the mayor and the
majority of the Board of Firemasters supportive of change
while the Chief of the Fire Department at first argued
that the grievances were not justified. According to
Kochan.~ and Hildebrarid, when management has not coalesced
or developed a “family understanding” on the issue at
hand, it is possible for multilateral discussions to
develop.39 This was certainly applicable to the alleged
discrimination in the Fire Department.
Local 134, still in shambles and clinging to racist
practices, made no comments about the grievance procedure
despite the fact that it signalled a significant improve
ment in working conditions. An example of the Local’.s
39Thomas A. Kochan, “A Theory of Multilateral Col
lective Bargaining in City Government,” Industrial Labor
Relations Review 27 (July l974):528-530.
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attitude is exemplified by its actions at the Board of
Firemasters! meeting on Decen~ber 19, 1969, when the
Co~is~jo~ announced its report Local 134 presented
what it considered to be a vital resolution Which re
quested that a Position of chaplain be created in the
Atlanta Fire Department. This request was granted with
out fanfare4O
In addition to wage increases, Local 134 also pushed
for the restoration of ‘tHouse Seniority Rights.”41 House
seniority was lost by those who were rehired after the
September 1966 strike. Firemen hired during the strike,
many of them Black, had more seniority after the strike
than strikers who were rehired despite the fact that some
had been with the department for twenty years. This
anomaly became a thorn in the side of much of the Local
134 membership which was overwhelmingly white. The Union
was supported in its effort to regain seniority by Chief
P. 0. Williams, who was an obvious Local 134 s~pathjzer
At the July 28, 1969, Board of Firemasters meeting, Local
l34’s representative, Captain C. H. Ellis, pleaded with
the Board to restore senority rights. According to the
Captain “one of the Primary objecti~~g of Local 134 was
40Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department Minutes of
Meetings of thern Board of Firemasters meeting of 29
December 1969. (Typewritten)
41House Seniority was based on years of service in
the Fire Department. One had a choice of station duties
and vacation based on seniority.
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seniority.”42 Chief P. 0. Williams had rewritten the
Department Rules Book to include seniority Rights. How
ever, the Board of Firemasters at the December 29, 1969,
meeting ruled that “any member who is discharged, re
signs or leaves the Department for any reason and is re
employed shall lose any house seniority he had as a result
of prior service.”43 Thus, the Board stood fast to its
1966 policy.
During the Allen administration, the formal labor
relations machinery for the firemen progressed from an un
written grievance procedure to a written one. However,
this progress cannot be attributed to Local 134. The
Local was essentially concerned with wage increases (which
it requested yearly) and the restoration of house seniority.
In 1967, Local 134 won the 56 hour work week. This achieve
ment will be fully discussed later. The grievances pre
sented by the Brothers Combined were highly publicized and
marked the beginning of the open riff that has existed
between Black and White firefighters to this very day.
Collective Bargaining and Formal
Administrative Machinery AFSCME
Aside from the Department as an area for solving of
labor problems, Mayor Allen set forth, the policy of the
42Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 28 July
1969. (Typewritten.)
43Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 29 Decem
ber 1969. (Typewritten.)
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the city regarding its formal channel for labor relations
in a letter to Joseph Jacobs. Jacobs had requested that
the Mayor enter into collective bargaiHing with the Union
in order to negotiate a contract. Allen, however, was of
the opinion that the Civil Service Act was a “strong con
tract between the employees and the city government, the
terms of which are spelled out in law.”44 The mayor
stated that wages, working conditions and fringe benefits
were set forth by the city charter, and city ordinances
adopted by the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen. It is
the preference of the city government that the unions of
the city speak for their members and make known to the
city officials the desires, suggestions and aspirations of
the employees. He further stated that the information
provided by the union is
invaluable in enabling us to intelligently seek
to improve the condition of our employees and
to go to the public with the proper arguments
in favor of increased taxation which continues
.to be the source of municipal income.45
The mayor stated that the Personnel Board and:the Personnel
Director are always available to meet with the unions’
representatives and receive information concerning em
ployee benefits. The relationship between the city and
AFSCME has always been “most cordial” and he hoped it
44Ivan Allen, Jr., to Joseph Jacobs, 29 June 1966,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
451b1d.
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would remain that way. To this extent, the city’s policy
regarding labor matters whIch involved AFSCME was •that
information regarding their members be transmitted to the
Personnel Department. However matters involving wages
and hours of pay would be sent by the Personnel Board to
the Mayor and Board of Aldermen.46 Hence, the labor re
lations flow chart would look like Table 2.
TABLE 2
LABOR RELATIONS FLOW CHART









At each step in the procedure the union could present pro
posals, make appeals and use “end run” tactics when feasible.
46 i d.
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This practice, according to John ]~‘. Burton, is the initial
response by city governments to bargaining. The city dis
cusses wages and working conditions with union repressen
tatives by using the traditional government apparatus.
No changes are madein terms of authority for dealing with
labor and no person is responsible for decision making.47
Rather, a myriad of departments and committees are involved
and no one is responsible for making a binding decision.
Therefore, everybody can engage in what Lupha calls “de
cision avoidance.”48
In a letter to the Mayor dated July 22, 1966, Joseph
Jacobs expressed his concern about the “low wages and in-
adequate fringe benefits” being paid by the city to the
classified employees represented by the Union.49 The
sub-standard wages received by these employees, he as
serted, could be rectified if the city would approve a
4 to 6 step wage increase beginning January, 1967. Fol
lowing the city’s policy as spelled out in a June 29,
1966 Mayoral statement, Jacobs requested that the union
be advised as to when it could appear before the appro
priate committees in order to make its request know. 50
48Peter A. Lupsha, “Constraints on Urban Leadership,
or Why Cities Cannot be Creatively Governed,” in Improving
the Quality of Urban Management, eds. Willis D. Hawley and
David Rogers (Beberly Hills, California; Sage Publications,
1974), vol. 8, p. 610.
49Joseph Jacobs to Ivan Allen, Jr., 22 July 1966,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
50mid.
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The Mayor responded to Jacobs request promptly and j~_.
formed him that his request had been forwarded to the
Personnel Board and the Finance Committee and the
Union would be prevailed upon for input at the time of
1967 budget preparations. 51
Beyond the budgetary request, the Union also ex
pressed concern with employee classification. During
the 1966 fiscal year, the city had contracted the Public
Administration Service (PAS) of Chicago, Illinois, to do
a classification survey in order to develop accurate job
descriptions for each of the different position levels
in the classified sercies. The PAS survey also involved
salary recommendations based on comparable classes of
jobs in public and private sector employment.52 The PAS
report, compited in late 1966, was accepted by the Mayor
and Board of Aldermen for implementation. Meetings re
garding the report were held between the Mayor and AFSCME
officials.53 The report recommended no raises for some
positions, while for other 3 step raises or more were
proposed. Approximately eighty percent of the AFSCME
represented employees feel into the latter category. The
51Ivan Allen Jr. to Joseph. Jacobs, 25 July 1966,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Goergia.
52John Broadwell to Harvey M. Lincoln, 19 September
1966, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
53Ivan Allen Jr. to Albert I. Gross, 5 January 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Finance Committee, despite the PAS recommendations, pro
posed at least a one step increase for the former cate
gories. However, AFSC~ officials, were not satisfied
and continued to push for more more.54 On February 23,
1967, Local No. 359 in a letter to the Mayor, Board of
Aldermen, and Director of Personnel expressed a desire
“to communicate to each of you the appreciation of our
membership for the pay increase granted to us in January
of this year.”55 However, the group expressed a genuine
concern regarding “a few inequities” in the PAS reclassi
fications.56 The group requested a meeting to discuss
the matter and the Mayor referred them to the Personnel
Board.57 There is nothing in the records to indicate
whether or not a meeting took place. Notwithstanding,
a letter from the Director of Personnel to the President
of Local 359 indicated a willingness on behalf of the
city to review the issue.58 Despite this apparentwill
ingness, no concessions were made.59
54Ibid.
55AFSCME Local 359 to Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., Board
of Aldermen and Director of Personnel, 23 February 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
56Ibid
57Ivan Allen, Jr. to B. F. Wages, 16 March 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
58Carl T. Sutherland to B. F. Wages, 16 March 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
59lnterview with. Carl Paul, Deputy Director of
Personnel, Atlanta, Georgia, 12 April 1977.
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Although the city officials discussed most matters
regarding working conditions of employees with Union
leaders, sometimes they failed to do so. Such omissions
sometimes resulted in unexpected reactions by the employees
affected. On November 21, 1967, there was a work stoppage
by employees at the Hill Street Construction yard because
they were told to work in the rain. Earlier the city had
merged the Construction and Sanitation Departments and
changed its policy regarding working on rainy days. Here
tofore, if a person in the Construction Department re
ported for work during inclement weather, the employee
would receive a full day’s pay for not working.6° In
November 1969 the Board of Aldermen adopted and approved
an ordinance to amend the previous policy. The new
amendment was as follows:
Employees in the department of sanitary en
gineering classified in the general classi
fication plan as equipment operators I and II,
who report for duty and whose services are not
required shall be paid a full day’s pay. Such
employees, however, shall be available for
service until discharged for the day. Em
ployees in the department of sanitary engi
neering classified in the general classifi
cation plan as laborer I, who report for duty
and who are not required for work during the 61
day, shall be paid a half day’s compensation.
In a memorandum dated October 26, 1967, Ray Nixon, the
Director of the Public Works Department, had informed
6Oj. W. Giles, “Field Notes,” 21 November 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
61Atlarita, Georgia, “An Ordinance to Amend Chapter
21, Article, 1, Section 21-22 and 21-23 of the Code of
Ordinances,” (6 November 1967).
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Tom Landers, Supervisor of the Hill Street Plant, that
beginning as of this date, it will be necessary that
all of our personnel are to work on rainy days.”62 This
information did not filter down to the workers. Conse
quently, the decision, unilateraly arrived at by city
officials with no input from union officials or affected
employees was not taken lightly by the concerned parties.
On November 21, many workers refused to work in the rain.
Union officials sought to persuade the employees to re
sume work and appealed to Ray Nixon to reconsider the
new policy. J. W. Giles, a union official, received a
terse reply from Nixon. He was sent by mail a copy of
the new ordinance and was told that it was “self-explana
tory.’t Nixon attempted to soften the blow by reporting
on the progress of an earlier union request for new
heaters which had been ordered for the bullpen at Hill
Street and for the Catchbasin Crew.63 Union officials
then appealed the new policy to the Alderinanic Public
Works Committee; however, the city made no concessions.
While the 1968 budget was being prepared, the
Union presented its “wages and working conditions” pack
age in resolution form to the Mayor on November 15, 1967.64
62Ray Nixon to Tom Landers and Joe Boleman, 26
October 1967, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
63Ray Nixon to J. W. G~1es, 27 November 1967, AFSCME
Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
64B. F. Wages to Ivan Allen, Jr., 15 November, 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files:, Atlanta, Georgia.
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The Union prefaced its proposal with this comment which
set forth its interpretation of the~ 1966 Carl T. Suther
land statement.
The Personnel Board of the. City of Atlanta has
formally recognized the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
as representatives of city employees, exclusive
of firemen and policemen. 05
The group then made the following request. A three step
pay raise for all employees; increase of the car allowance
to $100.00 for city employees who use their personal auto
mobiles for official purposes; adoption of overtime pay at
one and one-half times as the practice for all hours over
40 per week; provision of uniforms for all blue collar
employees; city liability insurance for all employees
while operating vehicles owned by the city; implementation
of c.hanges in longevity pay; and weekly payment for all
day-rated employees working in city government.66 The
request regarding day-rated employees had been made by the
union on July 21, 1966.67 The Mayor, as usual, forwarded
the request to the Finance Committee and the Director of
Personnel.68 The proposals were presented by union of
ficials to the Finance Committee November 27, 1967.69
65Ibid
67Michael Botelho to Milton Farris, 21 July 1966,
AFSCNE. Local 1644, Atlanta, Georgia.
68R.EarlLanders to B. F. Wages, 17 November 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644, Atlanta, Georgia.
69Charles Davis to B. F. Wages, 22 November 1967,
AFSCME Local 1644, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Several weeks later, by way of the media, union offi
cials were informed of the city’s intention of, giving a one
step pay increase. Albert Gross, Director of District
Council No. 14, in a protest letter to the Mayor expressed
shock and anger and made a mild threat. He wrote: The
officials of the City of Atlanta could very well be jeopar
dizing labor peace with such a meager wage increase.70
Gross requested a meeting with the appropriate committees
in order to solve the problem. The Mayor once again re
ferred the request to the Finance Committee.71 In a
pointed letter Milton Farris, Chairman of the Finance
Committee, rejected the Unions’ request to meet with the
Committee on the grounds that the Committee had heard
the Union’s plea at the budget hearings and was “thoroughly
familiar with the facts.”72 Nevertheless, he did leave
an opening for the union by adding that any additional
information which the union might wish to present could
be presented in writing for the Committees’ considera
tion. Farris expressed surprise over Gross’s attitude
and somewhat paternalistically observed that “the present
Finance Committee in granting the increase last year and
70Albert I. Gross to Ivan Allen, Jr., 19 December
1967, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
71-Ivan Allen, Jr., to Albert I. Gross, 20 December
1967, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
72Milton Farris to Albert I. Gross, 26 December
1967, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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again this year has done far more to improve salaries
and wages for city employees than has been done in many
years in the past.”73 In an angry response, Albert Gross
stated that Farris had in effect closed the door to any
further meetings between the union and the Finance Com
mittee. He then set forth. the union’s position.
On August 19, 1966, Mr. Carl T. Sutherland,
Director of Personnel for the City of Atlanta,
wrote a letter to Mr. Joseph Jacobs, Attorney
at Law, and I quote in part,”The Board will
continue to recognize this union and its affil
iated local unions as representatives of City
Employees, exclusive of firemen and policemen.”
In view of this fact, in the future, we would
appreciate your showing us the courtesy of
advising us of your actions pertaining to
Wages, Hours, Working Conditions, and other
Conditions of Employment of City Personnel.
While it is true, there is not a binding con
tract between the City of Atlanta and this Union,
we are convincred that our union plays a moral
and responsible role in your labor relations.
If we are to play our role well, it would be
to be the best interest of the City of Atlanta
and our members if we are properly informed.
It is very difficult to get a true picture
of the City’s intentions when we get our infor—
nation piece-meal fror~i, the news media, from our
members, and through the grape vine. We would
be most grateful if you would use your influence
to correct this procedure in the future. If you
would be kind enough to do so, we would appreci
ate your officially advising us of the City’s
position on each item presented to the Finance
Committee public hearing on the budget recently
by Representative, J. W. Giles, of this organi
zation. 74
Having the advantage, Farris waited until April 17,




proposal step by step. The request for a three step
salary increase was not granted. A three step increase
hAd h~en approved in 1967; however, on January 2, 1968,
the Board of Aldermen approved a one step increase, as75
had been predicted by the mdeia. After some deliberation,
the city decided not to grant a flat $100.00 automobile
allowance per month for employees using their personal
automobiles for city business. Instead, each employee
who was required to use his personal car for city busi
ness would be directly compensated for specific costs
involved. With regard to overtime pay for work in excess
of 8 hours per day at 1—13~ times the regular salary rate,
the Board would seek to make uniform overtime payments to
all employees. Farris. further indicated that the city
was not able financially to grant two and one-half times
the regular rate of pay for holidays nor was it financially
able to furnish liability insurance to any and all employees
while operating city owned vehicles. The request to reverse
the longevity ordinance was partially granted: “We did
amend our program to give longevity increases to employees
who have been employed 20 to 30 years and have not hereto
fore benefited from the program.” The request that uni
forms be furnished to all employees except white collar
workers was implemented, with the exception of a few park
75Miltorj Farris to Albert I. Gross, 17 April 1968,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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employees. The city also implemented the request to pay
all day rate employees on a weekly basis for the Sanitary
Division.]6 Mr. Farris then concluded his~report:
I want to express to you our appreciation for
your interest in the city employees and bring
ing to our attention the employees’ viewpoint
of the matters presented. We expect to do all
we can to further improve the compensation and
working conditions of the city employees at
every opportunity. 77
Despite the persistent complaint of the union that
the city should provide city owned vehicles and despite
the support of the proposal by Carl T. Sutherland (who
was of the opinion that the union recommendation was
valid and would assist the city in its recruitment ef
forts),78 the Finance Committee, under the Allen admini
stration, always found the proposal too expensive.
Although Farris had already informed the union of
the city’s position on the 1967 union proposal, the union
received more information regarding improved working con
ditions from Carl Sutherland on July 2, l968.~~
I think you will be pleased to know of certain
recommendations made by Messrs. Ray Nixon, Ralph
Hulsey, and me to the Mayor and Board of Aldermen
76Ibid
77Ibid.
78Carl T: Sutherland to Ivan Allen, Jr., 12 July 1968,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
79Carl T. Sutherland to J. W. Giles, 2 July 1968,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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to improve the employment situation in the
Sanitation Divisino of the Public Works
Department and of action taken by the Mayor
and Board of Aldermen on these recommenda
tions 80
The recommendations which were approved consisted of the
city providing four sets of uniforms yearly for waste
collector drivers. The uniforms were supposed to be
fitted and laundered by the employees. Money had been
appropriated for the purpose of enlarging the Sanitation
Division field offices so that all personnel could be
accommodated in inclement weather; also, the number of
latrines and bathrooms would be increased in these areas.
In order to deal effectively with employee grievances, three
Field Personnel Assistants would be employed so that proper
rapport could be established with the employees.81- The
union’s response to the great news was that it was “pleased
to know of the efforts expended.”82 The union, never sat
isfied, continued to present its proposals for improvements
in wages, hours and working conditions in the form of
specific resolutions for the budget.83
Other than the Aldermanic Committee structure, the
union met often with Personnel Department officials to
80Ibid
W. Giles to Carl T. Sutherland, 10 July 1968,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
83Ernest H. Steward, B. F. Wages and W. 0. Bullard
to Ivan Allen, Jr., 1 November 1968, AFSCME Local 1644
Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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settle. their members.’ grievances. Sucligri.evances were
frequently settled at this level and at the departmental
level. The employee was usually reinstated prior to an
appearance before the Personnel Board.84
The union was from time to time called upon to
discuss its position on changes in working conditions,
and was given an opportunity to register approval or
disapproval of new ideas and proposed changes presented
by the city. An example of this process is glimpsed in
a letter from J. W. Giles to Carl Sutherland regarding
a meeting on the proposed sick leave and vacation changes.
The union was partially satisfied with the consultation on
the subject and proposed that they be continued. Giles
also took the opportunity, in an August 15, 1968 memo
randum, to state once again the unions’ position on the
status of labor relations in the city: “In the interest
of improving labor relations. . . it is going to be necessary
to enter into collective bargaining in the immediate
future.”85 At this time, such a statement had become
84”Report of Director Albert I. Gross, Greater
Atlanta Public Employees, District Council No. 14, AFSCNE,
AFL-CIO December 11, 1967 through January 5, 1968,” AFSCI’~!E
Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia. On December 27, 1967
the union officials held a conference with Mr. Weatherly
of the Atlanta Personnel Department regarding Edward A.
Hogan’s grievance. As a result of this meeting Hogan was
re-instated on December 28, 1967. The Director’s monthly
reports are sprinkled heavily with these kinds of actions.
W. Giles to Carl T. Suthe~land, 15 August 1968,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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standard procedure. However, a wildcat strike of sanita
tion employees on September 3, 1968 did bear fruit in the
area of bargaining.
A major outcome of the strike was the fact that the
city was forced to move in the direction of serious nego—
tjations For the first time the union presented its
demands (as opposed to requests) to Mayor Allen directly.
The Mayor agreed to a Letter of Intent and committed the
city to a grievance procedure. During the months following
the strike, the city officials and the union engaged in
discussions. On May 15, 1969, a Statement of Policy on
employee relations and Grievance Procedures recommended
by the Personnel Director and approved by the Personnel
Board was adopted in Resolution form by the Mayor and
Board of Aldermen.86 The innovations contained therein
were accepted by James Howard, President of Local 1644,
and approved by the membership.87 For the first time in
the history of Atlanta, a Memorand~ of Understanding had
been negotiated and signed by the City and AFSCME. Mayor
Allen has referred to the Memorandum as a ‘tCoritract.”
However, he further stated that he agreed to the proce
dure “because it did not impose upon the city any
8°Atlanta, Georgia Adopting Official Statement of
Policy Relatign to Grievance Procedures and Other Con
ditions of Employment for All City Employees” Resolution
(15 May 1969).
87Ivan Allen, Jr., to James Howard, 15 May 1969,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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obligation that it didn’t already have.”88 (See Appendix B
for Statement of Policy and Grievance Procedures). The
Memorandum of Understanding, despite Allen’s view, was
not a contract because it was adopted as a resolution
rather than as an ordinance and did not have the force
of law, clearly indicating that the city had continued
its decision-avoidance policy.
Informal Understandings
The records indicate that AFSCME officials played a
dual role in terms of their relationship with the city.
Aside from the formal channels used to improve working
conditions, union officials also aided the city in its
efforts to pacify and/or control the workers they repre
sented as well as kept officials happy. There is indi
cation of this in a February 15, 1968 memorandum from
Robert H. Morriss, W. C. P. Enginner in Public Works
Department to Giles, the local union representative.
We have agreed that the Atlanta Employees’
Union will issue a memorandum and follow up
with a firm policy which takes a strong against
drinking on the job and misconduct growing from
such drinking to the degree that the local union
representatives and its members will support
actions on the part of supervisory personnel of
the City of Atlanta, leading to dismissal of
employees for such conduct.~9
88Ivan Allen, Jr. Interview.
89Robert H. Morriss to J. W. Giles, 15 February 1968,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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The union had a policy regarding drinking on the job, and
Mr. Mor±iss requested a copy which the union granted.
Not only did Giles send several copies to Morriss, he
enthusiastically distributed over one thousand copies of
the policy to AFSCME members.9° In a special memorandum
to AFSCME members the union officials unequivocally
stated their position about drinking on the job.
The records in the union office on grievances
and appeals of employees before the Personnel
Board make it very evident to the officials
of your union tha~ there appears to be a com
mon practice of DRINKING ON THE JOB. This is
to advise that your union cannot condone this
practice which is, without question, against
the principles on which organized labor was
built. In view of these principles, we cannot
continue to represent people who have been dis
ciplined on this matter. After the City of
ficials justify their accusations on such a
charge, the union will forego any further
support of any appeal on such a charge being
under the influence while on duty. We are
fully aware that this position will be criticized;
however, we are also fully aware of our respon
sibility on this matter. Therefore, please take
our advice, DO NOT REPORT FOR WORK UNDER THE
INFLUENCE AND DO NOT DRINK WHILE ON THE JOB.
This rule is absolutely necessary in order to
maintain safe working conditions for those who
are tempted to drink, as well as their associ
ates and ~he public with whom they come in
contact. 91
The union attempted to maintain an amicable relation
ship with Carl T. Sutherland, Director of Personnel. In
9°J. W. Giles to Robert H. Morriss, 11 March 1968,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
9LtMatters Affecting Employees of the City of Atlanta
Within the Jurisdiction of Local No. 4, Local No. 20, Local
No. 259, and Local No. 850 for Period Covering: May 1, 1968
through May 31, 1968,” AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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1962, flowers were sent to the funeral of his mother. On
October 27, 1966, in a lette.r to Mr. Robert Coulson,
Executive Vice PresjdenL of the American Arbitration Asso
ciation, Albert I. Gross, International Representative for
AFSCME in charge of Southeast Region, related that he was
pleased to know that Carl T. Sutherland was being con
sidered for an appointment to the American Arbitration
Association’s Labor Panel. He further stated,
Our union has a bargaining relationship with
the city of Atlanta. . . In my experience with
Mr. Sutherland I have found him to be firm
and fair in his actions toward our members.
In my opinion he is a man of the highest
integrity and I would nto hesitate one
moment to recommend him as an arbitrator.92
Another example of the informal methods used by the
union to arrive at a position acceptable to the city in
volved the case of observing Southern Memorial Day. Mr.
R. E. Hulsey, Superintendent of Atlanta Sanitation
Department, attempted to convince W. 0. Bullard, Presi
dent of Local 850, to support the idea of personnel
working on th.e holiday although the city could not pay
their holiday pay and time and a half. The union de
clined. It was mutually agreed upon by the union offi
cials and Hulsey that Friday April 26~ 1968, would be a
holiday and no one would work. Hence, Saturday would be
92Albert I. Gross to Robert Coulson, 26 October
1966, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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a working day with. pay at the rate of time and one hale.
In order to qualify for holi:day pay, all employees would
have to work Thiir~d~y and Monday. A memorandum to this
effect was sent to all employees in the Sanitation
Division and th.e memo specifically stated that this was
a compromise reached after meeting with union officials.93
Earlier in this chapter, reference •was made to the
city’s policy regarding working on rainy days. Despite
the ordinance regarding the policy, confusion was wide
spread in the Sanitation Division. In a July 24, 1969
directive to all employees in the division, Hulsey ad
mitted there was some misunderstanding among the em
ployees with respect to working on rainy days. In order
to clear up the confusion, he referred then to an agree
ment that he had concluded earlier with James Howard, an
AFSCME official.
Some time ago Mr. James Howard and I agreed
that whenever there is a sudden downpour of
rain our employees will be allowed to find
shelter until the rain slacks up. When the
rain slacks up we are to return to work. On
the days there is a steady rain or drizzle
we will continue to work as in the past.94
A copy of the memorandum was sent to James Howard. Howard
responded with. a memorandum to all AFSCME members in the
93R. E. Hulsey to All Employees of the Sanitation
Division, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
94R. E. Hulsey to Employees in the Sanitation
Division, 24 July 1969, AFSCI~ Local 1644 Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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Sanitation Division. He stated that he was aware of the
misunderstanding among employees regarding working on
inclement days. He then gave them the following charge:
Only you and your co-worker knows L~i9I when
there is a hard downpour of rain, this will
have to be left up to the entire crew to
determine whether the raining Lsic/ conditions
are too bad to go out and work. —
We know that we have good dedicated and high
level employees in the sanitation division
who will see that this will not be taken ad
vantage of when there is a drizzle of rain.
I am expecting you as good men to see that this
problem is eliminated. 95
There are no records to show the responses the workers had
to this new interpretation.
Strikes and Job Actions Firefigh ers
On June 7, 1966, Atlanta faced its first strike of
fire fighters in th.e history of the city. However, dis
satisfaction and unrest regarding working conditions
among the firemen had been festering for some time. In
1962, all departments in city government with the excep
tion of the Fire Department had their work week shortened
to forty or forty-four hours. Beginning August 22, 1963,
Local 134 under the leadership of President J. G. McEver,
passed a resolution each. year similar to this.
RESOLVED, “That the Mayor and Board of Aldermen
of the. City o~ Atlanta endorse, recommend and
establi.sh by ordinace covering the Fire Depart
ment a maximum work week of fifty-six hours (as
95James Howard to All Members of Sanitation Division,
Atlanta, Georgia, Public Employees AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 29
July 1969, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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the first step in establishing a forty hour
workweek for the Fire Department) commonly
referred to as the “Baltimore Plan,” and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that such maximum
standards be established without reduction
in pay, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that work performed
in excess of fifty-six hours in amy one work
week, be compensated at the rate of time and
one-half of the established rate of pay.96
In 1963, 1964, and 1965, Local 134 presented pro
posals similar to the foregoing and requested pay raises
from the Board of Firemasters. The Board consistently
approved the proposals and referred them to the Finance
Committee for implementation.97 Notwithstanding, the
proposals usually faced imminent death in the Committee.
By January 1966, the patience of the fire fighters
had grown thin and once again Local 134 representatives
made an impassioned appeal for a fifty-six hour work
week to the Board of Firemasters. William T. Knight,
Chairman of the Board, informed the delegation that the
same resolution had been presented to the Board in September,
1965 and had been approved by the Board and forwarded to
the Finance Committee. During this time, the 1966 budget
was being prepared and efforts were made to get the fifty-
six hour work week approved. It seemed that support for
96Atlanta (Georgia) Fi.re Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 25
September 1963. (Typewritten.)
97Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meetings of 25
September 1963, 15 December 1964, 27 September l965~
(Typewritten.)
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the plan was not sufficient and the. necessary funds were
not available. According to KnLght~ the Finance Com
mittee only approved a one. step pay raise for all city
employees.98 Local 134 representatives then requested
the Board to approve the resolution again and resubmit
it to the Finance Committee for reconsideration along
with the request that union officials be allowed to make
a presentation before the Committee. The Board accepted
all of the union’s requests.99 The Board also adopted
and forwarded a union resolution requesting that f ire-
fighters be compensated at a rate of time and one-half
for work in excess of forty hours per week.1-°°
The Finance Committee took the resolutions under
consideration. The Committee conducted public hearings
on March 18, 1966, to hear arguments for the resolutions.
The Committee also reviewed reports, from the Mayor and
the city comptroller, citing a lack of funds needed to
implement the resolutions.101 Soon thereafter, the
Finance Committee made the following recommendations to
the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen:
98Atlan.ta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of




101Finance Committee to the Honorable Mayor and Board
of Aldermen, 21 March 1966, Atlanta City Government Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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After due and careful consideration, the Corn
mittee determined that there we~e no funds on
hand and available at. this time to implement
either or both of the requests made by the
International Association of Fire Fighters.
Therefore, it is with regret that Committee
is forced to file an adverse report with your
Honorable Body pertaining to these requests:
however, the Committee and the Board of
Aldermen pledges that it will give first
preference to reducing the work week of fire
men in formulating the 1967 Budget before any
overall salary increase is considered for
employees and officers of the City.l02
The Committee did approve a provision for overtime pay at
the rate of one and one-half tiriles the regular rate of
pay to firemen who were called back to duty in an emergency
after having worked 60 hours in that particular weekJ°3
These recomindenations were accepted by the Mayor and
Board of Aldermen.
Within the fire fighter ranks, dissatisfaction was
rampant. A large group of the dissidents were unhappy
with the way Local 134 and the affiliated International
organization were handling the problems with the city.
Hence, after a Local 134 meeting the group split ranks on
April 18, 1966. The marvericks secured a charter and
became known as Atlanta Fire Fighters Union Independent
Local 1 (AAFU). The Independent Union within a few days,




Local 134 almost memberless.1-04 The new union gave the
following reasons for the separation.
This union was formed in April of this year
when it became quite obvious that our old
organization had become politically ineffec
tive. This position has since been verified
in a news statement by one official of our
old organization whIch stated it was in
Complete Harmony with the City’s position.
However, the members of the organization do not
accept this point of view. 105
Despite an attempt by Local 134 to prevent an appear
ance by the AFFU’s president Captain J. I. Martin, before
the Board of Firemasters, Knight allowed the presentation
to be made. Martin stated that he had in his possession
500 signatures of Atlanta firemen which were evidence
that his union represented the majority of the fire
fighters. Martin insisted that Local 134 had not acted
in the best interests of the fire fighters. Accordingly,
he urged the city to hold negotiations sessions with his
group in order to solve the existing problems as soon as
possible, warning that otherwise, the consequences would
be unsatisfactory. Martin was assured by Knight that the
Board had done all it could possibly do and had encouraged
the dissidents to have”faith in the Board.”106 M. Bowden,
lO4j ~. rnartin “Resume of Atlanta Fire Fighters,
Inc.,” 1966, (Mimeographed), Atlanta Fire Fighters Inde
pendent Union Files, Hape.ville, Georgia.
Ibid
V 106Atianta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes oe
Meeetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 30 May
1966. (Typewritten.)
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the City Attorney, also addressed the group and stated
that legally the city did not come under thE National
Labor Relations Board Ruling, and, consequently, could
not enter into any bargaining arrangement. Furthermore,
the present city laws would not permit an increase in
pay except the one time during the year when the budget
was being prepared and adopted. The Board reaffirmed
its support of the rasolution passed by the Aldermanic
Board which gave top priority to an increase in pay and
a reduction in hours for firemen when the 1967 budget
was prepared. 107
The AFFU was displeased with the Board?s decision
and sought to bring about change by using publicity gen
erating techniques in order to garner public support.
Advertisements stating AFFU’s positions were placed in
the local newspapers,108 and City Hall, individual alder
men and the Atlanta newspapers were besieged by pickets,109
all to no avail. Finally, on June 7, 1966, 631 members
of the Fire Department went on strike. The Independent
union had resorted to what Love and Sulzner refer to as
the dual system of pressure tactics, the strike and pro
test tactics.~° The Independent Union also changed its
id.
108Atlanta Constitution 16 May 1966
109Atlanta Jou~rial, 17 i~ay 1966 and Atlanta Consti
tution 2FM~y 1966.
~~°Thomas N. Love and George T. Sulzner, “Political
Implications of Public Employee Bargaining,” Industrial
Relations 11 (February l972):26.
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demand to a fifty-six hour work week and an immediate
$100.00 a month salary increase.111 Local 134 members
remained loyal to the city and manned the dese~ted sta
tions around the clock.. However, they were not pleased
with the fact that the city was now discussing labor
matters with a rival union which allegedly received direc
tions from Tony Zivalich a Teamster organizer. On June
9, 1966, the city and the Independent Union reached an
agreement. The Mayor agreed to dismiss all pending Court
action arising from the strike; there would be no repri
sals, penalities or punishment for any of the personnel
involved in the strike and an impartial mediator would be
selected to make a non-binding recommendation regarding
the issues.112 On June 10, 1966, the Board of Aldermen
passed a resolution authorizing the Mayor to enter into
an agreement with the firemen on the selection, choice
and designation of a mediator.
1. In accordance with the agreement reached,
the Mayor be authorized to enter into an
agreement with, the firemn in the selection,
choice and designation of a mediator, either
in the person of one individual or in the
form of a fact finding committee consisting
of several individuals, the duties of which
mediator or fact finding group shall be to
make inquiry and of all members of the Atlanta
Fire Department and to make recommendations as
to changes looking toward improvement of wages
of all firemen in keeping with, the financial
ability of the city;
111Atlanta Journal, 24 May 1966.
112Atlanta Jourhal 10 June 1966.
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2. that the report of the mediator or fact
finding group be furnished to all firemen
and to the city and that it also be made
public;
3. that th.e cost of employment of such medi
ator or fact finding committee be borne by
the City of Atlantà.il3
Dr. Edwin 0. Harrison, President of Georgia Institute
of Technilogy, a Mechanicl Engineer with no significant
experience in mediating labor matters, was selected as
mediator fo the dispute. Harrision held a public hearing
on July 25, 1966, at the Merchandise Mart and spokesmen
for both sides were given the opportunity to testify in
support of their respective positions.114 Despite the
Independent union’s new request for a forty eight hour
week and $100.00 per month hazard pay, Harrison made the
following recommendations, to be effective January 1,
1967, in a report dated August 22, 1966:
I am recommending that the firemen be given a
choice of the following options, with the
decision being left entirely to the firemen.
It should be understood that whichever option
~t~f~~cra
general increases granted to City employees at
large.
Option I: Reduce the average work week from the
present 60 hours to one of 56 hours.
~3At1anta, Georgia, ~‘A Resolution Authorizing the
Mayor to Enter into an Agreement with the Firemen in the
Selection, Choice and Designation ó~ a Mediator” Resolu
tion. (10 June 1966).
114Edwin D. Harrison, “Mediator’s Report in the
matter of the Atlanta Firefighters Union, Inc. and the
City of Atlanta,” 22 August 1966, Atlanta, Georgia, (Mimeo
graphed.) Atlanta Fire Fighters’ Independent Union, Inc.,
Rapeville, Georgia.
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which permits a three-platform
operation.. . This reduction in
hours would be made without any
change in total compensation, so
that the houfl5~ rate would be ef
fectively increased from the pre
sent figure by an amount slightly
above seven (7) per cent.
Option II: Maintain the present average work
week of 60 hours and grant the pre
sently employed firemen the fruits
of the increase in the total wage
bill which would have resulted from
the necessary employment of addi
tional firemen if Option I were
selected. This increase would
amount to seven fourteen hundreds
(7.4) per cent to be granted on an
“acrosthbd” basis 115
The union voted to reject the recommendations and re
quested a 10 per cent pay increase effective September 1,
1966, and a fifty six hour work week beginning on January
1, 1966. The Board of Aldermen expressed sympathy with
the union’s position. Nevertheless, it passed a resolution
to grant a two step raise and a fifty six hour week ef
fective January 1, 1967.116 This same resolution was
adopted by the Board of Aldermen September 6, 1967.117
However, the firemen made their move on September 2 when
~6Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemaster’s meeting of 29
August 1966. (Typewritten.)
~7Atlanta, Georgia, “Pledging the Creation of
Sufficient Positions Effective October 1, 1966 within the
Department of Fire to Implement 56-Hour Work Week by
January 1, 1967, and Pledging Salary Increases for Fire
Fighting Personnel, Uniformed Police Personnel, and
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over 500 men went on strike.118 The Mayor immediately
sought an injunction requiring the firemen to return to
their posts. Local 134, as in the earlier strike, re
mained loyal to the city and manned the stations with
the help of city policemen.
The city fathers arrived at a “family understanding”
regarding treatment of the strikers. All striking firemen
were dismissed from their jobs when they failed to report
to work and the city actively recruited replacements.
Between September 19 and 23, the Board of Firemasters dis
missed 362 firemen in absentia and accepted 26 resignations.
However, the Board at its September 13, 1966 meeting had
changed the Fire Department rules to allow employees who
were dismissed or had resigned to be able to apply for re
employment within three years of the date services were
terminated subject to the approval of the Chief of the
Fire Department and Board of Firemasters.119 As a condi
tion of employment, the Board now required firemen to
sign the following oath: “I further solemnly swear and
Other City Employees, Effective January 1, 1967 “Resolu
tion (.6 September l966)~ and Atlanta, Georgia, Expressing
the Board of Aldermen’s Confidence in and Its Approval
of Efforts and Actions of Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., Alderman
William T. Knight and Alderman Milton Farris in Seeking to
preserve Orderly Good Government and Provide Adequate Fire
Protection for the City- of Atlanta in the Crisis Created
by the Unwarranted Strike by Members of -the Atlnta Fire
Fighter’s Union Independent” Resolution, (6 September 1966).
~-18Atlanta Constitution, 3 September 1966.
119Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 13 Septanber
1966. (Typewritten.)
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and affirm that I will not engage in any strike, walk-out,
work stoppage or work slow-up while employed as a member
of the Atlanta Fire Department.”12°
Within one year, approximately 362 striking firemen
were employed. But they were only allowed to return under
the most severe restrictions. These firemen were re
employed at the lowest rank (of private) and their house
seniority was forfeited. They did not lose their longe
vity and pension rights. 121
Despite the nation wide support received by the
strikers, and the local assistance of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., the Allen administration stood firm in its
position. According to Kochan, when management has
coalesced in a position and unity exists, the possibility
of multilateral bargaining is practically non-existent.3-22
This theory was bolstered by the Administration’s united
stand with regard to firing the strikers. On January 1,
1967, the Administration kept its promise to the firemen.
The fifty six hour week went into effect and a three step
pay raise was implemented. However, the Independent Union
was dead.
1201bid
~-21-Interview with. Robert Caum, Former Secretary of




Strikes and Job Actions AFSCME
The Allen administration faced its first sanitation
job action on January 15, 1968. The sanitation workers
refused to go to work in ice and snow, and the action
appeared to be a spontaneous development. After a con
ference with city officials however, about two thirds of
the garbage collectors returned to work and the other
third went home, but reported for duty the next day.
Albert Gross, the Director of District Council 14 of
AFSCME, denying union responsibility for the work stoppage,
said that the underlying cause of the stoppage was the
starvation wages which were being paid to the workers.
The Union had requested a three step raise for 1968 but
did not get it. According to the Atlanta Journal, Gross
warned that “if something is not done soon about the low
wages these people are getting, this is going to happen
again. “123
During the last week of August, rumors circulated
in the Sanitation Department that a strike was going to
take place and the Union had moved to contain the strike
sentiment. In this regard, the city appears to have de
cided to take precautions against future job actions.
On August 30, 1968, a memorandum was disseminated to all
sanitation employees by R. E. liulsey; the Superintendent
123Atlanta Journal, 15 January 1968.
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of the Sanitati~on Department. The memorandum, co—signed
by J. W. Giles, an AFSCME official, read as follows:
Please be advised that I have consulted J. W.
Giles, Director of the Greater Atlanta Public
Employees District Council l4-AFSCME AFL—CIO,
who had advised me that any work stoppage of
any nature without the express consent of
Union 850 and/or District Coucil 14 shall be
considered an unauthorized and illegal work
stoppage.
In view of this ruling of the Union, as Super
intendent of this Department, I urge you to
re-evaluate your unauthorized action and re
turn to your duties immediately.
Director J. W. Giles concurs with this posi
tion and advises me that an employee engaging
in an illegal work stoppage does so without
support of the Local Union 850 and/or District
Council 14. 124
Despite the warning by Hulsey, on September 3, 1968,
a wildcat strike of sanitation workers at the Liddell
Drive Substation took place, depriving the northside of
the city of services. The strikers demand higher pay and
refused union appeals to return to their jobs. The local
union officials considered the strike to be an “unautho
rized and illegal work stoppage” and refused to support
it.125 There existed a Memorandum of Understanding
which governed Local 4, Local 359 and Local 850 and re
lated to any action to conduct a strike vote in any one
124R. E. Hulsey to All Sanitation Employees, 30
August 1968, AFSCME Local 1644 Files., Atlanta, Georgia.
125Atlanta Journal, 3 September 1968.
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or all three locals. The.~ wfldcatters ~röm Loc~l 850 had
not ~o1lowed the intraunion rules. According to their
regulati~ons, a local or group within a local that tàok
any action to strike which~ was contrary~ to the policies
spelled out, would Be faced with having its actions con
sidered illegal, and would not receive any support from
any of the locals. This document had been ratified by
all the locals on July 9, 1968.
The Mayor did not participate in the Preliminary
negotiations. The city was represented by Alderman
Everett Milljcan, Chairman of the Aldermanic Public works
Committee; Ray Nixon, the public works chief and Ralph
Hulsey, Sanitary Department Head. The major demand was
$100.00 a week take home pay immediately. During the
discussions, the city explained that due to legal limi
tations it would not be able to increase salaries until
January 1, 1969. However the negotiation group promised
as much as a two or three-step raise beginning January,
1969. Thus a return to work agreement was formulated on
these conditions.l26 Encouraged by the local union repre
sentatives, the spokesmen for the wildcat strike agreed
to the promise of a raise; however, the strikers refused
to accept the offer. According to the Atlanta Journal,
the strikers “laughed” at their colleagues when the
~~26Atlanta Constitution, 4 September 1968.
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leaders asked them to return to work and accept city
promises of higher pay next year,1-27 Hence~ the strike
continued.
When the strike entered its third day, Jerry Wurf,
national head of the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal employees assigned Morton H. Shapiro, a
regional official for the southeastern states, to investi
gate the grievances of the strikers and determine if local
union offcials had been too hasty in disavowing the walk
out. J. W. Giles, the local official who had termed the
strike t~illegal,h1 complained of national l!interferencett
in local dispute. Meanwhile, the national office had
requested the SCLC, civil rights organization, to enter
the controversy. 128
After the National AFSCME office joined the dispute,
top city officials began to negotiate: Mayor Allen;
Milton Farris, Chairman of the Finance Committee; Everett
Millican, Chairman of the Public Works Committee; Carl T.
Sutherland, Director of Personnel; Ray Nixon, Chief of
Police Works; R. E. 1{ulsey, Superintendent of the Sanita
tion Department; and John Dougherty, Associate City
Attorney.129 The union now delcared its full support of
‘~AtlantaJourna1,4 September 1968.
128Atlanta Jo~irna1, 5 September 1968.
1291van Allen, Jr., Intei~view.
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the sanitation workers in their efforts to secure justice
in bringing about adequate wages and deèent working con
ditions. Shapiro stated that •the union would demand
$100.00 week gross wage increase and satisfactory working
conditions. 130
While the strikers deprived the city of their labor
and protested their low wages, union officials, in closed
sessions with city officials, bilaterally arrived at an
agreement to upgrade wages and working conditions.. On
September 5, 1968, Shapiro, the union leader, requested
that all promises and agreements arrived at be reduced
to writing in the form of a Letter of Intent. The Mayor
agreed to the request. At first, Millican, on behalf of
the city, made a firm commitment for a 2 or 2.5 step
increase in salary starting January 1, 1969. This amounted
to a raise of approximately 9.5 per cent. However, the
workers were demanding a take home pay of $100.00 a week.
At the time of the strike the lowest paid trash collector
earned a gross salary of. $66.50 per week. Further Millican’s
offer was less than that offered to the strikers earlier.
Shapiro broadened the scope of the bargaining to include
the following: binding arbitration, a 25 per cent wage
increase, a revised pension plan, paid family hospitali
zation by the city, adequate bathrooms and lockers at the
13°Atlanta Constitution, 6 September 1968.
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stations, a written grievance procedure, reclassifica
tion of the scout car driver position and shop stewards
recognized by the city of each location.131-
On September 6, 1968, a Memorandum of Intent had
been negotiated by the two groups and signed by the city
negotiating committee which include Ivan Allen, Mayor;
Milton Farris, Chairman of the Finance Committee, Everett
Millican, Chairman of the Public Works Committee; and
Carl T. Sutherland, City Personnel Director. The group
promised to publicly make every effort to see that the
agreements were adopted and carried out by city officials.
The Memorandum of Intent was not a binding document; both
parties knew that the agreements would have to be approved
by the legislative branch. However, the Mayor in an in
terview stated that he was confident that the agreement
would be approved in some form by the Board of Aldermen
because the persons who had negotiated it represented
powerful committees and their views were respected by the
Board. The agreements provided that effective Januay 1,
1969, a three-step salary increase would be granted to
city employees; the Personnel Director would immediately
draw up a written grievance procedure; the Personnel
Director would ask the Personnel Board to reclassify the
position of scout car driver; improvements would be made
131J.W.Giles”Notes~’5 Septethber 1968, 6 September
1968, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
128
inniediately in the. field offices located at Hill Street,,
Liddell Street and North Avenue with th.e $40,000.00
already appropriate for that purpose; the city would
recognize shop stewards at all locations; and no posi
tive actions would be taken against those persons in
volved in the~~strik~.~’32
On September 7, 1968, union officials presented
that portion of the agreement which provided for a three
step increase. Notwithstanding, the sanitation workers
overwhelmingly rejected the offer when they discovered
that the raise would not become effective until January
1, 1969. According to a reporter for the Atlanta
Constitution, those who stood to register their affirma
tive vote were white and those who were negative were
Black.133 The workers obviously felt they could get more
and the union officials believed the same. Some believed
that the strike at this juncture had begun to take on
civil rights overtones similar to the Memphis strike
earlier in the year. Dr. Martin L. King, Jr., then head
of SCLC, was assassinated April 4 while in Memphis, to
lead a march. of sympath.y for the AFSCME union strikers
there. When the union took its vote on th.e wage offer,
Hosea Williams, Dr. King’s aide, was present at the
3-32Memorandum of Intent, September 1968, City
Government Files, Atlanta, .~eorgia.
1-33Atlanta Constitution, 8 September 1.968.
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meeting and gave a rousing speech. He state~d that this
was not a white or black fight, it was a “have and have
not fight.” He urged solidarity of the group and stated
“if you desire our help, SCLC, we are ready to sock it to
them baby.”134
After the workers rejecte.d the three step pay raise
proposal, the Mayor announced that the strikers had to
report to work on Monday in order to hold their jobs.
Emergency measures were also set up to deal with the
garbage pile up. Free 30-gallon polyurthylene bags were
issued to citizens at the fire stations for greater con
venience in transporting th.eir garbage to the 200 odd
sanitary boxes placed near schools for for garbage col
lection. Andrew Young, executive vice president of SCLC,
assured the strikers in open rally of the moral commitment
of SCLC to the right of garbage workers to get a living
wage; after all Dr. King had given his life for striking
garbage workers in Memphis.1-35 The leaders of this civil
rights organization threatened the city with demonstra
tions and boycotts in order to win acceptance of the de
mands. The threat of firing was still a possibility,
although most knew that the city was aware of the dif
ficulty in hiring enough garbage and wastecollectors to
1-34Giles “Notes.”
‘35A~tlanta Constitution~ 9 September 1968,
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replace those who mi~ght be dismissed. For over a year
the sanitation department had found it difficult to fill
available jobs despite. an intense recruiting effort.’36
The strikers by now were actively supported by
Community leaders such as Sen. Leroy Johnson, Rep. Ben
Brown, Rev. J. D. Crier and Rev. Ralph. Abernathy, to
name a few. The city sought and received a Court Injunc
tion from Fulton Superior Court Judge Luther Alverson.
The Judge ordered the strikers to return to work and re
frain from trying to keep other emloyees from working.
He held that his injunction was based on state law and
court decisions on public service making such strikes
illegal. 137
On September 11, 1968, the Aldermanic Board convened
after being summoned into special session by the Mayor to
pass a resolution that authorized and approved a three
step raise for sanitation workers as of January 1, 1969.138
Despite these developments, the union and the workers
held out for more. Finally on September 12, the Mayor and
his negotiating team met with, officials from SCLC, who by
now were acting as informal mediators. They offered to
136Atlanta_Journal, 10 September 1968.
1371bid
1-38Atlanta, Georgia, “Th.e Pledge of a 3 Step Raise
for Sanitation WOrkers ‘as of January 1, 1969” Resolution.
(11 September 1968).
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encourage the strikers to resume work if the city would
agree that there would be no reprisals against the workers
And I-hey would be paid for the days lost while on strike.
The city agreed to the proposal if the workers would re-~
turn to their jobs by Friday and work Saturday and Sunday
without pay. The city reaffirmed its offer of a three
step pay increase effective January 1, 1969. The workers
accepted the offer and the strike was over.139 As promised
earlier in the negotiations, the Mayor signed a Letter of
Intent (See Appendix C) which was approved by the Board
of Aldermen and in l969amem:orandum of understanding was
drawn up which included a Statement of Policy and Grievance
Procedures. The Administration had engaged in collective
bargaining and observed the Georgia law. This was done
by publishing the agreement in the form of a Memoranda of
Agreement signed only by the city negotiators which were
later published as ordinances and resolutions.
The agreements made in th.e Letter of Intent were
approved in resolution and ordinance form. For the first
time the city issued a statement regarding employee re
lations. The Statement of Policy which included a griev
ance procedure was included in the employee handbook. The
Statement of Policy indicated that the city government was
interested in communicating with, all employees on all
139Carl T. Sutherland “The Atlanta Sanitation Workers’
Strike,” Public Employee Relations 20 (1969) :25.
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matters concerning their rights, privileges and responsi~
bilit~es, and was desirous. of receiving from them any
recommendations they might have Concerning salaries, wages,
hours and other conditions of employment. Further, it
stated that recomrnedations. regarding these matters would
be accepted from AFSCME or other recognized organizations
representing city employees. The Personnel Board and/or
the Director of Personnel was authorized to entertain
these recommendations However, the resolution was clear
on the authority of thes~e two offices. They simply had
the power to make recommendations Final decisions would
be made by the Board of Aldermen and the Mayor.
As a result of the Administration’s reaction to the
strike, a bargaining process had been superimposed on the
traditional government apparatus.. The scope of the dis
cussion, like before, would be unlimited. However, the
Personnel Board and/or the Director of Personnel were
responsible for them. This model conforms to what John
R. Burton refers to as a typical initial model for bar
gaining. The plan incompasses utilization of the existing
expertise in the organization, in this case the Director
of Personnel and the Personnel Board, as well as continuing
the established authority relationships. Burton, however,
argues that this arrangement proves to be unstable for the
following reasons: Persons within the structure are not
professional labor negotiators and often cannot match the
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expertise of a trained union negotiator. Also, labor re
lations is a full time job, time consuming and requires
the attention of a full time official if i.t is- done pro
perly.14° In subsequent chapters, when the Massell and
Jackson years are discussed, the conclusions drawn by
Burton will be analyzed to see if they apply to Atlanta.
Summary
The exploratory and descriptive analysis of the re
lationship between the city and the recognized unions,
AFSCME and IAFF, between 1966-1969 as presented in this
chapter indicates the following. The relationship which
developed between the Allen administration and the two
unions was shaped by the contextual variables: the
mayor’s personality, the formal government structure, and
the formal definition of the mayor’s role. The Allen
administration entered 1966 with a number one agenda for
labor relations which is characterized by “muddling
through” decision-making rather than a holistic approach
to decision-making. According to Kotter and Lawrence,
disjointed incremental decision-making is a common pro
cess used by men with. limite.d information. Interviews
with members of the Allen administration indicate that
the decision-makers were relative novices in the field
of labor relations.. Hence, the ad hoc policy which
140John F. Burton, p. 128-129
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developed was a logical one. The. Administration was
willing to make short-~range incremental concessions
which related to the problem at hand.
The Administration continued the previous Adinini
stration’s policy regarding the right of employees to
join, and be represented by the unions. Dues checkoff
previously granted to AFSCME was also continued, however,
rio efforts were made to extend the. privilege to IAFF. The
loose “meet and confer” policy, meaning the city was
willing to discuss any problem with an employee or or
ganized group at any time, also continued, Obviously,
neither the Mayor nor the Board of Aldermen thought it
necessary to centralize labor relations by designating
a branch of the government to deal with labor problems
in order to bring order to the tangled bureaucratic sys
tem in use. Instead of a collection of Aldermanic Com
mittees, with the Finance Committee welding most influ
ence, along with the Director of Personnel, the Personnel
Board, the Mayor and th.e Board of Aldermen engaged from
time to time in discussions regarding wages and working
conditions with union representatives. These meetings
took place whenever the city or th.e union requested them
and anything could be discussed. Nevertheless, it was
understood by all parties involved that any agreements
reached with these officials were not binding. Management’s
only responsibility was to listen and then unilaterally
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arrive at some decision. This loose, flexible policy,
which favored management, was accepted by the Administra
tion hecause it allowed the city to engage in decision
avoidance. Moreover, this cumbersome fragmented policy,
which allowed for decisional avoidance and prevented risk
talking change, helped to precipitate the 1966 and 1968
strikes.
During periods of crisis, the Administration simply
reacted to the problem and made muddling decisions which
applied directly to that problem. In the case of the
1966 firemen’s strike, Mayor Allen was willing to do
something the city had never done before when he decided
to use a mediator to make non-binding recommendations re
garding the labor dispute. Furthermore, during the 1968
strike, he promised and approved in 1969 a Statement of
Policy and Grievance Procedure which laid a foundation
for the possible development of a formal labor policy.
Allen’s personality had a telling affect on the re
lationship between the city and the unions. He believed
in collective bargaining but he was not willing to engage
in risk-taking changes. Departmental heads were expected
to solve labor problems. If they could not do do, these
problems were to be solved at a higher level. Although
the government structure allowed for a weak mayor system,
Allen, through his power to appoint Aldermanic Committee
members, appointed persons that he could control and had
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confidence in the key con~ni;tte~s. Thus there ~as the ap
pearance of decisions arrived at independently at each
level of the structure, yet, these decisions were known
and approved by the Mayor beforehand. Allen took ad-~
vantage of the fact that the mayor’s role in labor rela
tions was vague, and when he felt it necessary he took
an active role in labor negotiations. This was particu
larly true during times of crisis.
The different reactions of the Administration to the
1966 fire fighters’ strikes and the 1968 sanitation strikes
were partially shaped by the Mayor’s views regarding the
right of public employees to strike. As indicated earlier,
the Mayor did not believe that public safety employees had
the right to strike. Thus when mediation attempts failed,
the Administration enforced the state law which forbade
strikes by public employees and fired the strikers. The
Administration had reached what Hildebrand refers to as a
“family understanding,” on the matter of firing the strik
ers, and efforts by third parties to initiate multilateral
bargaining were thwarted. The Administration was also
obviously concerned with preserving its amicable, paterna
listic relationship with Local 134 rather than giving in
to the strikers and having to deal with a maverick, mili
tant and authentically independent union.
During the 1968 sanitation strike, the Administra
tion’s attitude differed. The strikers were able to amass
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a solid base of conmrnnity support for their cause and they
had access to trained professional union negotiators. The
Administration did not have strong feelings about the
right of sanitation workers to strike. Therefore, the
workers were not fired and they were paid for some of the
days they were on strike and dues checkoff was not re
voked. The Administrationwas willing to engage in col
lective bargaining (as defined in the introduction) in an
attempt to solve the labor dispute. Once again the Adminis
tration reached reached a “family understanding” regarding
its position and third party interest groups were mobilized
by the city to force the workers and the union to come to
terms. The fact that the city was able to engage in multi
lateral bargaining indicates that rank and file and the
union representatives had not reached a coalesced position.
The agreement reached was implemented in ordinance and
resolution form and became part of the personnel handbook.
According to Burton, this process conforms to the initial
bargaining stage and can be labeled informal bargaining.
This proceudre is also commonly found when state law pro
hibits a binding contract between public employees and
city government.
In the case of the firemen, Local .134 clearly had
access to the municipal decision makers. Rowever, the
records indicate that the Brothers Combined Social Club
was also a viable interest group with access to the
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municipal decision makers similar to that enjoyed by
Local 134. Thus Brothers Combined and the Cormnunity
RelRtions Commission oervcd as third party pressure
groups to force needed change in workIng conditions for
firemen. Once again, however, the changes brought about
were short run and directly addressed the crisis at hand.
As the Allen administration entered its final days,
IAFF and AFSCME were still intact. TAFF displayed war
scars, as a result of the split in its ranks brought
about by the 1966 £ ire fighters strike. AFSCME, however,
was still rejoicing from the successful negotiations which
resulted from the 1968 sanitation strike. Yet, both unions
were willing to push for more of a voice in the decision-
making process which determined wages and working condi
tions for city employees. Although Ivan Allen was not a
candidate for mayor in 1969, he supported Rodney Cook, a
representative of the business community to be his suc
cessor. The labor community was of the opinion that
vice-mayor Sam Massell, a mayoral candidate, would be
willing to support their efforts and continue to build
upon and develop the labor policy established by Allen in
1969. For years he had orally supported the concept of
collective bargaining for public employees and the causes
of the working man. In a speech given February 19, 1969,
at the Emory University Nurses~ Alumni Association Student
Award Banquet (a copy of which was sent to the AFSCME
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union), Massell stated he supported the efforts by orga
nized gr.oups to bargain collectively. H.e warned that
people in power were not listenting to the demands being
made; and he added that if the only obstacle to collective
bargaining was the state law, then administrators should
call upon the legislature to change the law.141 This
statement had many to believe that if Massell came to
power then collective bargaining would be a part of his
Adminstratjon. Thus Massell sounded like the man labor
needed. The unions worked vigorously through COPE to
register voters and actively campaigned for Massell’s
election. When Massell was elected Mayor in November
1969, AFSCME officials immediately reject the Allen admin
istration’s proposed two step pay increase as inadequate,
indicating that they wanted twice that amount along with
a myriad of needed fringe benefits. AFSCME did show a
willingnesss to waitand see what the new Administration,
whom they had helped to elect, would offer before a strike
vote was called. Time would show that the hasty marriage
between Massell and labor was in for a short honeymoon.
Massell, Emory University Nurses’ Alumni
Association Student Award Banquet, Speech., 19 February
1969, AFSCME Local 1644 Files~,’ Atlanta, Georgia.
CHAPTER III
THE SAM MASSELL ADMINISTRATION 1970-1973
In 1969, Ivan Allen indicated that he would not
seek re-election. However, persons seeking Allen’s po
sition were not in short supply, for Atlanta voters were
given a field of four candidates to choose from:
Everett Millican, Sam Massell, Rodney Cook and Horace
Tate. Only the last three persons were considered to
be serious contenders. Sam Massell, Vice-Mayor from
1966-1969, was considered to be one of the new breed
of politicians in the South and his platform stressed
human relations and integration. On the other hand,
Rodney Cook represented the Atlanta business community
which traditionally controlled City Hall. Horace Tate,
the third serious contender, had a distinguished career
as an educator in the Black community. In the primary,
the Black community split its support between Massell,
Tate and Cook. However, in the runoff, with Tate out,
the Black community united with labor and supported Sam
Massell. Massell received 54.9 percent of the vote.
Later, an analysis of the vote revealed that approxi
mately 73 percent of Massell’s votes came from the Black
community. Hence, Atlanta politics appeared to be
140
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entering a new stage. For the first time, Atlanta had
a Jewish Mayor and a Black Vice-Mayor, Maynard Jackson.
Outwardly, it appeared that things were looking up for
Blacks and the labor community.
AFSCME felt that it now had a friend in the Mayor’s
office. Massell’s labor position had long been under
stood by the local. In 1962 when candidates for office
were surveyed by AFSCME, Massell had indicated that he
was a supporter of collective bargaining for public em
ployers. By 1969, his position had broadened to include
the right of some public employees to strike. However,
after the election, Massell indicated that he had not
developed any agenda which involved reforming~ the pre
vious Administration’s labor relations policy. Rather,
the former mayor revealed that he was a novice in matters
relating to public employee unionism and his plan was to
deal with problems as they arose.1- As a result, the
number one agenda setting process which so aptly applied
to the Ivan Allen administration, was the model Massell
had chosen.
~ganization and Membership
The Massell administration’s policy in these areas
was a continuation of the previous Administration. Massell
felt that workers were better off if they were organized-
1lnterview with Sam Massell, Former Mayor of Atlanta,
Atlanta, Georgia, 3 February 1977.
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if their organization was viable. His policy was to recog
nize anyone, to meet, negotiate and counsel with anyone
whether they represented “four thousand or four employees ~“2
This led to a continuation of the Allen administration’s
loose “meet and confer” system.
Membership within AFSCME and IAFF was open. As far
as the city was concerned, anyone could be a member. IAFF
excluded chiefs from membership and AFSCME, according to
city officials, was opposed to management being members.3
In this manner, the city continued its policy of “no
policy” on union membership.4
Representative Status and Dues Checkoff
The Massell administration developed no procedure
for certifying or selecting unions. The informal recog
nition of AFSCME and IAFF which had developed over the
decades was to continue. However, an official opinion
regarding the matter issued by John E. Daugherty, Associ
ate City Attorney, on March 28, 1970 embodied the city’s
official position during Massell’s tenure. The city of
Atlanta “has never given official recognition to any
2 i d.
3Massell, and Interview with Reverend J. D. Grier,
Chairman of the Civil Service Board, Atlanta, Georgia,
17 February 1977.
4lnterview with Dan Sweat, Central Atlanta Progress,
17 February 1977.
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employee organization and has never entered into a contract
with an organization. ‘~5 The city maintained this stance
throughout the Maoocll administration. A~ under the Allen
administration, the city claimed that the recognition of
AFSCME and IAFF was informal because the city had never
entered into a contract with either group. The city would
always be willing to discuss employee problems with any
group to achieve an agreement. These accords could be
adopted in ordinance or resolution form by the Board of
Aldermen and the Mayor. Usually, these agreements were
passed in resolution form, a decision avoidance tactic.
According to one city official, the union preferred to
have agreements in writing; as a consequence, the State
ment of Policy and Grievance Procedures negotiated by the
Massell administration was set to paper in order to accom
modate the union. However, these accords were not legally
binding and could not be enforced.6
The Administration of Mayor Massell, despite his
pro-labor campaign position, was not sympathetic to the
exclusive recognition of any union. The Administration
wanted to have the broadest possible latitude to discuss
labor problems with any group. Like the previous regime,
5john E. Daugherty to Mayor Sam Massell, 28 March
1970, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
6lnterview with John E. Daugherty, Assistant City
Attorney, 15 February 1977.
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it engaged in reactive, incremental decision-making.
Massell’s highly publicized stand on favoring collective
bargaining before he was elected to office failed to
become part of his labor plans. Moreover, his pro-labor
position was possibly aborted when his support for AFSCME
precipitously cooled during the 1970 sanitation strike.
The Mayor’s reaction to the strike took the form
of revenge against AFSCME. As indicated in the previous
chapter, AFSCME had received dues checkoff in 1959. The
practice was updated under the Allen administration~on
May 19, 1969 when an ordinance was passed which authorized
the Director of Finance rather than the City Comptroller
to deduct dues from the salaries and wages of employees
who were members of AFSCME. However, the long estab
lished practice ended on August 3, 1970, when the Admin
istration successfully revoked AFSCME’s dues checkoff
privilege.7 This was the Administration’s way of pun
ishing AFSC1~1E for striking against the City. It can
reasonably be concluded that the Mayor never really be
lieved in the right of certain employees to strike. The
ordinance which revoked dues checkoff was recommended by
the Finance Committee and treated as normal legislation
with only two aldermen casting negative votes and one
7Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Aldermen, meeting of 3 August
1970. (Typewritten.)
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alderman abstaining.8 Afterwards, Vice-Mayor Jackson urged
that checkoff be restored, and on August 17, 1970, the
matter was reconsidered. However, the Mayor was able to
garner enough support, due to the anti-union sentiment re
sulting from the strike, to defeat reinstatement by a vote
of 9-4. Many aldermen argued that they were opposed to
the new proposal because it did not allow other labor or
ganizations the checkoff, particularly the firemen and
the police. But, this excuse was soon proved to be in
valid. In 1971 and 1972, efforts, spearheaded by Alder
man Marvin Arrington and Vice-Mayor Jackson to restore
checkoff with theprivilege extended to any labor organi
zation, was defeated.9
In an interview, Massell revealed his bitterness
toward AFSCME as a result of the 1970 strike. During the
strike he was of the opinion that the national and local
AFSCME leadership had proved ‘tdisappointing.. . they had
given. . .bad advice to their members which was costly...
&r4T we decided that they were acting irresponsibly.”1-°
He stated his conviction that the Aldermanic Board preferred
8lbjd
9Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Aldermen, meeting of 3 May 1971,




to rid itself of union agitation and his opinion that the
union should come to a no-strike agreement, if they
wanted checkoff. He expressed his view of checkoff in
the following statement:
The Checkoff is a favor that the employer does
for the employee. I am satisfied that a vast
majority of the employees would prefer not to
have it. But the Unions prefer it.. . for ob
vious reasons. I think for that reason it is
a negotiable. item and that it’s something that
means a great deal to the Union, and in return
for that they should give something to manage
ment that means a great deal to management such
as protection against strikes.. .work efficiency...
or any number of things that management wants.
Checkoff should not be taken for granted.
Unions should agree to something. . .Without check
off, a laborerts union cannot exist.11-
AFSCME never agreed to Massell’s demands and he exercised
all of his power to prevent checkoff from being restored
during his tenure as Mayor.
1970 AFSCME Strike
Massell faced the threat of a strike immediately
after he assumed office. The Board of Aldermen and the
Mayor approved the 1969 proposed 2-step raise in January
1970. Yet, AFSCME was not satisfied. The AFSCME local
at this point had a majority Black membership and Blacks
had put Massell into office. After assuming office,
Massell immediately appointed a Black Alderman, Joel
Stokes, Chairman of the Finance Committee. As previously
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noted, this committee’s recommendations on financial
matters were normally approved without discussion by
the Aldermanic Board. It now appeared that AFSCME had
two significant allies in the city government, a Mayor
and a power Committee Chairman who was Black and would
be inclined to favor the upgrading of wages and working
conditions of Black sanitation workers. Thus AFSCME
demanded an additional one step increase retroactive
to January 19, 1970.
In the first month of the new administration, Joel
Stokes in a letter to the president of AFSCME Local 1644
stated his views on the matter of salary. “I sympathize
with your problems relative to increases in pay for all
city employees.” Discussions regarding the matter would
continue with the Union until February 20 by which time
the Committee would know what kind of funds it had to
offer. He concluded by promising the Union “whatever we
agree to, it is my intention to make this agreement retro
active to January 19, l970.t~l2 Within a few days, the
Stokes’ pledge appeared to be simply an empty promise. On
March 16, 1970, the Finance Committee approved a Resolution
to deny the salary increase demand and pledged that in the
late fall it would “seriously review the salaries of the
~-2Joel Stokes to Claude Holt, 21 January 1970, AFSCME
Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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employees and. . .upgrade, within its financial capabili
ties.”13 Angered by the Finance Committee actions, the
members of Local 1644 voted to do battle with the city
by taking a holiday on March 17, 1970 and not appearing
for work. In this way, the strike began.
In an interview, Massell stated, “Hell, I had just
walked into the office. . .and found out where the men’s
room was when they.. .went on strike.” The Mayor now
claims that the strike was a surprise to him. Earlier, he
alleges, officials of AFSCME, particularly Morton Shapiro,
had come to his office privately and stated”that they were
going to walk out for one day just to make a point of what
.they were requesting.. .1 said I understood.” Massell
claims that he explained to the group that he had on hand
only $400,000, a sum inadequate to cover their demands.
On the other hand, if they wanted to walk out for a day
and then get the few dollars the city had, it was fine with
him. “I didn’t mind them looking good, it didn’t bother
me because we had a job to do and they had a job to do.”
Massell’s allegations were not corroborated by union of
ficials. Whether a deal was struck is not significant ex
cept for the fact that after the strike went past the
“agreed one day,” Massell decided the union leaders were
1-3Atlanta, Georgia “A Pledge to Seriously Review and
Upgrade Salaries of City Employees When Appropriate,”
Resolution (16 March 1970).
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“liars” and he had been put “in a trick.” This attitude
influenced the actions he was later to take.1-4
After the strike began, the union demanded that
$2.5 million dollars be used to give raises to better
than 7,200 city employees. The city’s counter offer
was $5,000 in free life insurance for all employees and
minimum pay of $2.13 per hour. The city’s package amounted
to approximately $400,000,15 the amount Massell supposedly
had privately advised the Union he had at his disposal.
In any case, Massell and his advisors intended to negotiate
a package which did not exceed this amount, the Union
rejected the city’s offer and utilized a citizen committee,
in reality a “shadow party,” to attempt to mediate the
dispute. The group had no success.
Mayor Massell’s response to the strike was not what
most people expected. He was, in his opinion, determined
that the union was not going to run his town. On the other
hand, AFSCME felt that they had been betrayed by Massell.
They had made him and they could break him. Massell moved
to solve his problem by (1) informing striking employees
on Wednesday, March 18, that they would be fired if they
did not report to work on Friday, and (2) informing
14Massell Interview.
15William Uroman, Atlanta Sanitation Strike, (Boston,
Massachusetts: Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, 1970),
Part C. p. 13,
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striking employees on Friday that any one “illegally
absent” was fired. Thereafter, notices were sent with
$.51 special delivery stamps to 1,028 strikers at a cost
of $524.28 on March 20 informing them of their dismissal.16
Massell also tried to break the strike by attempting to
lead approximately 100 workers across picket lines. He
was helibent on holding his position, which was that
(1) all city employees had received a two step raise in
January (this included sanitation workers) and (2) the
city could not afford the pay increase demanded.
•After Massell’s special delivery letters were
mailed, the strikers’ jobs were declared vacant. Although
he had fired the workers, he said that they could come
back to work. However, each department head was to de
termine which employee he wanted back. He also declared
that the strike was over.17 This move by Massell brought
an immediate reaction from the union official, Shapiro,
who was quoted by the Atlanta Journal as charging:
The Mayor does not want to settled the strike,
letting each supervisor decide which employees
go back to work is the worst union-~bust tactic.
He claims to be a friend of labor and yet he
has just fired 1,600 poor people, mostly
Blacks. The city reneged on a promise of a
one-step increase. The Mayor now says you’ve
got the right to strike, but you’re fired.
We have no choice but to escalate the strike.
16Atlanta Constitution, 20 March 1970.
1-7Atlanta Journal, 21 March 1970.
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The city has been playing a number’s game.
Because three people showed up for work at
the Cyclorama, they say the strike is over.
The city is in for a longer siege.
Our fight is now with the City of Atlanta
and its great liberal Mayor.l8
The Mayor held standfast to his position that there
was no strike because ‘tpeople who are not employees cannot
strike.” He began to run ads in the local paper which
were supposedly an effort to get the facts of the current
city employees’ work stoppage before the people.19 Massell
also charged that the workers were being “misled” by their
leaders who were also outside agitators and a bunch of
scoundrels.2° He especially pushed this theme after Jerry
Wurf, th.e International President of AFSCME, came to town
and began to lead the negotiations. The union had apparently
underestimated him.21 He now admits to knowing little about
organized labor at the time.
That put them at a disadvantage.. .1 didn’t
know to bargain and maneuver and politic and
to promise less than what I could do.. .So
when they asked for money I put all my cards
on the table. They thought I knew the game
and I didn’t.22
19Mayor Sam Massell, Memorandum, 15 April 1970, City
of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files, Atlanta Files.
20Masseli Interview.




A currently ranking AFSCME official now states that from
hindsight, the view Massell expressed was probably true.
However, at the time the union was not aware of this
Massell shortcoming. Massell also believed the union
was not working in the interest of the people it purported
to represent, and he was very disturbed by the union’s
attempt to portray him as a racist.
Two weeks into the strike, the Vice-Mayor proposed
binding arbitration. Jackson expressed the opinion that
an arbitrator needed to look into the union’s claim that
the city had promised a raise and the city’s contention
that union officials had failed to push a compromise as
they had promised.23 The Mayor requested a legal opinion
on the question of whether or not the city could enter
into an agreement for binding arbitration with an
employee organization. On March 28, 1970, John E.
Daugherty, Associate City Attorney issued the following
opinion:
It is our opinion that all legislative authority
of the City of Atlanta is vested in the Mayor
and Board of Aldermen. Neither the Charter nor
the State law authorizes the Mayor and Board of
Aldermen to delegate their legislative authority
to any other group or person. The term arbitra
tion or binding arbitration means that both
parties are bound to carry out the finding of
the arbitrator or arbitrating body. Since this
would mean that the Mayor and Aldermen were
delegating their right to set the salaries for
municipal employees to another person or body,
23Atlanta Journal, 23 March 1970.
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it is our opinion that th.is would be an
unlawful delegation and therefore invalid.24
The Mayor accepted the city’s legal opinion. On the
other hand, he was of the opinion that the union had no
position in the city’s employer-employee relationship.
Massell’s next move was to use volunteers from the
city’s prison farm. However, these workers were harassed
and none volunteered the next day. John Wright, Presi
dent of the AFL-CIO’s Atlanta Labor Council voiced sup
port for the union’s quest for a “fair and reasonable
settlement.” He acknowledged that city employees were
grossly underpaid in comparison to other areas. Wright
also made it clear that he felt the strike was centered
on “personality conflict” rather than the issues and
that Massell’s use of city prisoners was unforgiveable.25
Meanwhile, the strike continued and was marked by violence
and a large number of arrests.
On March 25, 1970, city employees once again rejected
a negotiated agreement between the union leadership and
Massell. The agreement was identical to the city’s
original offer, with one exception. The city ix~w promised
to re-employ all strikers; however, they would not be
paid for the lost time.26 Black leaders such as Senator
24John E. Daugherty to Mayor Sam Massell, Jr., 28
March 1970, Atlanta, City Attorney’s Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
25Atlanta Constitution, 24 March 1970.
26Uroman.
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Leroy Johnson, Jesse Hill and Ralph Abernathy were trying
in various ways to mediate. However, some 400 to 500
members of the National Guard which Massell had orginally
requested from Governor Lester Maddox, were still on
standby alert and backed by the State Patrol. All of
this show of force only aggravated the strain that existed
between the city employees, the union and the Mayor. The
Mayor described the situation as a “reign of terror.”
Supposedly, union members were preventing loyal workers
from returning to their jobs.27
On March 25, 1970, Massell issued a statement which
represented his stand on the strike and the union:
My patience has been exhausted. Yet my heart
goes out to the workers who have apparently
been made a tool of a small band of power-
seeking union bosses.. . .1 have come to the
conclusion that some of the Lunion officialsj
must be ill-motivated and have littled in
terest in the peace and tranquility of our
community. . . This is sad, for they leave us no
alternative but to fight in defense--and fight
we will!28
Massell then assured workers who wanted to return to their
jobs that the Chief of Police had been advised to provide
any assistance needed to assure free ingress and egress to
all public facilities. He then declared “if this labels
me a ‘strike breaker;’ let me say to my friends in orga
nized labor, I am sorry--but in turn I say I must label
you a ‘city breaker.”29
29Ibid
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As the negotiations continued, Massell and Jerry
Wurf were pitted against each other. In this clash of
personalities, there apparently was an ego problem be
tween the two as well as a question of who was the most
powerful. From time to time, both stalked out of meet
ings and both participated in name calling. Screaming
matches were coninion during the negotiations. According
to Professor William Uroman, in his case study of the
strike, the following Wurf comments were typical of a
television meeting between the two on March 31, 1970.
You lie! You’re a contemptible, irresponsible
little man. You’re playing games with human
beings. How sick you must be. You’re a
little man who suddenly got power and can’t
handle it!
You ugly, vicious rumor-monger! You contemptible
strikebreaker. You are a sorry example of a
human. You’re not fit for the synagogue. You’re
the type ~hat was a concentration guard for the
Germans! 3’~’
Massell usually responded in kind to Wurf’s comments and
he decided to cease discussions with Wurf.
Massell’s reaction to the labor crisis was quite
different from Ivan Allen, despite the fact that both
mayors were operating with a number one agenda setting
process. Unlike Ivan Allen, who calmly negotiated with
AFSCME officials during the 1968 Sanitation strike,
Massell’s behavior indicated a total lack of negotiating
30Uroman.
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skills. Further, he openly displayed contempt and dis
dain for the employee representatives. Unlike Allen, he
underestimated the level of public support for the sani
tation workers and decided to exercise his power to fire
them. However, due to tremendous community support for
the cause of the poor Black workers, Massell was forced
to shift his position.
Before the March 31, 1970 budget deadline ended,
the Aldermanic Board adopted and Massell approved a
workers’ bonus plan. If a worker came to work everyday,
at the end of the week he would be rewarded with $5.00.
However, this offer was criticized by Atlanta’s civil
rights leaders, workers and union officials and the
strike continued.
At this point, support for the strikers from civil
rights groups, Vice-Mayor Jackson and the public began to
increase. Locally, funds were channeled through a Strike
Assistance Fund. Contributions ranged from $5.00 in
individual contributions to a $146.54 donation from the
Greater Piney Grove Baptist Church in Atlanta. Nationally,
funds came from as far south as Miami, Florida, and as far
north as Madison, Wisconsin. The Vice-Mayor disapproved
of the methods used by the Mayor to handle the strike. He
also differed with the Mayor over whether the city could
legally give the employees a pay raise after March 31.
Jackson was quoted on the matter by the Atlanta Journal:
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I belive that a reasonable and correct inter
pretation of that section of the city code
does not prohibit the type of increase re
quested by the strikers and their representa
tives. The limitation mentioned in the or
dinance is a prohibition against increasing
base salaries. . .And labor relations have long
defined base salaries differently from incre
ment or ingrade compensatory increase.31
Civil Rights entered into the strike despite Massell’s
efforts to keep the race issue out. Many workers and
labor leaders viewed the matter as a black-white issue.
Obviously, the city employees on strike were the lowest
paid municipal workers and they were almost all black.
Even Massell’s actions implied that he realized race was
involved because he not only consulted his witer counter
parts, but he had constant consultations with Senator
Leroy Johnson, Jesse Hill, Dr. John Middleton, Bishop E.
L. Hickman, Benjamin Mays and the Reverend Martin Luther
King, Sr. All of these men attempted to keep race out of
the issue; however, they cooperated with the Mayor and
convinced Black workers to come to terms.
On April 22, 1970, an agreement was signed by Mayor
Massell, union officials and community leaders which of
ficially ended the 37 day strike. The agreement stated
that the employees were to be reinstated with all rights,
privileges and seniority and without prejudice or recrim
ination. Legal charges against all parties would be
dropped by the city. Furthermore, twelve classifications
3~-Atlanta Journal, 18 April 1970.
158
of employment were to be referred to the Personnel
Board for study, consideration and recommendations. The
agreement also sounded a conciliatory note when it claimed,
‘11t is further understood the parties will seek to promote
and encourage understanding, harmony and good will in the
relationship between the City of Atlanta and its employ
ees
The workers returned to their jobs on April 23, and
the Board of Aldermen passed an ordinance to repeal the
$5.00 bonus plan and converted the funds into a one-step
salary increase. This increase was granted to 2,314 em
ployees in 21 classifications. Apparently Massell had
been wrong and Jackson partially right about the question
of whether a raise could be given after March 31. Ac
cording to the April 23 ordinance, the City Attorney
ruled that the increase was legal because
the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen could
change the method of compensating the em
ployees in an amount not to exceed the funds
allocated for the $5.00 bonus, so long as all
employees in the 21 classes are benefited by
the change and that there are no additional
classes or employees added. The City Attorney
further rules this will be within the promises
of the Charter relating to salary increases.33
32”l970 Strike Agreement,” AFSCME Local 1644 Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
33Atlanta, Georgia, “An Ordinance to Repeal the
Ordinance Adopted by the Mayor and Board of Aldermen on
Tuesday, March 31, 1970 Thus Amending Chapter 21, Article
11,” (23 April 1970).
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According to an interview with Massell, which is
corroborated by an intra-departmental memorandum in the
Financial Department, the strike settlement did not ex
ceed the $400,000 he had supposedly offered the union
before the strike. To be exact, the one-step increase
was to cost approximately $308,998.00. Massell and the
oth.er city decision-makers had entered the crisis with a
“family understanding” or a coalesced position which did
not shift despite the pressure from “shadow parties.”
In this case, the “shadow parties” were community civil
rights leaders and the Vice-Mayor. The workers lost pay
for 27 work days which amounted to a loss of $481.95 for
the lowest paid worker. It would take the lowest paid
waste collector approximately 642 days to recover his
loss with his new $.75 per day increase.34 Nevertheless,
the sanitation workers did stand up for what they believed
in and after it was over, they were MEN. Massell was a
winner and a loser. He had won the respect of the anti-
union community and lost the support of many Blacks and
union forces that had elected him. He proved to be an
inexperienced negotiator and a man unable to control his
temper. Even though he felt that he had won the battle,
the union still got the raise he had at one point termed
illegal. However, the unanswered question still remains.
Had Massell actually promised union officials a package
34Atlanta Constitution, 27 April 1970.
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eventually won after 37 workiess days before the strike
ever took place? If he did make such an offer, why had
union officials turned him down? Were the workers used
as pawns by both parties? Vice-Mayor Jackson came out
of the strike unscathed. Because he had opposed Massell’s
method of handling the strike, and had spoken out on the
legality of the raise, AFSCME viewed him as a friend.
In the 1973 city elections AFSCME would return the favor.
Strike Aftermath
Although the strike was officially over, wounds
created by the intense conflict were not easily healed.
This conclusion is supported by Massell’s correspondence
to AFSCME Local 1644’s president, Claude Holt. Massell
expressed his concern about the “complete disrespect for
the Mayor’s office” which had, in his opinion, been dis
played by Jerry Wurf during the strike. And now that
the strike was over, Massell felt that Wurf was demon
strating the same attitude toward the strike settlement.
He then pointedly expressed his view of Mr. Wurf, the
strike settlement, and the union.
Jerry Wurf dies hard. It has been my opinion
all along that he did not want the strike to
end this early and I am even more convinced,
now that it has been settled in his absence,
after reading his comments from Washington.
It is unfortunate that he would demonstrate
such complete contempt for Local 1644 of his
own Union which set forth in the first sentence
of the settlement agreement the desire to “bring
peace and harmony.”
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Mr. Wurf is quoted as saying: “Government
officials always complain that they don’t
have the funds to give raises. . .but some way
or another they reach under the bed and get
the money.” This was not the case in Atlanta.
The records will reveal that when the Union de
manded a raise of 2.4 million dollars we offered
a package on March 17th totaling just over 3
hundred thousand dollars, and I clearly advised
the union officials that we did not have addi
tional funds. These same monies were subse
quently alloted to 2300 of the lowest paid em
ployees on March 31st and unilaterally appro
priated as a one step raise to those workers on
April 20th. The settlement reached thereafter
did not in fact call for the expenditure of one
single dollar.
A statement by Jesse Epps, one of Mr. Wurf’s aides,
is included in today’s report from Washington
claiming that “the Atlanta workers’ success will
show public employees in other Georgia cities
that they can get more while keeping what they
already have.” This is terribly misleading at
the expense of municipal workers, so I am com
pelled to correct it by pointing out that the
workers who were on strike were not paid by the
city for the 36 days th.ey were out and were only
given minimal amounts from the Union, with the
result that it will probably take the normal
raises of several years before they will be
back “even with the board.”
I don’t claim to know a lot about union negoti
ations, so perhaps I am wrong, but it is of con
siderable surprise to me that after we reach a
settlement and the strike is ended the Interna
tional President and one of his aides should
publicly attack me if, in fact, they have any
intention of developing any meaningful relation
ship for their members with this Administration.
Perhaps as one who has supported and received
support from organized labor I have tried too
hard to protect this entity, and instead should
acknowledge th.e possibility that this particular
Union has outlived any usefulness it may have
been to city employees.
In behalf of city employees who belong to AFSCME,
this letter is to request a public apology if it
is the wish of this Union to represent them in any
meaningful relationship with Atlanta’s government.
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In addition, it has come to our attention that
the Union is distributing a mimeographed letter
to employees stating, in part, “Upon reclassi
fication, an additional 533 employees will re
ceive an increase effective May 1.” This, too,
must be corrected, for it was clearly under
stood that there was no promise as to how many--
if any--of these jobs would be reclassified and
a proposed beginning date was purposedly deleted
by agreement of both sides to allow the city
complete flexibility. ti35
The union did not publicly apologize to Massell and he was
now convinced that the union was not seriously seeking re
forms to benefit the city’s employees. After the strike,
the responsibility for union negotiations were given by
Massell to the Personnel Board. In an interview, Massell
made this statement:
Frankly. . . by the time the strike had been con
cluded.. .1 was satisfied beyond any doubt, that
AFSCME did not have capable leadership to pro
tect its own members and for that. reason I had
no interest in them at all. . .arid so.. .1 didn’t
take any special effort to. . . try and dissolve
their membership other than the check-off.36
During the strike, workers and union officials had
complained about working conditions. The union’s com
plaints about the horrid working conditions suffered by
waste collectors were confirmed in a Community Relations
Coinmision Report issued in the aftermath of the strike.
James Howard and other union officials indicated that
the CRC report confirmed the findiügs of the union.
35Mayor Sam Massell to Claude Holt, 24 April 1970,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
36Massell Interview.
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The report indicated that 672 of 714 waste collectors
were Black while only two of 52 supervisors were Blacks.
The report recommended that Blacks receive greater equity,
that better showers and clean up facilities be provided
the mean, and that the public be more cooperative.37
Massell struck back at the union on August 3, 1970,
by taking AFSCME’s most prized possession, the checkoff.
An ordinance was passed which eliminated the more than
10-year practice. Some argue that the checkoff system,
where the dues of union members are deducted from their
checks, is a prerequisite for an effective union organi
zation. The ordinance had no difficulty passing; only
Alderman Marvin Arrington abstained.38 Thus the labor
relations of the Massell administration were to evolve
in conflict with the union rather than in harmony. The
elimination of the checkoff was viewed by many as
Massell’s attempt to kill the union because of the treat
ment he received from union officials during the strike.
Collective Bargaining and Administrative Machinery
A major innovation which should have brought order
to the city’s crisis oriented, chaotic labor relations
37Community Relations Commission, “Report on Atlanta’s
Waste Collection System,” Atlanta, Georgia, May 1970.
38Atlanta, Georgia, “An Ordinance to Amend Article
VII of Chapter 2 of the Code of Ordinances, So As to Re
veal Section 2-144, Which Now Authorizes the Deduction of
Union Dues from City Employees’ Wages; and for Other
Purposes,” (3 August 1970).
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was instituted under Sam Massell. The position of Direc
tor of Labor Relations was created and Joel Gay, a long
time labor leader, was appointed to the position. An
inter-office memorandum describing the nature of the new
administrator’s work indicated that the Director of Labor
Relations would be responsible for developing the city’s
overall employee-management program. Thus it appeared
that the Administration was about to develop a number
three agenda setting process which entailed long range
planning and a comprehensive approach to labor relations.
This would have meant that the Administration had chosen
to preclude future reactive, crisis-oriented, incremental
decision-making. However, this was not to be the case.
In reality, the Director of Labor Relations had no
authority and the records indicate that the number one
agenda setting process for labor relations continued.
According to Massell, the new director’s job was to keep
the Mayor advised of problems anywhere in city government.
He was “like an Ombudsman, but specifically in the field
of labor.”39 This powerless Bureau coupled with the
Aldermanic Committees, the Personnel Board and Massell
made up the hodge-podge machinery during the Massell ad
ministration.
After the 1970 Sanitation Strike, Massell delegated
the responsibility for decisions regarding wages and
39Massell Interview.
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working conditions with, employees, and labor unions to the
Personnel Board as stipulated in the 1969 Statement of
Policy Resolution. As indicated, in the previous chap-.
ter, this plan, according to John F. Burton, calls for
the utilization of existing expertise and maintenance of
established authority relationship which proved to be an
unstable arrangement. It would seem that Massell had
chosen to superimpose a bargaining procedure on the tra
ditional government apparatus.
Massell has characterized th.e relationship which
existed between labor and his Administration as “adver
sary.” This relationship was due to many factors: Mas
sell’s personal anti-AFSCME feelings; the Administration’s
belief that the union was trying to take over the city;
racism; and the city’s hodge-podge labor machinery. This
relationship will now be illustrated.
Formal Procedure IAFF
Labor relations problems regarding grievances with
in the Fire Department were improved tremendously as a
result of the recommendations from the 1969 Community
Relations Commission Report. The New Grievance Proce
dures were approved by the Board of Firemasters February
16, 197040 but they were never incorporated into an
40Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meeting of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 16
February 1970. (Typewritten.)
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ordinance nor adopted in resolution form by the Board of
Aldermen.41 Under this new procedure, a fireman could
take his grievance to a seven man grievance committee
made up of six non-officer firemen, three black and
three white, and one citizen from the community at large.
According to the procedure, the committee would receive
a written complaint from employees of the Atlanta Fire
Department within ten days of an alleged incident. The
Committee at the close of a hearing or investigation,
would submit a written report and recommendation within
ten days to the Chief of the Fire Department. The Chief,
in turn, would render a decision or ruling within thirty
days from the receipt of the Grievance Committee report.
If the aggrieved or accused was not satisfied with the
Chief’s decision or ruling, he could appeal such decision
or ruling in writing to the chairman of the Board of
Firemasters within ten days after he received notice of
the Chief’s position. The Board of Firemasters would
render its decision or ruling within thirty-five days
from the conclusion of its investigation. All decisions
or rulings of the Board of Firemasters would be final
and binding, subject to the review of the Mayor and
Board of Aldermen and/or an appropriate legal tribunal.
(See Table 3.)
41-Interview with Chief James I. Gibson, Atlanta Fire
Department, Atlanta, Georgia, 8 February 1977.
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This was the formal procedure by which grievances of fire
men were heard.42
The procedure for entering any formal complaint
about working conditions or wages was also changed during
the Massell administration. The Board of Firemasters
ruled at its December 1, 1970 meeting that anyone who
desires to appear before the Board of Firemasters should
submit in writing to the Chairman of the Board of Fire
masters the matter or subject to be discussed. A copy
42”The Establishment of a Grievance Committee of
the Atlanta Fire Department and Provisions for Appeals
therefrom,” Fire Department, Atlanta, Georgia, 16
February 1970, City of Atlanta Fire Department Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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of this should be sent to the Secretary of the Board
of Firemasters ten days prior to date of the Board
meeting in order to be placed on the Agenda.43 This
TABLE 4
LABOR RELATIONS FLOW CHART FOR PRESENTATION OF








was a move toward an open policy in terms of firemen
being allowed to present their complaints directly to
the Board as shxwn in Table 4 above. Previously, they
had to go through th.e Chief and he could determine
whether their problems were worthy of the Board’s ears.
The Massell administration was characterized by
numerous feeble attempts to implement the Community
43Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 1 Decem
ber 1970. (Typewritten.)
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Relations Commission’s recommendations. Local 134 never
stated a position on the matter. It clung instead to
the theory of promotion based on competitive examination
which ran counter to the Commission’s recommendation.
The union’s position was always in line with Chief P. 0.
Williams and Carl T. Sutherland, the Director of Person
nel.
In a January 13, 1970 letter to Alderman Jack
Summers, Chairman of the Board of Firemasters, Sutherland
expressed concern about the the publicity that had been
given to complaints by Black firemen alleging discrimi
nation in the employment and promotion of firemen. He
informed Summers that the Personnel Board, the Director
of Personnel, and the Fire Promotion Board had agreed
to respond to the Commission’s recommendations in the
following manner: The suggestion that the Otis-Lennon
test be eliminated as the written test presently used
to examine applicants for employment and be replaced
by a simple requirement that an applicant complete the
tenth grade was asinine. This suggestion, according
to Sutherland, was “not” practical L~ecause aT fire
fighter must be able to do more than “direct a stream
of water onto a fire.” Thus, the Personnel Department
would continue to recruit the best qualified men available
to train for careers. In regard to the recommendation
that “a black recruiter spend full-time on outside
170
recruitment,” Sutherland felt this request was already
being fulfilled. He further stated that the Personnel
Board was calling upon Black firemen to assist in re
cruiting efforts by urging young men who “possess the
minimum qualifications” to apply for positions in the
Fire Department. The situation wherein the Fire Depart
ment recruitment folder had no pictures of black firemen
was “inadvertent” and instructions had been issued to
prepare a new folder showing at least “one black fire
man.” The Personnel Director recognized that the re
quest for a full-time black person to be assigned to
reception in the Personnel Office was valid and a special
effort would be made to secure a ‘Tqualified black inter
viewer” whenever a vacancy occurred. Moreover, the
request that the Firemen Interview Panel be expanded
to three members with the third one being Black was
being implemented. However, the proposal “that all
bona fide residents of the City of Atlanta” applying for
any Civil Service job be given a small number of points
on hiring examination for living in the city of Atlanta
was not consistent with the mission of securing for the
city government the best qualified employees available.44
The denial of this request seemed to ignore the
fact that it was common practice to add points to the
44Carl T. Sutherland to Reverend Samuel W. Williams,
13 January 1970, City of Atlanta Fire Department Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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civil service exam scores of military veterans. Also,
it appears to discriminate because at this juncture in
history, approximately 50 percent of Atlanta residents
were Black and this concession might have given Blacks
a chance to catch up in the Fire Department and make
amends for all the years of discrimination. Also, one
must remember that over half of the force were members
of Local 134 and it was common knowledge that its member
ship was predominately white and most whites had begun to
flee the city limits of Atlanta. Hence, the move toward
giving residents of Atlanta bonus points would definitely
have enhanced the status of Black applicants. The group
also agreed to fully integrate fire stations by placing
Black firemen in all stations and on most shifts. Yet,
approximately half of the Black firemen continued to
serve as the lone black on most shifts instead of in
pairs as recommended by the Commission. In fact, it
appears that the only concession made to the Commission
and the Brothers Combined without modifications was the
assurance that a Black firemen’s picture would be in
cluded in the Fire Department’s recruiting brochure.
With regard to promotions, the Fire Board main
tained its old policy endorsed by Local 134. “As Black
firemen gain experience with additional service they will
be able to compete successfully for officer positions.”45
45Carl T. Sutherland to Reverend Samuel W. Williams,
13 January 1970, City of Atlanta Fire Department Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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The Fire Board ruled that the Register for the Fire
Lieutenant’s examination given March 1969 was accepta
ble. It disagreed with the Coimnission’s claimthat
discrimination was practiced in establishing the
Register because white firemen were allowed to attend
a special school where they were exposed to the examina
tion materials, and Black firemen were excluded.46 Thus
th.e Fire Promotion Board made no concessions to the
Commission Report.
At the Board of Firemasters meeting January 6,
1970, Local 134 requested a one step salary increase
and a correction of any injustices in logevity pay.
The Board simply listened to the request. Mr. William
Hamer, of the Brothers Combined, continued in his role
of gadfly and offered proposals that would help eliminate
discrimination against Black firemen. Among his con
cerns were segrgated sleeping and locker arrangements
as well as the promotion process. Local 134 remained
silent on these issues. Vice-Mayor Maynard Jackson
made a motion that the Board of Firemasters recommend to
the Fire Promotion Board that they select the two Black
Firemen who had passed the Lieutenant’s examination given
March 1969 and promote them to Chief’s Aides. This
motion was carried unanimously.47 This suggestion on the
47Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 6 January
1970. (Typewritten.)
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surface appeared to be routine, but, it was a very sensi
tive matter. One of the major complaints of the Brothers
Combined was the seemingly unfair method used by the
Chiefs to select their aides. Top men on the list could
be overlooked and the lowest man on the list chosen based
on the Chiefs’ personal preferences. Once selected as
a Chief’s aid, one was automatically a lieutenant and
most became Captain within a short period of time. This
appeared to be a fast route for promotion for the
Chiefs’ favorites; in fact, it smacked of a bona fide
spoils system.
After the unfavorable publicity given this procedure
by the Community Relations Commission, the Fire Promotional
Board encouraged the Chiefs to select Aides from the top
of the Lieutenants’ Register. However, the Vice-Mayor
was requesting that the procedures be bent once more in
order to have two Black officers, which seemed fair based
on past shenanigans in the department in particular.
Nevertheless, Chief P. 0. Williams was adamantly opposed
to this move. He argued that the two Blacks had passed
the examination; however, they were not qualified to be
Chiefs’ Aides because their records were too bad.48
In order to solve the problem, the Firemasters held
a special meeting on February 2, 1970. Despite the protest
48lnterview with William Hamer, President of Brothers
Combined, Atlanta, Georgia, 29 April 1977.
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from Local 134, Chief Williams made the following recom
mendations which were approved by the Board of Fire-
masters. The two Black firemen presently on the Fire
Lieutenants’ Register were to be promoted within ninety
days to rank of Chief’s Aide.. Another Black was to be
moved into the Fire Prevention Bureau to help in Public
Relations. According to Chief Williams, “these promo
tions and this move L~ercJ immediate and visible symbols
of L1~~~7 determination to help better the relations be
tween the races.”49 Although Local 134 had never stated
any opposition to the old practice of promotion, on
this occasion it now adopted the position of Chief
Williams. Local 134 mustered all the ammunition it
could to protest the Firemaster’s move when it brought
Charles Hall, District Vice-President of the International
Association of Firefighters, Washington, D. C., to the
meeting and requested that he be allowed to speak. Hall
stated that the National’s position was that promotions
be based on competitive examination. However, he made
the following recommendations regarding the Atlanta pro
motional system.
1. List of materials from which exam is taken
to be posted in all stations.~
2. All promotions to be made from the top of
list.
3. All in line promotions shall be made com
petit lye.
49Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 2 February
1970. (Typewritten.)
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4. Training school L~hou1d bej made available
for all members seeking promotion.
5• Llnstitution of! grievance procedures to
allow test grades to be appealed before
the promotion list is certified.SO
It is questionable as to whether Local 134’s concerns was
over the issue of promotion or the issue of the promotion
of Blacks. Regardless of the source of the concern, the
Board of Firemasters simply listened.
Despite the less that casual response from the Board,
Local 134 became zealous in its efforts to insure that
promotions be based on competitive examinations. At the
March 30, 1970, Board of Firemasters’ meeting, two un
usual resolutions were presented by Mr. Ellis, President
of Local 134. The first resolution requested that only
those who had passed the examination for officers be al
lowed to be in charge of a fire apparatus. The second
resolution requested that all fire apparatus operators
be required to pass the test as qualifed operators.5~-
According to Mr. Hamer, these unusual resolutions were a
direct result of Black firemen requesting permission to
drive fire trucks back to the station after a fire. This
was a means of acquiring experience and the privilege was
the discretion of the Officer in charge. Furthermore,
the procedure was a long established one. It was at this
5°Ibid.
51-Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 30 March
1970. (Typewritten.)
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point in time that Black firemen requested the opportuni
ty of doing something that white firemen had always been
allowed to do. Everybody knew that in order to be li
censed, you had to pass the written and practical exami
nation at the Fire Tower and everyone also knew this was
an accepted way to get experience. Thus it appeared that
Local 134 was set on preventing or hindering Black fire
men from becoming fire apparatus operators.52 The Board
ignored the request. Mr. Hamer spoke briefly on white
firemen’s disrespect for Blacks and Local 134 requested
the restoration of seniority lost during the 1966 strike.
There appeared to be a running feud between Local 134
and the Brothers Combined. However, the Board of Fire-
masters simply listened to the petitions but took no
action.
On March 31, 1970, Chief P. 0. Williams informed
the Board of Firemasters of actions taken by the Fire
Department in regard to recommendations made by the
Community Relations Commission. The departmental hiring
policy would remain the same. However, the Fire Promo
tional Board had revised promotional policies wherein
all Lieutenants would be recommended for promotion from
the top of the register and could be assigned as House
Lieutenants, Aides to Chiefs, Rescue Lieutenants, or
Training Lieutenants. However, he remined them that
52Harner Interview.
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these rules were rescinded for a period of ninety days,
to allow two Black firemen on the Lieutenants’ Register
to be promoted to Chiefs’ Aides with the rank of
Lieutenant. Thus on March 7, 1970, Atlanta got its
first Black fire officer, Frank Bolden. The Chief fur
ther stated that the Chief of Training had started an
Officer’s Candidate School which would cover all phases
of Fire Department Activities and study material would
be issued to each man attending the school.53 It must
be noted that this proposal had been specifically pre
sented by Local 134 through Charles Hall, not the
Commission. He also stated that personal indignities
toward individual firemen would not be tolerated; that
the Grievance Committee was functioning; and that work
was being done toward creating a human relations program.
He concluded his report with “we have come a long way in
a very short time.”54 It probably would have been more
appropriate to state: we have been dragged kicking and
screaming a short way in a long time.
During the months of March and April, 1970, the
city of Atlanta was faced with a crippling sanitation
strike by AFSCME. However, Local 134 through Captain
Joe Whitley assured th.e city that they would remain loyal
53Chief P. 0. Williams to the Board of Firemasters,




to the city during the crisis. Local 134 was concerned
about possible concessions to the sanitation strikers.
Of particular interest was the possibility of the city
offering the strikers their jobs back with all benefits
when the same was not done for firefighters in the 1966
strike. The union also warned of possible legal action
if the city granted the strikers anything that did not
apply to the firemen. They were definitely of the opinion
that the conversion of the bonus toa one step raise was
illegal because of the budget law.55 However, none of
the threats was carried out. The sanitation workers did
get their jobs back with full benefits and a one step
raise.
Local 134 finally won a four year fight to regain
seniority lost during the 1966 strike of August 31, 1970.
At the August monthly meeting of the Board of Firemasters,
Mr. W. E. Findley, Committee Chairman of Seniority for
Local 134, requested that seniority be restored. The
Board decided to restore full seniority. However, a
demand of the Brothers Combined directed toward ending
segregated bunks and lockers was added. According to
the agreement, bunks and lockers with the exception of
Captain, Lieutenant and Fire Apparatus Operators were to
be assigned alphabetically as of September 15, 1970.56
55George Berry to Dan S~eat, 7 April 1970, City of
Atlanta Fire Department Files:, Atlanta, Georgia.
56Atlanta (Georgi~ Fire Department, Minutes of Meetings
of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 31 August 1970.
(Typewritten.)
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Hence, Local 134 and the Brothers Combined, in their
view, had won a significant victory. At the same meeting,
Local 134 requested that the firemen’s uniform allowance
be the same as the police department’s allowance--$125.O0
per year. This request was submitted by the Board of
Firemasters to the Finance Committee57 and approved by
that body, and the Board of Aldermen approved the request
in ordinance form on March 1, 1971.58
A major conflict between the city and Local 134 revol
ved around parity in pay for police and firemen. Early in
the Massell administration, policemen were given a 21.25
percent pay increase while firemen and other city employees
received a 8.5 percent salary increase. This move wiped
out parity in pay between the two groups which had existed
during the Allen administration. Local 134 appealed the
changes in salary between the two groups to the Board
of FiremastersS9 and was actively supported in its
efforts by A1dermanj-j~ D. Dodson, Chairman of the Board
of Firemasters.60 Local 134 communicated its concern
57Alderman Jack Summers to Alderman Joel E. Stokes,
3 September 1970, City of Atlanta Fire Department Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
58Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the BoardofAlderinen, meeting of 1 March 1971.
(Typewritten.)
59Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 28
September 1970. (Typewritten.)
60Alderman H. D. Dodson to Chief P. 0. Williams, 25
January 1971, City of Atlanta Fire Department Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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about the matter and the request was referred to the
Finance Committee6i The Commjtteà recommended that
the communication be filed.62 During this same period,
a proposed ordinance to bring back parity was authored
by Alderman H. D. Dodson. It was read to the Board of
Aldermen and referred to the Finance Committee.63 The
Finance Committee returned it to the Board with an ad
verse recommendation, February 1, 1971 to which the
Board agreed.64 The matter of parity was also sup
ported by Chief P. 0. Williams, and he was of the opin
ion that his recruitment efforts were being hindered by
the disparity in pay between th.e two groups. At the
September 9, 1972, meeting of the Board of Firemasters,
he expressed his concern with the problems involved in
recruiting firemen at $612.00 per month on a 56 hour
week and policemen at $693.00 per month on a 40 hour
work week. He stated that the Fire Department had thirty
61Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Aldermen, meeting of 4 January
1971. (Typewritten.)
62Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the. Board of Aldermen, meeting of 1 February
1971. (Typewritten.)
63Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Aldermen, meeting of 18 January
1971. (Typewritten.)
64Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the. Board of Aldermen, meeting of 1 February
1971. (Typewritten.)
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vacancies and was unable to recruit twelve men during the
last recruitment. He felt that if parity in policemen
and firemen pay was returned, his effort would vastly
improve.65 Despite support from the Chief of the Fire
Department and the Board of Firemasters for the cause of
Local 134, the Finance Committee supported the position
of the Mayor and continued to render adverse decisions
on requests for parity. These adverse decisions were
always approved by the Board of Aldermen indicating a
“family understanding” among the decision-makers on the
question of parity.
In addition to the battle for parity, Local 134
spent most of its energy fighting for a 40 hour work
week, and a shift and night differential wage schedule
during the Massell administration.66 The firemen felt
that they should be treated as other city employees.
Thus a 40 hour work week and extra pay for night duty was
justly theirs. Except for the occasional salary increases,
the Local’s demands fell on deaf ears. The Board of Fire-
masters continued to present resolutions for a 40 hour
work week, and a shift and night differential wage
65Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of th.e Board of Firemasters, meeting of 25
september 1972. (Typewritten.)
66Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 16 April
1973, meeting of 28 February 1972, meeting of 20 December
1971, meeting of 9 November 1971. (Typewritten.)
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schedule to the Finance Committee, but the Committee al
ways returned adverse reports which were accepted by the
Hoard of Aldermen.67 As in the case of parity, the de
cision-makers had reached a “family understanding’ on the
matter in question.
In terms of better working conditions, the major
victory won by Local 134 under the Massell administration
was the “24 hour on, 48 hour off” work week. At the
July 2, 1973, Board of Firemasters meeting, W. J. Hunter,
Vice-President of Local 134, appeared before the Board
and argued the advantages of the 24-48 proposal. The
Board in its deliberations made no decision regarding the
matter.68 The initiative to implement the 24-48 came
directly from Mayor Massell. According to the Mayor, the
24-48 was his idea and he was not encouraged in his efforts
by the union.69 Notwithstanding, his claim is not corrob
orated by the union or the records. Nevertheless, the
Mayor and the union supported and pushed the 24-48 con
cept and it became a reality.
During the Massell administration, there was an ef
fort led by Vice-Mayor Jackson who had been actively
67Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Firemasters, meeting of 27 March
1972. (Typewritten.)
68Atlanta (Georgia) Fire Department, Minutes of




involved with the Board of Firemasters to give formal
recognition to IAFF Local 134. In 1971, the State IAFF
was successful in its lobbying efforts, and the Georgia
Assembly passed the Fire Fighter’s Mediation Act granting
fire fighters in cities of 20,000 or more inhabitants
that elected coverage the right to bargain collectively.
According to the statute, fire fighters could be repre
sented by a labor organization and could bargain for
wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions and all
other terms and conditions of employment. Further, in
the event of impasse, mediators could be authorized to
conduct hearings and submit non-binding findings. Con
tracts, not to exceed a term of one year, could be nego
tiated; however, any contract had to contain a provision
against strikes and job actions.7° On August 2, 1971,
Vice-Mayor Jackson and Alderman Marvin Arrington pre
sented an ordinance to the Aldermen providing for the
City of Atlanta to adopt the provision of the 1971 “Fire
Fighter’s Mediation Act” for consideration.7l At the
Aldermen’s meeting on August 16, 1971, the paper was read
for the second time. Alderman Leftwich questioned the
70Georgia, Fire Fighter’s Mediation Act, Georgia
Laws (1971)1:565-571
71Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Aldermen, meeting of 2 August
1971. (Typewritten.)
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legality of the paper because it was co-sponsored by the
Vice-Mayor. The City Attorney researched the question
and found that the Vice Mayor was not in fact a member of
the Board of Aldermen and consequently could not introduce
legislation for the Board to act upon. On the other hand,
the City Attorney ruled that the paper was legal because
it was co-sponsored. The Board of Aldermen voted to adopt
the Ordinance by a show of hands (7 yeas and 6 nays which
were not recorded by name) and the record does not show
how individual aldermen cast their votes. Near the end
of the meeting, Alderman Wyche Fowler stated that the
paper should be reconsidered at the next regular meeting
of the Council.72 At the September 7, 1971, meeting of
the Board of Aldermen, the paper was reconsidered and a
lengthy debate ensued. The paper was defeated by a vote
of 9 to 6 again by show of hands.73 The Mayor felt his
constituency was anti-labor and he opposed the ordinance.
Obviously, between the Board meetings, he was able to
garner enough support to defeat Jackson’s efforts. For
all practical purposes, this was the end of the considera
tion given to the Fire Fighter’s Mediation Act. The law
making body of the city has never seriously considered it
72Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Aldermen, meeting of 16 August
1971. (Typewritten.)
73Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the Board of Aldermen, meeting of 7 September
1971. (Typewritten.)
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again. Thus, when the city could leagally engage in col
lective bargaining and contract with, a group of city
employees, it failed to do so. One alderman now argues
that he was lukewarm to the ordinance because he did not
believe it was constitutional.~4 However, if the alder
men had been committed to developing formal “legal” ar
rangements with the IAFF it could have done so and left
any question of constitutionality to be decided by the
courts. Yet, some blame for the failure of the Board
of Aldermen to approve the Ordinance must rest with Local
134., The evidence indicates that the union did not ac
tively lobby for its passage.75 This half-hearted effort
was possible due to the union’s primary concern with
parity, pay raises, the forty-hour work week and the
general weakness of the Local.
The Massell regime came to a close while the
battle lines were being drawn among IAFF, the city, and
the Brothers Combined over the issue of promotions. This
was part of the legacy which Massell was to bequeath to
the Jackson administration in the area of labor rela
tions. In November, 1972, William Hamer and four other
Black firemen filed charges of promotion discrimination
against the City of Atlanta’s Fire Department with the
74lnterview with. Q. V. Williamson, Atlanta City
Councilman, 11 February 1977, Atlanta, Georgia.
75Local 134 never presented the matter before the
Board of Firemasters, nor did it send any communications
to the Board of Aldermen.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The
Board of Firemasters minutes from 1969-1972 abound
with allegations of Black firemen that information per
taining to firemen in general was withheld from them.
In order to seek redress of their grievance, five Black
firemen filed a complaint with EEOC in 1972.76 On
October 23, 1973, Franklin Thomas, Director of Personnel,
in a letter to EEOC expressed a willingness on behalf of
the Fire Department to voluntarily change some of its
promotional policies.77 However, EEOC did not rule on
the issues raised by the five Blacks until the Jackson
administration took office. The EEOC ruling, and the
court actions, starting in 1974, on the part of the city,
Local 134, the U. S. Justice Department and the Brothers
Combined literally turned the Fire Department inside out.
Hence, the Massell administration’s pattern of labor
relations with the fire fighters set the city on a colli
sion course because it was unable to devise an equitable
promotions policy for the department.
Formal Procedures AFSCNE
The mechanism for dealing with labor problems in
volving AFSCME under the Massell administration was
76Hamer Interview.
77Frankljn W. Thomas to Reuben M. Taylor, 23 October
1973, City of Atlanta Fire Department Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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similar to the Ivan Allen operation. Although Massell
claimed to have an open door policy (any employee or
group could discuss with him at anytime), this statement
was not true for AFSCME after the March-April 1970
Sanitation Strike. Massell indicated that after the
strike was over, he was satisfied beyond any doubt that
AFSCME did not have leadership that was capable of pro
tecting its own members. Thus he took no interest in
them at all. Rather, he referred AFSCME matters to the
Personnel Board.
As state previously, the Massell administration re
voked checkoff privileges after the strike. In an effort
to resume discussions with the city, Local 1644 voted to
strike on August 20, 1970. However, they gave their
leaders the authority to decide when a strike would be
gin. William Lucy, Executive Assistant to Jerry Wurf,
was in town when the vote was taken. The union was angry
because Massell had revoked the checkoff and many felt
that the right to organize was at stake. In effect, they
believed Massell was trying to destroy the Union.78 A
request that negotiations commence immediately was de
livered by hand to the Mayor’s office on August 25 by
AFSCME. The union requested that the city negotiate a
one year written agreement to cover the following items;
immediate implementation of the recommendations of th~
78Atlanta constitution, 21 August 1970.
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Community Relations Commission studies, (1) “Atlanta’s
Waste Collection System” and “Minority Hiring and Pro
motion Practices”; (2) a living wage for all city em
ployees; (3) protection from the spiraling cost of
living; (4) employer paid life insurance and medical
hospital benefits; (5) elimination of the five year
step system; (6) implementation of the previous agree
ment on employee classification; (7) correction of in
equities; (8) hazard pay; (9) job security; (10) bona
fide promotional system; (11) bona fide grievance pro
cedure terminating in impartial binding arbitration;
(12) union recognition and union securities and neces
sary improven~nts in all other terms and conditions of
employment. 79
A prompt response came from the Mayor’s office re
garding the union’s request. Massell stated, “if the
intent of the union is to develop dialogue toward im
proved employer-employee relations, then I am pleased
to encourage pursuance of the same.”8° He then informed
the group that their requests were being forwarded to the
Honorable J. D. Grier, Chairman of the Personnel Board
for consideration. In this way, Massell had shifted
union discussions to the Personnel Board and out of his
79Thomas, Adams to Mayor Sam Massell, 25 August 1970,
AFSCME Local 144 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
80Mayor Sam Massell to Thomas Adams, 25 August 1970,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
189
hair. The Personnel Board’s duties were to arrange
meetings with representatives of the Union at conven
ient dates. At the conclusion of the discussions, recom
mendations were to be made to the Mayor who would ask the.
Board of Aldermen to “conscientiously” consider them.
The Mayor then stated:
In the interest of the thousands of city em
ployees who could be beneficially affected
by various reforms in employment practices,
I take this opportunity to suggest a formal
denial at this time by the AFSCME Union of
any plans to call a strike, for certainly
good faith deliberations could be hampered
if conducted under the threat of such action.81-
The union was pleased with the city’s prompt re
sponse to their request. They also expressed pleasure
with. the Mayor’s choice of J. D. Grier to arrange the
meeting dates. Grier had been an active supporter of
labor for some time. However, the union noted that
Grier and the Personnel Board could only deal with non
economic items and that their laundry list included eco
nomic matters as well. Financial matters had always
been in the Finance Committee’s jurisdiction. Since
the Massell communications did not refer to the Finance
Committee, union officials were concerned as to whether
this was an oversight. In order to improve communication
between the parties, Thomas Adams stated the union’s
position.
190
The union negotiating committee has full
authority from the membership to enter
into good faith collective bargaining on
all issues affecting wages~, hours- and con
ditions of employment, subject to ratification
of the results of our deliberations, by the
union membership.
We trust that the city has similarly em
powered its representatives, so that no un
necessary delay is encountered in the effort
to resolve the differences between the city
and the employees.82
After several days, and no response from the Mayor,
the union was particularly perturbed because there had
been no clarification regarding the Personnel Board’s
role in the discussions. When no reaction from the
Mayor was forthcoming by September 3rd as to who would
discuss economic matters, the union questioned the city’s
willingness to deal in “good faith.” If indeed the city
was serious, why did it not officially authorize the
management committee to deal with the union on the entire
proposal rather than simply those items of non-economic
nature? Further, the union stated that it was prepared
to “negotiate in good faith around the clock, if need be,
to resolve the differences.”83
An attempt was made by the Mayor on September 18
to alleviate the concerns of the union. Massell informed
Thomas Adams, a union official, that he had met with the
82Thomas Adams to Mayor Sam Massell, 25 August 1970
(Second letter), AFSC~ Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
83Thomas Adams to Mayor Sam Massell, 3 September
1970, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Chairman of the Personnel Board and other Departments to
inform them of his desire for the union discussions to
“be in good faith with a sincere effort at determining
th.e needs and responsibilities flowing one to the other
between employer and employee.”84 Ultimately, the
findings of the Personnel Board would be recommended to
the Board of Aldermen in order to assist the Board in
their deliberations with regard to salaries, working
conditions and other matters affecting city employees.
Then he stated:
I purposely made my charge to the Personnel
Board as broad as possible so that they would
not feel restricted or in any way limited in
such a study as they might wish to pursue.85
Between September and December of 1970 the AFSCME
negotiating team met for hours with the Personnel Board
in an attempt to hammer out an agreement.86 The union
intended to negotiate a contract. However, Massell was
of the opinion that a contract would not be legal; thus,
any recommendations from the Personnel Board would have
to be adopted by the Board of Aldermen and approved by
the Mayor.
The Reverend J. D. Grier on December 16, 1970, sub
mitted the results of the discussions with representatives
84Mayor Sam Massell to Thomas Adams, 18 September




of AFSCME Local 1644 and other representatives of employees
in the city of Atlanta to Mayor Massell. The reconimenda
tions included an amended Statement of Policy together with
an amended Grievance Procedure. The union had also asked
for and the Personnel Board recommended the following: an
additional holiday for all city employees (Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s Birthday), the restoration of dues checkoff;
layoff would begin with persons having the least seniority;
seniority would be a major consideration in all transfers;
the city would implement the safety recommendations for em
ployees contained in the Community Relations Commission’s
Report; and Union stewards would be allowed to investigate
and process employee grievances during working hours with
out loss of time or pay.87
Before the Mayor responded to the Personnel Board,
the Finance Committee voted informally but overwhelmingly
to refuse to restore the checkoff on January 8, 1971.88
Upon hearing the news, the sanitation workers began to
engage in scattered work stoppage and picketing. This
activity on the part of the workers continued for several
months. However, the city did not fear a crippling strike
because employees had received a two-step raise during the
87Reverend J. J. Grier to Mayor Sam Massell, 16
December 1970, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
88Atlanta Constitution, 9 January 1971.
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month of January and the aldermen had also instituted a
$100.00 minimum weekly wage. The city also warned that
it had a well organized emergency plan to use in case a
strike took place.89 Massell was. not interested in
restoring checkoff without restrictions, and, at his
request, Senator Leroy Johnson tested out the feelings
of high. ranking AFSCME officials in Washington, 0. C.90
The city’s message was that it migh.t consider restora
tion of checkoff if the union agreed to a three year
no-strike pledge.91 Massell was convinced that public
opinion was on his side. Thus, he was. interested in
obtaining a no-strike pledge because it might insure
him re-election for a second term.
The Personnel Board and the AFSCME negotiating
team went back to the table and concluded an agreement
regarding restoration of checkoff with restrictions.
AFSCME agreed that there would be no strikes, stoppages
or slow-down for a period of twelve months and that the
Mayor and Board of Aldermen should agree that there
would be no lockouts for a period of twelve mnoths.
This twelve month no-strike agreement was to become a
part of the package presented to the Mayor on December 16,
89Sweat Interview.
90Massell Interview.
91Atlanta Constitution,. 21 January 1971.
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1970. Further, the two parties agreed that union repre
sentatives and representatives of the City of Atlanta
would continue, to meet for dIscussions concerning wage
and other conditions of employment with a “view toward
extending this agreement for an additional twenty-four
months.”92 The revised package was presented to the
Mayor by J. D. Grier January 26, 1971.
Massell responded to Grier on February 10, stating
that he had carefully reviewed and considered the Per
sonnel Board’s recommendations. He was clearly of the
opinion that a majority of the Board of Aldermen would
not support the recommendations and further, the public
should be given more protection.
I am of the opinion that a four year moratorum
on strikes, work stoppages and slow-downs
would demonstrate to Atlanta’s credit around
the country a sincere effort toward a coopera
tive partnership between labor and management...
at a time when many cities are frezing job
classifications cutting salaries and decreasing
employment rolls. I am pleased and proud that
we were able to provide the monetary benefits
requested and earned by the rank and file em
ployees, and I hope we will be in a position
to continue such strides of progress as a result
of future efficiency.93
Union officials did not take Massell’s offer lightly.
They viewed it as an attempt to “blackmail” them.
92Reverend J. D. Gri.er to Mayor Sam Massell, 26
January 1971, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
93Mayor Sam Massell to Reverend J, D. Grier, 16
February 1971, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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The Finance Committee, on February 17, 1971, ap
proved parts of the package negotiated by the Personnel
Board. All of the provisions were approved except the
recommendation regarding checkoff. Wade Mitchell, Chair
man of the Committee, agreed to recommend the portion the
committee had approved to the Board of Aldermen.
The full Aldermanic Board referred the package,
which has been negotiated by the Personnel Board and ap
proved by the Finance Committee, except for dues checkoff,
to th.e Joint Public Works and Water Works Committee in
March. The Board was of the opinion that the Joint Com
mittee should deal with the labor problem since it was
responsible for setting policy for the department most
affected by the sporadic union-directed work stoppages
which had transpired since January. However, this action
by the Aldermanic Board simply pointed up the instability
inherent in a bargaining system imposed on the existing
structure of authority without modifications. In the
1969 Statement of Policy, the Aldermanic Board had dele
gated bargaining responsibilities to the Personnel Board.
This policy had been implemented by Massell when he ap
pointed the Personnel Board to negotiate with the unions
in September, 1970. In spite of these actions, the problem
of fragmente.d authority for labor relation had been left
unresolved. The centers of power within the Administra
tion (in this case the Aldermanic committees) remained
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unchanged and had now been directed by the Aldermanic
Board to engage in labor negotiations. As indicated
by Burton and Hildebrand, elected officials are some
times anxious to negotiate with the Unions because it
might pay to play pro-union politics. To negotiate
might also strengthen the authority of elected officials
over their traditional jurisdictions.94 In any case,
the legislative branch was now engaged in collective
bargaining. The union took advantage of this apparent
confusion and actively lobbied with various members of
the Committee for their support. The union represen
tatives were aware of the fact that bargaining had
shifted from a bilateral to a multilateral operation.
In a few days, an agreement between AFSCME and the
Joint Committee had been reached, The new agreement
contained terms more favorable than those negotiated
with the Personnel Board. The obvious lack of a coales
ence or “family understanding” on the part of the decision-
makers made .this possible. A major concession found in
the agreement was fact-finding. The agreement was sub
mitted to the City Attorney’s office for a legal opinion,
and a section of the agreement entitled “Resolving Dig
putes” apparently presented some legal difficulty.. John
E. Daugherty, Associate City Attorney, was of the opinion
94John F. Burton, p. 129, and George 1-lildebrand,
p. 132.
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that although the proposal did not require mandatory
arbitration on the part of the city, it did require
th~ city to enter into fact-finditig proceedings upon
the request of someone other than the Mayor and Board
of Aldermen. For these reasons, Daugherty felt the
sections constituted an unlawful delegation of authori
ty. Daugherty also objected to the section which pro
hibited the city from taking any actions for a period
of sixty days following a request for fact finding
which he saw as a further invasion of the Mayor and
Board of Aldermen’s authority. He also objected to
statements in the proposal such as “agreement between
the parties” and “the official representative of the
employees.” As far as he was concerned, an “Agreement
between the City of Atlanta and any organization repre
senting employees”95 had never existed. To buttress his
conclusion, he quoted an opinion issued by Henry L.
Bowden, City Attorney, December 4, 1970.
Thus, it is my opinion that nay written
agreement with a labor union containing
terms as previously assumed would con
stitute a bar to free legislation in
matters of municipal government by the
present and future Mayor and Board of
Aldermen of the City of Atlanta.96
Therefore, Daugherty was of the opinion that the city did
not have the authority to enter into this proposal and
~JohnE.Daugh~rtyto Q. V. Williamson, 17 March
1971, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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“there could be no unilateral adoption of such a proce
dure by the city in as much as this /~equired7 agree
ment between the two organizations.”97
The Public Works and Water Committees also agreed
to another clause which the union had worked to obtain
for a long time. The representation clause would have
recognized the right of one Chief Steward in each City
substation to process and investigate employee grievances
during working hours without loss of time or pay. Robert
S. Wiggins, of the city legal department, was of the
opinion that this clause was not legal because there
were no ordinances on the book which allowed an employee
to work for others on city time. However, he indicated
that the Mayor and Board of Aldermen could adopt such
an ordinance. Evidently this opinion cooled the ardor
of the committee because it was deleted.98
While the Joint Committees were hammering out a
settlement with the union, Massell was busy developing
a rigid proposal of his own. Under the Mayor’s plan,
check-off would be restored. However, the new procedure
would exclude firemen, supervisors and positions defined
as technical or administrative. No group was excluded
under the old ordinance and the new Committee proposals.
The proposal would extract a one year “no strike” pledge,
97Tbid.
98Robert S. Wiggins to Q. V. Williamson, 16 March
1971, AFSCME Lbcal 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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and the city’s Finance Director would be allowed to hold
up remittance of union dues for 95 to 110 days after de
duction. This lag in payment to th.e union was: to be
used as leverage against a strike. In the event the
union participated in a strike, the Director of Finance
was authorized to pay any amount of any deductions still
in his hands at the time to the city as payment for the
cost of terminating the deduction.~99
Massell informed the Aldermanic Committee that he
could under no circumstances support their now agreed
upon restoration of checkoff with no restrictions. In
a public relations ploy, in the middle of the contro
versy, Massell professed to look into union complaints
by working on a city garbage truck. He related in an
interview that he found a few minor problems which he
remedied personally. 100
At this juncture, it was blatantly obvious that
management, meaning the Mayor and the different comittees,
was divided over the matter of dues checkoff. The Mayor,
with his strong anti-AFSCME feelings, had developed a
proposal unilaterally which he knew was unacceptable to
AFSCME. The collective bargaining process was at this
point a hybrid form: the Mayor had decided to unilateral
ly make a decision, the union had negotiated bilaterally
99Dan Sweat to Members of th€ Board of Aldermen, 12
April 1971, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
1-°0Massell Interview, and Atlanta Constitution, 27
April 1971.
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an agreement with the Personnel Board which had been
given the authority to negotiate; and the union was now
engaged in multilateral discussions with the Joint Com
mittee. According to the Kochran concept of multilateral
bargaining, one could predict that some concessions would
be made to the union because of the difference of opin
ion regarding the negotiations among the Personnel
Board, the Joint Aldermanic Cormnittee and the Mayor.
It was now clear to Alderman Q. V. Williamson that
his liberal Joint Committee-Union agreement was doomed.
There was no way for it to get through the full Alder-
manic Board. After a careful count, Alderman Williamson
in an interview, stated that he did not have enough votes
to pass the accord, let alone override the Mayor’s prom
ised veto. The Mayor, he felt, had used his power to
pressure some of the aldermen to oppose the measure.
Because the Mayor had the power to appoint committee
members and Chairmen of Committees he was in a strong
position. “On crucial matters if you didn’t vote the way
the Mayor wanted, you could be removed from your committee
and placed as Chairman of the Look Out Committee.” Ac
cording to Alderman Williamson, the function of the Look
Out Committee was to “look out the window to see what was
going on.” With. this kind of leverage and the general
anti-Union sentiment which pervaded the Aldermanic Board,
Massell was able to have his way. Rather than taste
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bitter defeat, Alderman Williamson introduced his pro
posed ordinance in the form o~ a resolution deleting the
checkoff provision and it passed.101- Once again the
decision-makers had engaged in decision-avoidance. They
were unwilling to take a stand which would be binding,
preserving their prerogative to do nothing if they chose.
Further, the “family understanding,” (which was opposi
tion to restoring checkoff) which Massell and the majori
ty of the Aldermanic Board had reached before any of the
bargaining took place was preserved.
The Resolution was adopted by the Board of Aldermen
May 3, 1971 and approved by Sam Massell May 7, 1971. It
included a revised “Statement of Policy,” “Grievance Pro
cedures” and “Recorntrjendatjons.” This Resolution re
placed th.e May 15, 1969, Resolution, regarding labor
matters, and it clarified the city’s Statement of Policy.
During the month of September in each. year,
the Personnel Board will entertain formal or
informal presentations or recommendations con
cerning pay, hours and other conditions of
employees. The American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Inter
national Association of Fire Fighters, or
other recognized organizations representing
employees of the City who are members of such
recognized organizations. 102
The Resolution recommendations covered layoffs, transfers,
promotions, subcontracting, safety, maintenance of standards,
101Williamson Interview.
~-02Atlanta, Georgia, “A Resolution Changing the
‘Statement of Policy and Grievance Procedure’ of the City
of Atlanta” Resolution. (7 May 1971).
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maintenance of conditions and voluntary joint fact find
ing. Except for the changes in language, the Resolution
included all the reconffnertdations of the Personnel Board
except for the Representation Clause (which, the city’s
legal department had advised against) and the authority
to deduct Union dues from city employee’s wages which
was by now for all intents and purposes a dead issue.
On the other hand, the voluntary joint fact finding
clause was a new development. The clause spelled out
how a fact-finder would be selected and that his fee,
which would not exceed $1,000, would be borne equally
by the city and labor organization requesting such a
person. However, the resolution was clear that this was
plain and simple fact-finding and that the fact finding
would not be binding on either party.1-°3
In an attempt to bring Massell to terms regarding
dues checkoff, the AFL-CIO community in the city withdrew
its invitation to Massell to bring greetings to their May
12, 1971 Labor Awards Banquet. Jerry Wurf, National
President of AFSCME, was then invited to serve as
Massell’s replacement. The. Mayor responded by calling
a press conference in his office on the night of the
banquet and announcing to everyone’s surprise, including
city department heads, that city employees would be
given the option ofa four-day forty-hour workweek. In
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this manner, Massell seized the headlines and the Jerry
Wurf story was carried as minor news. In an interview,
Massell was asked if his actions were a continuation of
the Wurf-Massell feud and he answered, “Could have been,
I upstaged him a little bit and I enjoyed it thoroughly...
I licked his pants and he knows it.”1-°4 Atlanta was the
first city to adopt such a plan and Massell basked in his
glory. However, the plan was given less than lukewarm
support by organized labor and most department heads did
not like the idea and the “big plan” turned out to be a
failure. In an interview, Massell admitted he
caught them by surprise. . .and because of that,
they balked at it and tried to find fault...
instead of realizing that it.. .was a bonanza
for organized labor.105
He also admitted that it failed because he could not get
organized labor support.
In the fall of 1974, the union commenced negotia
tions with the Personnel Board. On January 7, 1972,
Reverend J. D. Grier, Chairman of the Personnel Board,
submitted the results of these negotiations to Mayor
Massell. The 1972 proposal contained the May 7, 1971
Resolution and recommended the following: that dues
checkoff be restored; that uniforms be provided for all




and Water Pollution; that serious consideration be given
to social security as a fringe benefit; and that employees
be granted time off from their jobs and aided by Union
Stewards in dealing with their grievances. The following
clauses were revised: compensatory time off and overtime;
automobile allowance; funeral leave and sick leave. The
group did not recommend a specific pay increase. However,
they did recommend that pay increases be provided for all
classes for 1972 in accordance with the cities ability to
106pay.
All of the negotiated changes were accepted and adopted
by the Board of Aldermen and Mayor in resolution form on
May 15, 1972 with language changes, except for the fol
lowing: shop stewards were excluded from the representa
tion clause; checkoff was deleted; and the revised ver
sions of compensatory time off and overtime, automobile
allowance, funeral leave and sick leave.107 This was the
last resolution stating the policy of the city with re
spect to labor matters adopted by the Board of Aldermen
and approved by the Mayor.
Between May 15, 1972 and December 1973, the end of
Masselltg term, the union accomplished very little. It
106Reverend J. D. Gri.er to Mayor Sam Massell, 7
January 1972, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
107Atlanta, Georgia, “A Resolution Resolving that
the Attached Statement of Policy, Grievance Procedures and
Recommendations Shall be in Lieu of that Adopted and Ap~
proved in l97l~T Resolution. (15 May 1972).
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maintained an amicable relationship with Joel Gay, the
Director of the Bureau of Labor and the Personnel Board.
However, it ceased attempting to negotiate an agreement
with the city and concentrated on helping union members
solve their grievances.1-08
Other than on grievances, most of the group’s
energies were spent trying to convice the Charter Com
mission, whose responsibility was that of writing a new
Charter for the city of Atlanta, to include a provision
in the Charter allowing city employees the right to or
ganize and bargain collectively.109 The Union proposal
was supported by other city labor leaders and by Andrew
Young, a candidate for the United States Fifth Congressional
District.110 Notwithstanding, the proposal failed.
The major reasons for AFSCME’s failure to continue
to pressure the city for change was due to internal
108lnterview with. Leamon Hood, Southeast Regional
Director of AFSCME, 2 March 1977. The following correspon
dence is found in AFSCME LOcal 1644 Files: W. F. White to
Harry Stone, 5 June 1972, Atlanta, Georgia; Franklin W.
Thomas to Emmett Carr, Jr., and Clarence Leavell, 12 June
1972, Atlanta, Georgia; Franklin W. Thomas to Joyce Brown,
25 May 1972, Atlanta, Georgia; Pelham C. Williams to
Joyce Brown, 13 October 1972, Atlanta, Georgia; Harry T.
Stone, Jr. to Franklin W. Thomas, 11 December 1972, Atlanta,
Georgia; and Joyce C. Brown to Pelham Williams, 3 October
1972, Atlanta, Georgia.
~-09Joyce A. Brown to Dear Brothers and Sisters,
September 1972, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
110Andrew Young to Emmet Bondurant, 29 Semptember
1972, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia..
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weaknesses. The records show that by August 1972, these
weaknesses were obvious to the Mayor. The Mayor in a
letter to George Elmendorf, a Union representative,
states:
For several months--I have tried to arrange
a meeting so that we could get acquainted.
For one reason or another, these eforts...
have not been successful. . .1 would be good...
to discuss our mutual interest.’11
Several days later, Elemendorf replied, “Unfortunately,
my work assignments are such that I have no free date in
the near future for a meetirig.’~12 Massell was of the
opinion that the local was near its end.
Despite the attempt by the Local’s officers to re
tain control, on May 31, 1973 the inevitable took place.
Judge Charles A. Moye, Jr. approved the trusteeship which
the International office had imposed on Local 1644. The
International named Leamon Hood, trustee, and Tony
Linthicum in the Atlanta Constitution quoted a letter
from Hood to Local 1644 in which he stated the reasons
for th.e trusteeship.
For some months now, we have viewed with
concern the lack of leadership; the in
creasing instability of the Union; dis
sipation of the local’s assets; growing
factionalism within its ranks; and most
importantly, diminishing participation by
the membership in the democratic process
of Local 1644.113
111Mayor Sam Massell to George Elmendorf, 22 August
1972, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
~2George Elmendorf to Mayor Sam Massell, 30 August
1972, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
~3Atlanta Constitution, 18 May 1973.
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As a result of this internal conflict, the. entire staff
of Local 1644 was fired and the Local President removed.
Among those dismissed were: James Koward, a loyal employ-.
ee for more than ten years; Joyce Brown, an energetic,
dynamic Black woman; and Fred Williams.1-14 The latter
two were hired quickly by the Labourers International
Union (LTU), AFSCME’s major rival in Atlanta. They were
to become a dynamic force in the efforts of LIU to orga
nize city employees in an area long considered the ex
clusive territory of AFSCME.
In December 1973, AFSCME began to get serious com
petition from LIU. Many logical reasons have been given
for this activity. According to Samuel Hider, Director
of Labor Relations for the City of Atlanta, until the
latest crisis in the economy, the most stable unorganized
group of employees in the United States were municipal
employees. By 1970, due to technological changes, which
eliminated many unskilled jobs and the closing of some
factories, union membership nationwide declined. One of
the commandments of a union is to keep its membership up
in order to keep its finances in shape. Although LIU had
~4Interview with Joyce Brown, International Repre
sentative for Labourers International Union, Atlanta,
Georgia, 23 July 1975, and Interview with Fred Williams,
International Union, Atlanta, Georgia, 23 July 1975.
11-5lnterview with Samuel Hider, Director of Labor
Relations, City of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, 14 July
1975.
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always organized municipal employees, these workers were
never its major interest. However, after 1970, it began
to move into the South to increase its membership among
city workers. Interestingly enough, it moved into AFSCNE
territory in Jacksonville and Birmingham during this
period and won the right to represent city workers.
Thus, by 1970, AFSCME appeared to have a real enemy in
LIII. The LIII claimed that it had literally chased AFSCME
out of areas that it had had for years because it had
nothing to offer the workers. LIII claimed to offer an
insurance plan, a pension plan as well as the slogan,
“We are for the people.”~-~-6
This AFL-CIO sister union competition served the
city’s interest well. AFSCME was in an extremely diffi
cult position. It was now faced with its own internal
problem as well as a formidable external one. When in
late December 1973, it attempted to negotiate with the
city fathers, AFSCME found the tables slightly turned.
AFSCME now had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
it represented city workers and to complicate matters, it
had to deal with. a lame duck Administration which cast
most of its requests aside..
In the Fall 1973 city elections, AFSCME and LIU
rolled up their sleeves and vigorously supported Maynard
116lnterview with howard I. Henson, Regional Direc
tor Laborers’ International, Atlanta, Georgia, 14 July
1975.
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Jackson for mayor and candidates for aldermen with pro-
labor platforms. AFSCME allegedly gave money directly
to the candidates they supported, going outside of
COPE. This was done because AFSCME desperately needed
the checkoff restored in order to hold on to Atlanta,
and a sure way of doing this was to put pro-labor candi
dates in office.1-1-7 Maynard Jackson was the perfect
candidate for AFSCME because he had consistently pushed
for checkoff as Vice-Mayor and his candidacy was made
more attractive because he had been a lawyer for the
National Labor Relations Board. So once again, as in
1969, AFSCME helped elect its “Man’T Mayor of the city
of Atlanta. It had also helped elect James Howard, a
long time union official, whose heart was known to be
in the right place to the City Council. The union also
had strong hopes that Jackson would not prove to be
another Massell.
Summary
The Massell administration failed to develop a ra
tional and efficient way to deal with its labor problems.
As a result of this failing, th.e relationship which de
veloped between AFSCME, IAFF and the Administration was
willing to discuss any problem at any time with employees
or their representative. The policy of “no policy”
~7Fred Williams Interview.
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regarding union membership, meaning anyone could join,
was also continued. The number one agenda setting pro
cess for solving labor relations problems was also
maintained. Thus the policy was short-range and crisis
oriented, and it entailed incremental decision-making
and when possible, decision avoidance. Despite the
fact that decision-makers within the Administration were
openly divided on labor issues, there apparently was
enough of a”family understanding” on several anti-
union issues to retard the growth of public unionism in
the city. Among these positions was the Administration’s
refusal to adopt the Fire Fighters Mediation Act and the
revocation of dues checkoff.
The John F. Burton thesis, which states that when
a system of bargaining is superimposed upon the tradi
tional government apparatus without modification, the
system will prove to be unstable, was borne out. The
Mayor and the Aldermanic Board delegated the authority
to engage in bilateral discussion with labor regarding
working conditions and wages to the Personnel Board.
However, neither was willing to give up what they felt
was their authority to bargain with labor.. Thus, the
Mayor and the Aldermanic Board, who possessed the author
ity to make decisions, decided to actively negotiate and
involve themselves in labor discussio.ns. This fragmen
tation of authority, in terms of responsibility for
211
labor negotiations, made bilateral and multilateral bar
gaining possible. Although frustrating to the unions,
the multilateral discussions which developed as a result
of the “dabbling” sometimes allowed the unions to use
end run lobbying tactics which enabled them to get some
concessions.
Except during times of crisis, decisions regarding
labor were still made unilaterally with some union input.
During the 1970 Sanitation strike, the agreement which
ended the strike was the result of multilateral bargaining
and it carried the signatures of city negotiators, com
munity leaders and labor leaders. Labor’s major achieve
ments under the Massell administration were the revised
Ivan Allen Statement of Policy and Grievance Procedure
and the new recommendations for changes in working condi
tions. Although these agreements reached through bilateral
and multilateral negotiations were adopted in resolution
form, they were significant because the city had made a
commitment to putting negotiated agreements in writing.
As the Administration came to a close, the public
unions in the city, although crippled, were still alive.
IAFF was still trying to recoup her losses from the 1966
strike and maintain her close relationship with the Fire
Department administration. However, the Brothers Combined
in its gadfly role, was making things difficult. AFSCME
had entered the Massell administration at top strength,
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but by 1973 it had virtually disintegrated due to Massell’s
vengeful actions and its own internal problems. The labor
policy of the newly elected Jackson administration had not
been announced. However, the public unions and high hopes
of change and a new day because of Jackson’s labor back
ground. During his tenure as Vice-Mayor he had actively
pushed the Aldermanic Board to approve the Firefighters
Mediation Act and it was common knowledge that he was com
mitted to the restoration of dues checkoff. Further,
there was hope that he would regularize the relationship
between the city and the labor organizations and move the
city to a number three agenda setting process in labor
relations matters. This agenda setting process would
entail developing a long range labor relations program.
The public unions in Atlanta had great expectations.
CHAPTER IV
THE MAYNARD JACKSON ADMINISTRATION
1974-19 76
In October 1973, Maynard Jackson defeated the in
cumbent Mayor, Sam Massell by garnering 59.2 percent of
the votes cast. The election of Jackson as Mayor of
Atlanta, Georgia, was considered a watershed event be
cause it was the first time in history that a Black
person had been elected Mayor of a major Southern city.1
The labor coalition in Atlanta was particularly
pleased with the outcome of the election because they
believed that they had helped elect a Mayor who was com
mitted to the concept of collective bargaining and a
fair deal for public employees. Almost immediately
after the Mayor was inaugurated, the unions began to
push for better working conditions, a significant salary
increase, formal union recognition and restoration of
dues checkoff- -all promises the unions alleged Jackson
had made during the Mayoral campaign.~
1Robert K. Whelan and Michael W. McKinney, “Coali
tion Politics in a SoutI-~rt~ City: An Analysis of the 1973
Atlanta Mayoralty Election,” Georgia Political Science
Quarterly (Fall, 1975), l23-l~6~
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Shortly after assuming offi.ce, the Jackson admin
istration began to reorganize city government as mandated
by the new charter. Although the new charter did not
require the city to make changes in its labor relations
apparatus, the Jackson administration began to move to
ward a number three agenda setting process in this area.
The apparent intentions were to develop a long-run,
holistic, and coherent labor relations policy. To this
end, two labor experts, Professors George King of the
Emory Law School and Sherman Dallas of the. Georgia
Institute of Technology were called upon to recommend
a new comprehensive labor strategy for the city. This
move was a departure from the policy of the past admin
istrations. As indicated in the previous chapters,
Allen and Massell engaged in a number one agenda setting
process which involved short-range, crisis-oriented
decision making in the area of labor. In this chapter
a descriptive analysis of the Jackson administration’s
labor policy and the relationship which developed between
AFSCME, IAFF and the city between 1974-1976 will pre
sented. ~
Organization and Membership
The Jackson administration departed from the pre—
vious Administration~s position on union membership. In
theory, the Administration has not prohibited anyone from
joining a labor organization. However, the privilege of
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dues checkoff is denied by Section 2-144 of the. Code of
Ordinances of the City of Atlanta to all persons
in an executive, professional or administra
tive position as defined by the Fair Labor
Standards Act or directors, department heads,
installation supervisors, confidential em—
ployees; all who have the authority to hire,
fire, discipline or effectively recommend
such actions.2
This clause has for all intents and purposes limited the
membership of AFSCME and IAFF, since neither union col
lects dues by hand from those city employees who are
excluded from checkoff.
In the years prior to the 1975 ordinance, IAFF was
allowed to offer membership to all persons in the Bureau
of Fire Services except chiefs, and it did. However,
the new procedure has excluded all officers holding the
rank of lieutenant upward. Local 134 has put forth a
concerted effort to regain the right to represent and
offer membership to lieutenants and captains, but to no
avail.3
Prior to the new ordinance, AFSCME had members in
Local 1644 who were supervisors. The loss of these mem
bers cut AFSCME’s strength considerably. This loss was
2Atlanta, Georgia, “An Ordinance to Amend Section
2-144 of the Code of Ordinances,’t C20 January 1975).
3Ferrin Y. Mathews to Sam Hider, 16 June. 1975.
Atlanta (Georgia) Bureau of Labor Relations, Minutes of
Meeting with Representatives of IAFF Local 134, meeting
of 24 March 1976. (Typewritten.)
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particularly felt when AFSCME Local NO. 4, which was made
up of supervisors and clerical employees from City Hall,
was effectively excluded by the new procedure.
In spite of these restrictions, there are persons
from the ineligible categories in both unions who claim
membership and sympathize with the union’s efforts. How
ever, the city does not recognize these non-paying, in
eligible members as being represented by the unions
either formally or informally.
Representative Status and Dues. Checkoff
When the Jackson administration began in 1974, it
was confronted with two rival AFL-CIO affiliate unions
competing for the right to represent city employees. Al
though AFSCNE lost the privilege of dues checkoff during
the MasseH era, it continued to represent city employees.
However, the Laborer’s International Union (LIU), now
made up of several disgruntled former AFSCME members and
employees, attempted to challenge the informal status of
AFSCME.
The City Council on January 25, 1974, adopted and
the Mayor approved a resolution reaffirming and clarifying
the cityt s statement of policy in dealing with organiza
tions representing employees of the. city. The resolution
recognize.d the existence of a conflict between AFSC~ and
LIU over the right to represent city employees. It also
recognized the fact that no ordinance existed which would
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a1lov~ for an election or the negotiation of a contract
between the city and any union. Therefore the city’s
policy regarding the matter would be to recognize only
those unions or organizations which represented city em
ployees in 1969. The resolution also stated that the
city’s Statement of Policy regarding labor matters, a
dopted in 1969 and amended in 1972, was still in force
until the Council adopted adequate measures.4
Hence, the Council and the Mayor, by adopting
Councilman James Howard’s Resolution, reacted to the
two-union dispute and engaged in a number one agenda set
ting process. This piece-meal action obviously did not
solve the problem, which confronted the city. In fact,
the Administration had engaged in decisional avoidance
which was a continuation of the previous Administrations’
actions. Furthermore, by adopting the city’s 1972 State
ment of Policy, the new Administration revealed an incli
nation to continue to superimpose a bargaining policy on
the traditional government structure which had in the past
proven to be unstable.
Dissatisfied with, the Council’s position, some city
employees who favored LIU picketed City Hall demanding an
4Atlanta, Georgia, “A Resolution by the Council Re
affirming and Clarifying the ‘City’s Statement of Policy in
Dealing with Organizations Representing Employees of the
City of Atlanta,” (‘25 January 1974).
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election in order to determine who would represent the
employees.,5 Earlier, a group of employees appeared be
fore the city’s Personnel Board and requested a repre
sentative election. Ironically, this group included
AFSCME Local l644’s former president.6
Unsure of the proper course to take, the new Admin
istration sought advice from the two labor experts,
George King and Sherman Dalls. These experts were
asked to develop a comprehensive labor relations plan
and develop a method by which the dispute between the
unions could be solved. Based on the King-Dallas report,
Jules Sugarman, the City’s Chief Administrative Officer,
recommended that the Mayor approve the preparation of a
labor relations ordinance which would:
1. /~reateJ a Bureau of Labor Relations.
2. 7Authorizef the Mayor to establish a pro
cedure for recognizing employee organiza
tions:
- permit him to define the units which may
be represented by one agent.
- require that 5O7~ of employees voting in
a unit vote in favor of a particular
— agent.
3. LAuthor1z~J the Mayor to enter into non-con
tractual agreements, on economic and other
matters with an agent, subject to approval
b1 the Cit1 Council.
4. /Authorize/ use of an advisory mediation panel
~hen the City and employee agents are not
able to agree.
5. Explicitly Lprotec~T the. right of an employee
to refuse to join organizations which are
~5At1anta Constitution, 29 January 1974.
6Joel Gay to Jule M. Sugarman, 10 January 1974, City
of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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agents and~ establishes h~s right to pre
sent individual views to the City.
6. LAuthoriz~J the Mayor to enter into an agree
ment with the agent for a voluntary dues
checkoff.
7. LAuthoriz~./ the Mayor to prescribe rules for
and arrange for the conduct of labor rela
tion matters including elections.7
The King-Dallas recommendations presented a possible long-
range, holistic solution to the city’s dilemma. In or
dinance form, the Adminstration could have formalized its
loose “meet and confer” bargaining system, solved the two-
union dispute, and established guidelines for the city’s
relationship with labor unions. Further, this recommen
dation would have eliminated the unstable bargaining
structure which had been superimposed on the traditional
government apparatus. This structure, as indicated in
the earlier chapters, allowed for a collection of com
mittees as well as the executive and legislative branches
to be involved in labor matters. The King-Dallas recom
mendations would have centralized the authority for labor
relations in the executive branch. The Jackson administra
tion, however, never proposed such an ordinance. Since
the Mayor did not make himself available for an interview
to discuss his labor policy, we may presume that he did
not favor the King-Dallas recommendations. Thus the long
range, holistic number three agenda setting process
7Jules Sugarman to Mayor Maynard Jackson, 15 April
1974, City of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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regarding the city’s labor relatLons policy appeared to
be evaporating during the first year of the Administra-~
tion.
Realizing that the matter of recognition was effec
tively at a standstill and would remain so until a de
cision was rendered regarding the conflict between the
two unions, AFSCME proceeded to file a grievance with the
AFL-CIO against LIU. AFSCME charged LIU with violations
of Section 2 and 5 of Article XX of the AFL-CIO Consti
tution for trying to organize and represent employees of
the city of Atlanta with whom AFSCME had an established
collective bargaining relations hip and for circulating
leaflets containing defamatory statements about AFSCME.8
Specifically the section under which the charges were
filed reads,
Sec. 2. Each affiliate shall respect the es
tablished collective bargaining relationship
of each other affiliate. No affiliate shall
organize or attempt to represent employees as
to whom an established collective bargaining
relationship exists with any other affiliate.....
Sec. 5. No affiliate shall, in connnection
with any organizational campaign, circulate
or cause to be circulated any charge or re
port which is designed to bring or has the
effect of bringing another affiliate into
public disrepute or of other wise adversely
affecting the reputation of such affiliate
or the Federation.9
8AFSC~ v. LIU Case Number 74-25, 2 May 1974, AFSCME
Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
~9AFL-CIO Constitution, 1975 p. 46-47, AFSCME Local
1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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LIU was found guilty of violating both the above sections
by David L. Cole, the impartial umpire. Cole’s decision
was appealed to the subcomittee of the AFL-CIO Executive
Council. This group upheld the Cole decision. In December
1974, George Meany informed the International President of
LIU that the said ruling was an order to refrain from
signing up individuals who had signed membership cards
with AFSCME before August 1970 and those who signed cards
during the 1973 AFSCME Campaign. If LIU had accepted into
their membership any such members or former members of
AFSCME, LIU was to advise them that they could no longer
be members and refrain from collecting dues payments from
such persons.1° Despite the ruling, LIU continued orga
nizing efforts.
Convinced that the AFL-CIO ruling had solved the
conflict, AFSCME petitioned for the right to become the
“exclusive bargaining representative” for the city em
ployees.11 The request was not granted. However, on
January 20, 1975 the Administration indicated that its
labor relations policy would be piecemeal and incremental.
Rather than pass an ordinance which would establish guide
lines for the city’s relationship with labor unions, the
10George Meany to Peter Foaco, 17 December 1974,
AFSCNE Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
11William Lucy to Honorable Maynard Jackson, 23 July
1974, AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Administration enacted an ordinance which authorized dues
checkoff and avoided the question of “exclusive recogni
tion.” According to the ordinance, an organization could
be recognized by the Council and Mayor for the purpose of
dues checkoff if the group submitted valid dues deduction
authorization cards signed by employees for more than one-
half of the total number of eligible employees.1-2 Ex
clusive recognition is not mentioned in the ordinance.
Yet it is suggested since checkoff would only be granted
to those groups or unions with more than half of the eli
gible city employees as members. Once an organization
qualified for checkoff there were conditions which had to
be met in order to keep the privilege. The checkoff was
conditioned upon the fact that the organization repre
senting the eligible employees nor any of its members would
strike, or participate in sitdowns, slowdowns, picketing,
patrolling, demonstrating or work stoppages. Further, there
was to be no campaigning or soliciting of membership on
city property during working hours. If any of the pre
viously stated activities occured, the Mayor would have
the right to suspend deduction of dues for a period of
12Atlanta, Georgia, Section 2-144 Code of Ordinances.
According to the 20 January 1975 ordinance “Eligible” em
ployees were those employees in the following departments
or bureaus of the city City of Atlanta combined: Bureau
of Correction; Bureau of Airport Maintenance and Operation;
Bureau of Facilities and Cultural Affairs; Bureau of Parks
and Recreation; Department of Environment and Streets;
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ninety days. After a period of ninety days, checkoff
could be reinstated by action of the Council and ap
proval of the Mayor.13
Although the Council in Section 2-144, Code of Or
dinance of the city of Atlanta, had set the criterion
for allowing union recognition for purposes of dues
checkoff, the question of whether eligible city employees
would sign cards or have an election to select a union to
represent them remained a political issue. On March 3,
1975, Councilman D. L.”Buddy” Fowlkes introduced an
ordinance to recognize LIU for the purposes of dues check
off. Fowikes asserted that the City Council should recog
nize the fact that LIU did represent some persons employed
by the city. However, the Council defeated the ordinance
on March 17, 1975.14
Undaunted, Howard I. Henson, LIU’s Regional Manager,
persisted in his push for an employee election and he con
tinued to receive support from Council members. According
Vehicle Maintenance Division, and City Hall Division (Bureau
of General Services). All of whom share a community of in
terest with respect to their hours of work wages and other
terms and conditions of employment; with respect to the
International Association of Fire Fighters only, the Bureau
of Fire Services. The Council attempted to expand the
ordinance to include the Bureau of Police Services in 1976.
However, the Mayor vetoed the Ordinance on July 8, 1976.
14Atlanta, Georgia, “An Ordinace Recognizing Laborers’
International Union for the Purpose of Dues Checkoff,”
Adversed (17 March 1975).
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to Henson, the Commissioner of Labor for the State of
Georgia agreed to supervise the procedure. On April 21,
1975, a resolution presented by Council members “Buddy”
Fowlkes, Panke Bradley, and Arthur Langford regarding an
election was adopted by the Council. The resolution pro
vided for the following:
That no union shall be recognized as the repre
sentative of a group of workers or a department
of the city government of the City of Atlanta
until such time as the Commissioner of the de
partment of group of employees involved shall
have certified to the President of the Atlant~.
City Council that an election has been held.’5
Mayor Jackson vetoed the resolution on April 29, 1975.
In a letter to President Fowler and Council members, the
Mayor stated that he was vetoing the resolution because
he believed it would be “incompatible with the ordinance
adopted by the Council on January 20, 1975.~?16 The
Mayor also illustrated what could possibly happen if
both the ordinance and the resolution were allowed to
exist.
“Union At’ could win the election in a particu
lar department and be designated as the proper
union for conducting discussions. However,
the City-wide vote might be for “Union B” thus
nullifying the election in the single depart
ment. ii
15Atlanta, Georgia, “A Resolution Calling for an
Election to Select a Union to Represent City Employees”
Resolution (2 April 1975).
16Mayor Maynard Jackson to flonorable W. Wyche Fowler




In subsequent weeks there were other unsuccessful
legislative attempts to arrange an election. However,
the legislative shenanigans ceased when AFSCME was formal
ly informed by Charles Davis, Commissioner of Finance,
that Local 1644 had complied with the provisions of the
1975 ordinance by enrolling more than half of the eligi
ble employees.1-8 Later, in the same year, IAFF Local 134
satisfied the more than fifty percent quota of eligible
employees in the Bureau of Fire Services and was granted
checkoff for the first time.
Most political observers expected the Jackson ad
ministration to adopt the Fire Fighters Mediation Act.
As Vice-Mayor, Jackson co-authored several ordinance
which would have allowed the city to adopt the state leg
islation. Meanwhile, Local 134 has actively lobbied for
its adoption, but the Administration has shown little in
terest. As a matter of fact, the city’s position was
clearly stated in the January 20, 1975 checkoff ordinance
and it remains the same.
By enactment of this ordinance the City of
Atlanta expressly declares that it is not
electing or agreeing to come under the pro
visions or to be covered by the provi~ons
of the “Fire Fighters Mediation Act.”1~
18Charles L. Davis to Leamon Hood, 16 June 1975, AFSCME
Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
1-9Atlanta, Georgia, Section 2-144 Code of Ordinances.
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The Administration checkoff ordinance has created
an administrative problem for those unions which quali
fied for the privilege. In 1976, both AFSCME and IAFF mem
bers at their membership meetings voted to increase the
amount of monthly dues deducted from their salaries. The
union leadership notified the Commissioners of Finance
of their decisions.20 In the past, when AFSCME had
checkoff this was always the procedure used. However the
new Administration sought a legal opinion from the City
Attorney as to the procedure to be utilized. The City
Attorney gave the following opinion based on his interpre
tation of Section 2-144.
I.t is our opinion that the Commissioner of
Finance may only deduct from the salary of the
employee who had filed with him a deduction card
the amount of money set forth on the deduction
card. The Commissioner is not authorized by
the Ordinance to increase the amount of money
which he is deducting from any employee’s
salary for the payment of union dues without
a specific authorization to deduct that amount
of money from the employee. . . this increase in
dues cannot be deducted without the filing with
the Commissioner of Finance of a ~w card....
signed by the employee in person.’1
20Samuel A. Hider to Jules Sugarman, 17 May 1976,
City of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
21Cleveland Chappell to Charles Davis, 30 November
1976. AFSCME had voted to increase the monthly membership
dues from $5.00 to $7.00. Henry R. Bayer Jr. to Charles
L. Davis 25 October 1976. IAFF had requested to increase
members’ monthly dues deduction from $5.00 to $7.50, City
of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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Hence, if any employee on checkoff wanted to have some
other amount deducted from his salary, other than the
amount on his dues authorization filed in the Commission’s
office, he would have to sign a new card. In the case of
AFSCME, this meant re-signing approximately 1,380 members.
Both unions are opposed to th.e actions of the city in
this regard and feel that the decision is punitive and
indicative of the Administration’s anti-union sentiment.
The Jackson administration has not granted clear
“exclusive recognition” to any group. Nor has it seen
fit to formalize its relationship with the unions who
represent employees. This direction, nonetheless, has
been suggested by Samuel Hider, the Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations. Inamemo dated May 7, 1976, to Jules
Sugarman, Hider stated that he “would fully recommend
that (the city) move towards exclusive recognition based
on (the city’s) terms and dealing with a limited number of
organizations.”22 In order to implement this recommenda
tion, the administration~wou1d be required to develop a
comprehensive labor relations program. Notwithstanding,
at this point it has not done so. Since the Mayor, was
not available for an interview, after repeated attempts,
his position on this matter is not known. Nevertheless,
22Charles Davis to Cleveland Chappell, 18 January
1977. Charles L. Davis to Bill Hunter, 18 January 1977,
City of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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it is a fact that neither the Mayor nor the Council have
put forth an ordinance to make HiderTs suggestion possible
or a resolution to indicate that they are committed to the
idea.
Formal Procedures IAFF
When the new city charter was implemented in 1974,
the Aldermanic Board of Firemasters ceased to exist. Labor
matters which concerned Local 134 were to be addressed by
the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Commissioner of
Public Safety. However, the delegation of responsibility
did not resolve the problem of fragmented authority for
labor relations. As previously stated, the Administration
continued to superimpose a bargaining system on the existing
government structure with minor modifications, and the
authority relationships in the city government did not
change. Thus, multiple centers of power, as John F. Burton
states, continued to exist--forcing the labor organizations
to negotiate with numerous officials on various issues.
Under the Jackson adminstration, Local 134 has dealt
with a variety of offices within city government in order
to address the membership’s grievances. In matters rela
ting to uniforms and safety it has appealed directly to
the committees within the Bureau of Fire Services (BFS),
which deals with, these matters. Monetary concerns are
taken directly to the Bureau of Labor Relations. This
decentralized method pleases the union because it believes
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it possible to achieve more by dealing with a variety of
offices. John F. Burton states that the view expressed
by the union holds some truth because the lack of clear
lines of authority for labor relations permits the union
greater flexibility in choosing which representatives of
management it will negotiate or discuss each issue with.
However, some city sources maintain that the patchwork
method the union is forced to utilize has not been very
fruitful. The major concerns of Local 134 under the
Jackson administration have been the grievance procedures
for firemen and the matter of promotions within the BFS.
These concerns will be fully detailed.
The grievance procedure or in the words of William
Hunter, President of Local 134, “the lack of a grievance
procedure within the BFS,” has created a major conflict
between the city and Local 134.23 Before 1974, employee
grievances were handled by the Fire Department and appeals
were made to the Board of Firemasters. After the new
Charter was implemented, employee grievances within the
Bureau of Fire Services could be appealed to the Civil
Service Board. The union was quite positive toward this
procedure. Many of the members took advantage of the new
procedure and were successful in getting a number of A.
Reginald Eaves, Commissioner of Public Safety, decisions
23lnterview with William Hunter, President of IAFF
Local 134, Atlanta, Georgia.
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reversed. As time passed, the number of reversed deci
sions made by the Board began to irrate the Commissioner.24
Thus, Eaves launched a concentrated effort to remove the
Bureau of Fire Services from the Board’s jurisdiction. By
1976 his efforts paid off when special legislation was
enacted to carry out his wish. At this juncture Eaves’
decision regarding employee grievances or disciplinary
actions were final and the only appeal an employee could
make would be through the Court systems. Local 134 active
ly fought to change the procedure. The union proposed
that a grievance procedure be enacted which would allow
for appeals from the Commissioner to be made to the Di
rector of the Bureau of Labor. Its proposal also spelled
out specific steps that the aggrieved party would take and
stated that if management failed to follow the procedure
the case would automatically proceed to the Civil Service
Board. The local’s proposal was not accepted by the
city. However, by late 1976 the city policemen were being
actively recruited by the teamsters. In order to demon
strate the city’s concern for the employee and eliminate
one of the arguments for a union, there was a movement a-
foot to place the Bureau of Fire Services and the Bureau
24Although the Civil Service Board is appointed by
the Mayor, City sources question the methods used by the
Board to arrive at decisions. It has been alleged that the
Board makes decisions based on emotions rather than serious
consideration of evidence presented by department heads.
It has also been viewed as being pro-employee.
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of Police Services back under th.e control of the Civil
Service Board. 25
The major conflict between Local 134 and the city
during the Jackson administration has been the question
of promotions within the Bureau of Fire Services. The
conflict is a direct outgrowth of the charges of discrim
ination within the department made by five Black firemen
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On
March 4, 1974 EEOC ruled in the case of William Harold
Hamer, et al v. City of Atlanta that the Fire Services’
promotional system discriminated against Blacks. Between
January 1, 1969 and January 1, 1974, 79 lieutenants within
the Bureau were promoted and of this number only six were
Black. At the time of the ruling, EEOC reported that the
Bureau had a total of six Black officers. EEOC charged
that these “statistics constitute a prima facie case of
discrimination which shifts the burden of proof to the
Respondent which Respondent fails adequately to support.”
EEOC further charged that the city’s promotional system
discriminated against Blacks in the following area: the
written examination; the methods used to score applicants
at the training tower; the oral interview; the practice of
giving longevity points; and the five year waiting period
25By April 1977, special legislation was enacted to
place the two Bureau’s back under the Civil Service Board.
The threat of the Teamsters had helped Local 134 achieve a
victory.
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required before an applicant could take the lieutenant’s
examination.26 The Commission requested that the city
cease to promote within the Bureau of Fire Services until
these discriminatory practices were rectified. Although
EEOC made its ruling in 1964, it did not propose a method
by which discrimination could be removed. Local 134, as
if prepared for the worst, joined with the Fraternal
Order of Police and blasted Eaves and federal officials
for ruling that the promotional procedures used by the
Bureau of Fire Services discriminated against Blacks
while allowing a similar system to remain in effect in the
Bureau of Police Services. The local also became vocal
about the issue when William J. Hunter, an officer in the
local, claimed that he had discussed the problem regarding
promotions with Eaves and the Commissioner had indicated
that he wanted to promote only Blacks in order to make up
for past discrimination.27 As a result of the EEOC re
quest, the Commissioner ceased to promote within the
Bureau of Fire Services after September 1974. Between
the time EEOC made its ruling and 1975, the Commission
expended most of his efforts in the Bureau of Police Ser
vices and little or no change occurred in the Bureau of
Fire Services.
26EEOC Ruling in William Harold Hamer, et al v. City




In January, 1975, Local 134 called Eaves’ attention
to a number of vacancies which existed in the Bureau of
Fire Services. The group was of the opinion that the Bureau
could not continue to operate efficiently unless the vacan
cies were filled. They also warned that a promotional exam—
ination had not been given in two years. Therefore, the
Commissioner should set up the procedure for a new exami
nation to be given immediately.28 The Commissioner informed
the group that he could not grant their request because he
was awaiting a final determination from EEOC regarding the
issue.
Refusing to accept the Commissioner’s interpretation
of the matter, Local 134 filed a class action suit against
the city of Atlanta, Maynard Jackson and Commissioner A.
Reginald Eaves in the Fulton County Superior Court on
February 7, 1975. The suit charged that that the city’s
failure to fill vacancies in the Bureau of Fire Services
by promotion “has had the effect of limiting the fire
protection of the citizens of the city of Atlanta.’t Eaves
and Jackson were accused of refusing to allow a new exami
nation to be given in order to establish a new eligibility
register since the previous register had expired in March,
1974. The Court was asked to restrain the city from im
plementing any new promotional procedure that might be
28William J. Hunter to A. Reginal Eaves, 23 January
1975, IAFF Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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suggested by EEOC “until there has been a judicial de
termination by this Court as to the validity of the pre
vious promotional procedure.” The Court was further re
quested to declare the previous promotional examination,
which EEOC had found discriminatory, valid and order the
city to follow the procedure in order to create a new
eligibility register from which existing vacancies were to
be filled.29
The union leadership claimed it had entered suit
against the city in order to seek due process and equal
protection for “all firemen.” However, it is in order to
question the motives of Local 134, since their efforts
were not in the interest of Black firemen. Thus they can
be accused of pushing a racist policy as well as attempting
to dictate city policy. No matter how the issue is inter
preted, the union’s actions were unprecedented. Never in the
history of the city had a union attempted to bring the court
into a dispute regarding promotions.
A Conciliation Agreement was issued by EEOC in
February 1975 and the city considered possible implementa
tion. The terms of the agreement were definitely unac
ceptable to Local 134. The agreement called for the im
mediate promotion of the five charging parties in the EEOC
complaint to positions of not less than lieutenants with
full back pay and the establishment of a priority promotion
29lnternational Association of Firefighters Local 134
et al v. City of Atlanta, filed in Fulton County Superior
Atlanta, Georgia 8 February 1975, IAFF Local 134 Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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roster. This priority roster would consist solely of
black firefighters and all existing vacancies and future
vacancies in the Bureau of Fire Services would be filled
from this roster until a new promotion examination was vali
dated by EEOC or until 51 percent of all superior officers,
meaning lieutenant and above, in the Bureau were Black.3°
By now inflamed, Local 134 argued that the agreement was
reverse discimination.
In order to protect its overwhelingly white member
ship, Local 134 hurriedly amended the court case previously
filed. The amendment charged that the Concilatory Agreement
granted preferential treatment to the the five charging
parties and to all black firemen in the city with respect
to present and future promotions and was discriminatory
toward white firemen. The amendment further claimed,
If defendents are not restrai~ned from imple
menting the terms of the said agreement, un
qualified or less qualified persons may be
promoted to positions of authority within the
Bureau of Fire Services requiring expertise
beyond their capability and experience which
would have a deleterious effect on the fire
protection of the city of Atlanta.3’
In short order, Local 134 was granted a temporary restraining
order by the Honorable Charles Wofford, Judge of the Superior
30EEOC Concilatory Agreement, February 1975, IAFF
Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
31lnternational Association of Firefighters Local 134
et al v. City of Atlanta, et al, Amended, IAFF Local 134
Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Court of Fulton County, preventing the city from promoting
any person within the Bureau pending the outcome of the
case.
Local 134 was not alone in its unhappiness regarding
the EEOC conciliatory agreement; the city has also found
the proposal difficult to live with.. Thus, Eaves developed
a counter proposal which would allow the city to have 12
percent Black officers in the Bureau. This proposal, en
dorsed by the Atlanta Journal as the only “realistic way
to deal with the problem,” was presented to the City
Council’s Public Safety Committee. The five charging par
ties would be promoted immediately to lieutenant and after
a period of two months nine of the eleven black lieutenants
including three of the petitioners would be promoted to
Captain. Further, the next fourteen lieutenant vacancies
would be filled by blacks and by July 1, 1976 at least
two Blacks would be named to the batallion chief’s level.
Eaves considered the proposal a “one shot deal” in an at
tempt by the city to rectify past racist actions in the
Bureau. Other than these, all future promotions in the
Bureau would be based on a merit system with both races
promoted according to objective criteria.32
Complete disapproval was expressed by the union’s
membership toward the city’s proposal. The union developed
a counter proposal which included a validated test,
32Atlanta Constitution, 28 May 1975.
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opposition to the five charging parties having any priority
for promotion and the adoption of the Fire Fighters Media
tion Act. The union argued that the promotion of all fire
ment should be based on th.e validated test and W. J. Baker,
one of the firemen named in the union’s suit, should be
promoted and granted back pay.33 This proposal was rejected
by the city.
Suspicious of the City’s intentions, Local 134 began
to actively monitor possible steps by the city which might
indicate violation of Judge Wofford’s temporary restraining
order. In September 1975, the union learned that three
firemen had been shifted to the rank of fire apparatus op
erator. These changes were viewed by the union to be pro
motions, because they included a raise in pay, and thus
were in violation of Judge Wofford’s order. Unless the
promotions were rescinded, the union warned the city that
it would ask the Court to cite the defendants for contempt.34
Within the matter of days the local was informed that the
appointments had been recinded.35
Dissatisfied with the progress being made in the
area of promotions, the five charging parties sought relief
in the Federal Court. On September 18, 1975 they filed a
33William J. Hunter to Jules Sugarman, 14 June 1975,
IAFF Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
34Arnold Shulman to James Weeks, 11 September 1975,
IAFF Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
35James A. Weeks to Arnold Shulman, 16 September
1975, IAFF Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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suit against the city. Among the charges cited was the
existence of a pattern of racial discrimination in the
Bureau of Fire Services in the areas of hiring, assignments,
transfers and termination. The group requested a freeze on
employment in the Bureau until all Black applicants were
reevaluated using non-discriminatory criteria.36
On December 1, 1975, the United States Justice
Department filed suit against the city of Atlanta, A.
Reginald Eaves, Department of Public Safety, P. 0. Williams
Atlanta Fire Department and the International Association
of Fire Fighters, Local 134. The Justice Department charged
that “the defendants have pursued and continue to pursue
policies and practices that discriminate against blacks
with respect to promotional opportunities in the fire
department.” The data upon which the Justice Department
based its case was that gathered by EEOC.37
Both the five charging parties and the Justice De
Partment filed their cases in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division
and were heard by Judge Moye. By December 1975, charges of
discrimination against Blacks regarding promotions and
charges of reverse discrimination against whites regarding
36lnterview with William Harold Hamer, President of
Brothers Combined, Atlanta, Georgia, 12 May 1975.
37United States of America v. City of Atlanta, et al.,
Filed in United States North Georgia District Court, Decem
ber, 1976, IAFF Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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promotion within the Bureau of Fire Services were being
heard in the Georgia State Court and in the Federal
Courts.
Exactly one day after the Justice Department filed
suit, Judge Wooford issued a permanent restraining order
prohibiting promotions within the Bureau until the Court
made a decision. At the hearing, A. Reginal Eaves testi
fied that 28 vacancies for promotion to the position of
superior officers in the Bureau of Fire Services existed
and that all such promotions would go to blacks including
the five charging parties. Judge Wofford stated that he
was of the opinion that if promotions were now opened in
the Bureau, Eaves. “would promote 100 percent Black firemen
to superior officer positions, and this, in effect, would
beadecided case of reverse discrimination.” The Judge
was also of the opinion that the EEOC concilation agreement
and Eavest proposal were “arbitrary and discriminatory”
because both ignored “qualifications for promotion.”
Further, the Court felt that there was no evidence that
the tests and other criteria used by the Bureau for pro
motional pruposes before 1974 were “racially oriented or
biased against blacks.” Rather, Judge Wofford claimed that
the testimony given by Deputy Chief James Gibson, which
supported Local 134’s contention, indicated that the tests
were job related. Therefore, Judge Wofford concluded:
This Court cannot subscribe to the theory that
a person should be promoted simply because he
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was a member of a group~ formerly the subject
of discrimination, or because he is a member
of such minority group. Discriminatory pre
ference for any group, minority or majority.
is precisely what Congress and the Courts have
proscribed.
This Court deplores discrimination in any form.
We cannot and must not prefer one group over
another. It is essential that the only priority
to be given in promotions within the Bureau of
Fire Services is that of qualifications and the
safety of the people of the City of Atlanta.38
Between January and March of 1976, various consent
decrees were worked on by the Justice Department, the City
of Atlanta, the five charging parties and Local 134 in an
attempt to find a solution to the problem. The following
chart is an illustrated example of the EEOC proposal, the
union proposal and the final proposed consent decree in
1976. (See Table 5.)
On April 5, 1976 the City Council adopted and the
Mayor approved, on April 9, 1976, a Resolution whith would
authorize the Mayor and Commissioner Eaves to enter into a
Consent Decree settling the issues involved in the two law
suits filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.39 However, the “proposed
38lnternational Association of Firefighters, Local
134, et. al. v. The City of Atlanta, et al., Order by Charles
Wofford, Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County, Atlanta
Judicial Circuit, 2 December 1975.
39Atlanta, Georgia, “A Resolution Authorizing the
Mayor and Commissioner Eaves to Enter into a Consent Decree
to Settle Firefighters’ Lawsuits,” Resolution (9 April,
1976).
TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS
EEOC Conciliation Final Proposed
Agreement Union Plan Consent Decree




(c) Placement on priority No back pay
promotion roster
2. Long Range 517~ black officers None No priority other
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class - 48% black
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3. Interim lOO7~ black promotions Lt. Capt. Bat. Chief 337~ to Battalion
Goals until validation or 1976 - 6O7~ 457~ 0 Chief
long range goal 1977 - 6O07~ 4O7~ 0 557~ - Lt. & Capt.
achieved mm. mm. (1st yr. - all to~ 1978 - 6O7~ 50% 1st Vacancy~ affected class and
to blacks thereafter 75% to
. affected class
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3 mos. as lt,





















5. Back Pay 5 charging parties and all No back-pay Back pay issue to be
other affected decided by court as
tO whites and blacks
6. Record Records to be submitted to None Records to Justice
keeping EEOC Department
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final consent degree” was not agreed to by all parties and
the year 1976 came to a close with no solution in sight.4°
After Local 134 rejected the previously illustrated
Consent Degree, relations between the local and the city
(particularly Commissioner Eaves), became frigid. This
relationship is reflected in the correspondence between
the union and Eaves. On June 30, 1976, P. 0. Williams, the
Director of the Bureau of Fire Services, issued a memorandum
directing all firefighters and fire apparatus operators to
acquire a Class 4 or 5 driver’s license by August 1, 1976.
Local 134 informed the Commissioner that its members would
obtain the required licenses if and when the city of Atlanta
was prepared to pay the fees for the licenses.41- The Com
missioner did not respond in writing to this demand. However,
,,42
the union was told in verbal terms to go to hell. The
Local was also of the opinion that they should be involved
in the reorganization meetings that were being held in the
Fall of 1976. They demanded that they be included in the
discussions. However, Eaves did not agree to their demand
and he left no doubts about his position on the matter. In
a letter to the union leadership he made the following state
ment.
I am not dealing with representatives of unions,
only with individuals in whom I have a great deal
40Hamer Interview and Hunter Interview.
41-William J. Hunter to A. Reginald Eaves, 27 July 1976,
IAFF Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
42Hunter Interview.
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of confidence, as we attempt to improve the
delivery services to the citizens of Atlanta.
T~en there is a meeting at which Brothers
Combined is invited, rest assured that Local
134 TAFF also will be invited.43
Aside from the occasional meetings with Sam Hider,
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, over changing
the Grievance Procedures and an appeal to the Finance Com
mittee for a raise, Local 134 had virtually no input into
the labor relations apparatus by the end of 1976.
Collective Bargaining AFSCME
The amicable relationship between AFSCME and the
city almost came to a halt during the early days of the
Jackson administration. Disgusted because the Massell ad
ministration had ignored their demands for a significant
salary increase, the union viewed the one—step salary in
crease that the Council had approved with utter contempt.
AFSCME, in a latter to the Council made the following
charges:
We in AFSCME Local 1644 worked hard with other
citizens of Atlanta to get a local Government
elected that would work to correct some of the
many wrongs of the past four (4) years, but if
we fail at the ballot box, we will go back to
the streets if we must in order to get justice
and better pay for our services.44
The new Administration appeared to be sensitive to AFSCME’s
demands.
4A. Reginald Eaves to William J. Fowler, 15 February
1974, IAFF Local 134 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
44Leamon Hood to Wyche Fowler, 15 February 1974,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Mayor Jackson proposed and got the Council to approve
a 8.5 percent pay increase for the 6,466 lowest paid workers
as of April 1, 1974. Higher paid city workers, except for
individuals earning $20,000 or more, would get a 4.25 percent
increase in April and a 4.25 percent in January, 1975. The
employee benefit package of the new Administration also in
cluded increased city contribution to the pension fund and
assumption by the city of the employee contribution toward
hospitalization insurance. Seeking to improve working con
ditions, the Jackson administration implemented, with
AFSCME’s approval, curbside garbage pick up.45 The new
system was called “herbie the curbie.”
Although the new Administration had gotten off to a
good start by improving salaries and employee benefits, the
procedure or method used to handle labor problems remained
ad hoc. Yet, the Administration was in a unique position
to make changes. The new Charter was being implemented and
the Mayor was in the process of reorganizing the government.
Thus, he was in a position to develop a strong labor rela
tions policy, if indeed labor relations was to be considered
a major priority.
In the early days of the Administration, the Council
and the Mayor approved the Statement of Policy adopted by
the city in 1972 in realtion to labor matters. This meant
45Atlanta Journal, 15 March 1974.
248
that the Civil Service Board, which under reorganization re
placed the Personnel Board, was responsible for discussion
with labor organizations. However, this policy was not
carried out. AFSCME continued talks with the Personnel
Board and new negotiating sessions were held with A. Regi
nald Eaves, Executive Assistant to the Mayor, and Emma I.
Darnell, Commissioner of Administrative Services. Proposals
were presented by the union and the city presented counter
proposals, and as time passed AFSCME and the Mayor’s repre
sentatives agreed on some labor-management problems. By
March 1974, it was clear to the Administration that AFSCME’s
major goal was to negotiate an agreement between the union
and the city. After a review of the city’s counter-proposals
and some of the tentative agreements made by the Mayor’s
representatives, it appears that the city was headed in this
direction. However, the union representative clearly states
that discussions held in 1974 with the Civil Service Board,
A. Reginald Eaves, and Emma I. Darnell were not productive.
Though tentative agreements were reached with each group,
the Mayor allegedly in each case decided that he could not
support the agreements. The union was encouraged to wait
until the new Director of the Bureau of Labor came on board.46
In September 1974, Samuel A. Hider assumed the position
of Director of the Bureau of Labor. The union was encouraged
46lnterview with Leamon Hood, Southeast Regional Di
rector of AFSCME, Atlanta, Georgia, 2 March 1977.
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by Hider’s background because he had more than 20 years of
labor experience.. Hider immediately rej acted the Eaves.
Darnell tentative agreements calling some of them “ridicu
lous.” In an interview, Hider alleged that in fact no
tentative agreements were reached between AFSCME and the
Eaves-Darnell team. Rather, there were a number of items
that the two negotiating teams discussed. However, AFSC~
officials hold that the items were not simply discussed,
they were tentative agreements. One particular item dis-~
cussed by the Eaves-Darnell team and AFSCME which AFSCME,
alleges was agreed to, subject to Mayor and Council approval,
stated that employees would notworkoutside when the tempera
ture dropped below 25 degrees. Hider felt that the Com
missioner (meaning management) should always have the
authority to order employees to work even in inclement
weather if need be. To give up this authority, he argued,
would mean giving up control over the workers. Hider also
refused to continue discussions with AFSCME until the LIU v.
AFSCME controversey was settled by the AFL-CIO. However,
he did begin work immediately on the development of a check
off ordinance which would set the criterion for union selec
tion. On January 20, 1975, the Ordinance was adopted and in
a matter of months AFSCME was recognized for the purpose of
dues checkoff. The Jackson administration continued the
procedure used for union discussions known as “Meet and
Confer,” which did not require the development of any formal
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relationship with AFSCME. Instead, informally the union
was to have discussions with Hider who would report his
findings to the Mayor. The Mayor, if he chose, would send
the proposals to either the Appropriations Committee or to
Personnel for recommendations. The Personnel Office and
the Appropriations Committee would send their recommendations
to the NayGr and the Mayor would then develop his recommenda
tions and send them to the Council for approval.47 This
system was a continuation of the policy of Allen and Massell
which superimposes a bargaining system upon the traditional
government apparatus, with minor modifications. Bettwen 1974
and December 1976, discussions between the city and AFSCME
regarding pay increases and working conditions were in the
words of union representative Leamon Hood;
Unstable, irratic and contradictory.. . a glaring
example of the duplicity.. . sort of double dealing
wishy washy or the incompetency and irresponsible
ness of this administration in the field of labor
relations . 48
The following account of negotiations gives some credence to
the above statement. After receiving majority status, AFSCME
began to hold discussion sessions with Samuel Hider and Emma
I. Darnell, Commissioner of Administrative Services. The
union made it crystal clear to the Mayor’s representatives
that it wanted to negotiate an agreement. However, there
47lnterview with Samuel A. Hider, Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations for the City of Atlanta, Atlanta,
Georgia, 2 March 1977.
48Hood Interview.
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appeared to be confusion between the Mayor’s representa
tives as to whether the Mayor was willing to sign such, an
agreement. Despite the confusion, discussions continued
between the two groups. The city was in the process of
revising the Civil Service Rules and the union’s input was
requested. Hider’s position was to allow the union input
into the Civil Service Rules. He felt that after the Rules
were approved by the Council, those portions which applied
to the employees represented by AFSCME could be removed and
incorporated into a document which could be called a Memo
randum of Understanding. the union’s position was not in
accord with the city’s position. AFSCME wanted to negoti
ate its own document, and after the Civil Service Rules were
adopted, the rules could be amended if they conflicted with
the union agreement. It was obvious that the two groups
were headed in different directions.
AFSCME, despite the conflict over procedure, did have
input into the development of’:Civil Service Rules. Mrs.
Lucy S. Pennington, Director of Personnel, and Mr. Hider
sought input from the union. Mrs. Pennington revised the
original document to include the union input which was the
result of more than twelve months of meetings with AFSCME
representatives and the Director of Labor Relations. The
document was then submitted to the Executive Committee of
the Council At this level, the union become a pawn in the
political chess game. The Executive Committee rejected the
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negotiated document and replaced it with Mrs. Pennington’s
original document which was management oriented and
contained no union input. Realizing what had happened,
the Director of Labor Relations and the union met for a
few hours just before the document was accepted by the
Council and managed to insert the union’s grievance proce
dure format. However, that was all the union was able to
salvage. The union blamed the Mayor for the actions of the
Council’s Executive Committee arguing that the Mayor’s in
action on the Rules forced the Council to take the initiative.
AFSCME charged that there was obviously no “sincere desire
on the part of the Administration, to develop a meaningful
and workable labor-management relations environment. . .
All during 1975 and 1976 when the Civil Servic.e
Rules were being revised, AFSCME had erratic discussions,
interrupted by work stoppages and strike threats, with
Hider regarding a negotiated Memorandum of Understanding.
According to Hider, approximately 80 percent of a Memorandum
of Understanding had been tentatively aggreed to by AFSCME’s
negotiating team and the Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations by mid 1976. However, the tentative agreements
had not been submitted to the Mayor for his approval or
rejection by the end of December 1976. The union was of
the opinion that as each section was tentatively agreed to,
49Leamon Hood to Lucy T. Pennington, 12 November 1976,
AFSCME Local 1644 Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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it should be submitted to the Mayor for review. However, the
Mayor’s representative felt that the document should be com
pleted and then presented as a package to the Mayor. The
two negotiating teams as of December 1976 were at a stand
still on procedure. According to Hider, the completion of
the document had been hindered by AFSCME’s insistence on
negotiating separate work rules for their members which the
city refused to go along with and the problem of an inadequate
staff in the Bureau of Labor Relations. As a consequence,
the union had made little process in the direction of forma
lizing its relationship with the city even though the Mayorts
representative indicated that the Mayor supports formaliza
tion of the relationship. However, the Mayor had not put
forth an ordinance which would give him the authority to
enter into a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding, nor
had one been put forth by the Council. Thus, even if the
executive branch negotiates a Memorandum of Understanding,
there exists no assurances that the Council will approve
such a document.
Other than the aborted attempt to negotiate an agree
ment with the City, AFSCME has directed all of her energies
in the areas of employee benefits and salary increases for
the membership. In 1975 the Administration announced that
there would be no salary increases for 1976 other than the
regular increment that all employees receive unless they
have reached the maximum pay in their range. Angered,
254
AFSCME sought to mobilize its energies in an all out effort
to prevent this possibility.
On December 10, 1975, AFSCME requested access to the
city’s records in an attempt to prove that there was money
in the proposed budget for salary increases. The request
was granted and AFSCME experts from Washington analyzed the
budget.5° According to city officials, this was an attempt
to show the union that the city was bargaining in good
faith. The AFSCME experts concluded that the proposed bud
get underestimated the city’s expected revenues. Their
report speculated that the city would realize between $5.8
to $5.9 million dollars of additional revenue over and above
the cash-carry over projected in the city’s budget proposal.
Moreover, the expected surplus could be used for salary
increases. However, the city argued that the alleged sur
plus was appropriated for various funds and was not available
for purposes external to the applicable fund. Moreover, the
only surplus in the proposed budget was the reserve for appro
priations and these monies were not sufficient to fund cer
tain necessary city programs throughout the year. AFSCME
suggested changes in the budget to the Finance Committee.5’-
However, the Committee rejected all of the AFSCME proposals.52
50GharlesL. Davi,s to TomJennings, 15 December 1976,
AFSCME Local l644Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
51AFSCME to Finance Committe, 29 January 1976, AFSCME
Southeast Region Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
52Richard Gutbman to Local 1644, American Federation
of State and Local Employees, 24 February 1976, AFSCME South
east Region Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Failing in its attempt to persuade the Finance Com
mittee, AFSCME went back into negotiations with the Mayor’s
representative, Samuel Hider, hoping to get some commitment
from the Mayor on pay raises. The relationship between the
city and the union was at a crucial point and the union
membership was ready to strike in order to force concessions
from the city. On March 10, 1976, the Mayor, whose position
all along had been that there was no money for raises, pro
posed the following measures to add to the regular incre
ment. A million dollar surplus had been found in the auto
mobile repair funds and could be used to make a temporary
improvement in salaries. This surplus would fund a temporary
cost of 1i~ing bonus of $200 for each city employee.53 The
Mayor recommended his proposal to the Council. However,
the Council was considering its own solution to the crisis.
At this point, the City’s bargaining system, which has been
superimposed on the traditional government apparatus with no
changes in the existing authority relationships, began to
prove unstable. Although the executive branch was assumed
to be primarily responsible for solving the crisis, the leg
islative branch had not formally delegated its authority.
Thus the Council and the Mayor began to bargain with the
union separately in attempt to solve the situation. These
actions indicated that there had not been a “family under
standing” regarding the position of the City before
53”Statement by Mayor Maynard Jackson on City of
Atlanta Employee Wage and Benefits,” 16 March 1976, City of
Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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negotiations commenced, and it pointed out that the respon
sibility for labor relations was not firmly established or
understood. The union recognized the absence of a coalesced
position on the part of management and began to engage in
multilateral bargaining. The AFSCME representatives con
tinued to negotiate with the Mayor’s representatives and
they resorted to end run lobbying tactics with. council
members. Based on the multilateral theories of Kochan, Love
and Sulzner, one could predict that the union would come out
of the negotiations with much more than they entered with.
The Council proposed to give all employees a one-step
raise. Since there were not enough funds to underwrite
the increase, the Council proposal stated that the executive
branch would identify and terminate 300 regular full-time
positions. The Council was seriously considering this pro
posal which they knew the Mayor did not support since he had
stated over and over again that he would not lay off employees
in order to give raises to others.
Because of the turn of events, and at Samuel Hider’s
request, Mayor Jackson became personnally~involved in the
AFSCME negotiations in an attempt to prevent a strike. The
Mayor entered the negotiations, knowing as did the Council,
that A. N. Pullen and Company, an independent auditor, had
found 234 unfilled funded positions. However, the Pullen
Report indicated that the City needed an average vacancy
rate of 250 general funded positions in order to meet the
25 7
city’s obligations for 1976. If the Council’s proposal pro
viding for a one-step increase was adopted, it would bring
about a mid-year shortage of $1,710,000 and require the
city to fire approximately 340 General Fund employees.54
In the middle of the Union-Mayor negotiations, the
Council passed an Ordinance on March 15, 1976, which would
grant all city employees a $500 annual increase when the
executive branch could identify and terminate 300 funded
full-time positions. The attempt by some Council members
to give the raise to the lower paid employees, those in range
62 and below, failed by a vote of 8-9. The Council debate
indicated that the councilmen had no knowledge of the exis
tence of any money to make the ordinance worth the:paper it
was written on. They carefully set the amount of the increase
and the number of positions the Mayor would have to eliminate
in order to fund the increase. However they cautiously refused
to state the positions that the Mayor should abolish. It
was common knowledge that the positions abolished, if any,
would be in ranges 62 and below, those ranges that were sen
sitive to AFSCME because these were the ranges where the
overwhelming majority of the AFSCME members were located.
One councilman warned that the Council did not know the impli
cations of the ordinance and that it was a “three headed
54jules M. Sugarman to The Atlanta City Council, 15
March. 1976, City of Atlanta, Bureau of Labor Relations Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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winged goose.”55 It was now obvious to everyone involved that
the Council and the Mayor stood in diametrically opposed posi
tions. The union could now expect to win some real conces
sions or accumulate a bag of promises which would be im
possible to collect upon. One councilman put it succinctly
when he stated that “the Council had put the Monkey on the
Mayor’s back.”
On the day the Council passed its ordinance, which the
Mayor refused to sign, AFSCME clarified its position on the
negotiations. The executive branch was informed of the fol
lowing minimum prerequisities which AFSCME insisted were
necessary in order to avert a strike.
1. Provide immediate one-time $200 cost of living
bonus.
2. Provide a 30~ per hours increase for each em
ployee effective April 1, 1976 ($624 per
Annum)
3. Provide complete hospitalization premiums for
dependents.
4. Provide one additional holiday for employees
(day after Thanksgiving).
5. No Layoffs.56
By March 22, 1976, the Mayor and the union had arrived
at a tentative agreement, subject to approval by the Council.
The Mayor called a special Council meeting for March 23, 1976,
so that he could discuss wages benefits for employees.57 In
his Council presentation, the Mayor indicated that the March
55Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of Meet
ings of the City Council, meeting of 15 March 1976. (Taped.)
56R. H.. Jones to Charles L. Davis, 15 March 1976, City
of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
57Mayor Maynard Jackson to James J. Little, 22 March
1976, City Governments Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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23, 1976 Tentative Agreement which. he had signed, was ar
rived at after more than thirty hours of negotiations.
Negotiations that had been made increasingly difficult by
the Council’s actions on March 15, 1976. He questioned
the Council’s intentions when it promised city workers a
$500 annual increase that the city did not have. He also
ch.arged the Council with knowing that th.e vacancies he was
to identify did not exist. “It is my conviction that the
ordinance you passed contemplates laying off employees and
that the majority of those laid off would come from grades
62 and below.” After warning the Council that “our concern
ought to be with doing what is right within what we can do,”
the Mayor proceeded to read the March 23, 1976 Tentative
Agreement and requested Council approval.
March 23, 1976 Tentative Agreement
1. $208.00 per year (equivalent of 10~ per hours)
effective April 1, 1976.
2. City of Atlanta to increase its share of de
pendent coverage premiums for hospitalization
from 407~ to 707~.
3. One (1) additional (Floating) holiday.
4. No layoffs of employees represented by AFSCME.
5. In addition to the above, every effort shall be
made to fund the $500.00 per year raise passed
by the Atlanta City Council effective July, 1976,
(or earlier if possible), with the understanding
that such funding shall not be achieved by
laying off employees represented by AFSCME.
The Mayor then clarified his position on items 4 and 5 of the
agreement. The following is a special statem.ent attached to
the agreement with his signature.
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I agree to recommend the above to the Atlanta
City Council. However, it is understood that,
by agreeing to recommend Items 4 and 5, above,
the City of Atlanta and the undersigned, in
dividually, do not imply that they will layoff
any employees whether represented by AFSCME or
not.
The Mayor indicated that he felt the agreement “to be a very
reasonable compromise”and strongly recommended approval.58
In an effort to implement portions of the tentative
agreement, on March 26, 1976, the Council approved a floating
holiday and payment by the city of 707~ of the dependent hos
pitalization coverage. They also amended the March 15, 1976
ordinance to allow all employees at range 62 and below to
have a salary increase of $208.00. The $500 promise was
still a possibility if the Mayor could identify and termi
nate 300 funded-unfilled positions.59 AFSCME believed that
this was possible and would be done by July 1, 1976. Thus
the AFSCME membership were told that they had won a $708.00
pay increase.
In July, AFSCME expressed dissatisfaction with the
Mayor’s failure to eliminate the 300 positions. According
to the union this was a “breach of faith.” In a letter
to the Mayor, AFSCME charged the city with having 300
funded-unfilled positions. The fact that the Mayor had
58Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of Meet
ings of the City Council, meeting of 23 March 1976. (Taped.)
59Atlanta, Georgia, “An Ordinance Amending Chapter 21,
Article 11 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Atlanta
So As to Establish a 1976 Classification and Salry Schedule
for Officers and Employees of the City,” (26 March 1976).
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ailed to abolish them was simply an attempt to renege on
his commitment.
We bargained in good faith. and even went to
the extent of offering to assist you in your
task. . . You have had three months to identify
the~uifi1led positions and have not done so.
We consider this a violation of the spirit
as well as the letter of our agreement. .. (the)
AFSCME leadership will recommend Job action to
begin on July 12, 1976 if conditions and dia
logue don’t change.6O
The City reacted by sending a memorandum to all city employ
ees refuting the AFSCME claims. The position of the city
was that it was in an economic strain and in order to give
the $500 raise the Mayor would be forced to layoff some
employees and give raises to others. They further claimed:
To date, we have not been able to identify and
abolish 300 positions. In fact, although every
effort has been made, we must still identify
and abolish an additional 55 positions to pay
for the $208 increase which you are now receiving.61-
On July 9, 1976, the AFSCME membership responded to
the city directive by voting to hamper but not halt city
operations, hoping to force the city into giving the $500
raise. The majority voted to support a “Safety Program” and
gave the negotiating team the power to call a strike at any
time. Meanwhile the city offered a one time only increment
of $100 per employee which the union rejected as obscene
60Leamon Hood to Honorable Maynard Jackson, 6 July
1976, AFSCME Southeast Region Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
61-Samuel Hider to All City of Atlanta Employees, 9
July 1976, City of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations Files,
Atlanta, GeOrgia.
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and absurd.62 Although the Mayor warned the Union that pro
test, slowdowns or strikes would not change the fact that the
city had no money for raises, the Union continued to imple
ment its “Safety Program.” The “Safety Program” consisted
of a meticulous check of city equipment for safety defects
which had the effect of delaying the start of garbage pickup
for approximately 45 minutes. This program lasted about one
week. On July 19, 1976, approximately 850 City employees,
all AFSCME members, took the day off calling it “City
Employee Pride Day” to protest the failure of the city to
implement the $500 raise.63 All of these actions, endorsed
by the union, were in direct violation of the Dues Check
off Ordinance. Regardless, the Mayor did not revoke the
privilege.
Once again the city appeared to be headed toward a
direct confrontation with AFSCME. A strike seemed imminent.
On July 24, 1976, the Mayor issued a position paper on the
labor situation. He argued that he had lived up to every
provision of the March 23, 1976 agreement, including the
provision about the $400 raise, because he had made every
effort to locate 300 positions which were funded and unfilled
in order to terminate them but could not. The Mayor warned
that a strike would not put money into the city’s treasury
and that, on the contrary, it would only hurt the city and
the union.64
63Atlanta Constitution, 21 July 1976.
64Mayor’s Office, “City of Atlanta Position Paper on
Labor Situation,” 24 July 1976, City of Atlanta Bureau of
Labor Relations Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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In a last minute attempt to prevent a strike, the
Mayor met secretly on July 24, 1976, with AFSCME represen
tatives and other city officials in the office and in the
presences of Representative Andrew Young, and Dr. Randolph
Blackwell. The union recommended that the Mayor consider
using funds from the recently approved Public Works Em
ployment Act, 1976 for raises for AFSCME members. The
Mayor agreed, barring any legal restrictions, that he would
recommend to the City Council that anticipated funds from
the newly enacted Public Works Employment Act, 1976 from the
Title II Countercyclical funds be used to finance salary
increases. 65
On July 29, 1976, the Mayor informed the Finance
Committee that it would be impossible to eliminate the 300
positions necessary to fund the $500 salary increase “without
substantially reducing the level of essential municipal
services.” He indicated that if the Council would approve,
he was of the opinion that monies the city anticipated re
ceiving from the Countercyclical funds could be used by the
city as substitute financing to grant salary increases. He
indicated that this method of financing had been discussed
with counsel to AFSCME and the Senate staff representative.
65Portions of what was actually agreed to at the secret
meeting is disputed. The unions position is that the Mayor
agreed to use the money to pay the $500 increase to the lower
paid employees. Mr. Hider states that the Mayor agreed to use
the funds for raises for all employees. Mr. Hider also states
that Jerry Wurf, International President of AFSCME stated that
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I recommend to the Council that ]~ or my
designee be authorized to enter into
discussion with. employee representatives
pertaining to the use of countercyclical
funds when they become available for the
purpose of improving salaries of City
employees in grade 62 and below. I should
be very clear in stating that the amount
of countercyclical funds available is not
sufficient to fully fund the $500 salary
increase which the Council previously ap
proved. It, however, would provide suffi
cient dollars for a significant increase.66
The mayor then submitted a draft resolution for the Commit
tee’s consideration which would indicate Council approval
for him to continue his discussions with employee repre
sentatives regarding the use of countercyclical funds for
the purpose of improving salaries of employees in grade
62 and below. The Committee rejected the Mayor’s proposal
and questioned the legality of the matter. The Mayor’s
proposal was later denounced by Councilman Richard Guthman,
Chairman of the Finance Committee, as “an irresponsible,
short-term solution.”67 Once again the failure, of the
Administration to reach a “family understandingT’ or a
coalesced position on the immediate issue pointed up the
instability within the city’s administrative bargaining
machinery.
he knew he could not strike the city and win, and the union
did suggest the use of the Countercyclical funds for raises
in order to get th.eir backs from the wall. The Mayor re
fused to be interviewed.
66Maynard Jackson to Honorable Richard Guthman, 29
July 1976, AFSCME Southeast Regional Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
67Atlanta Constitution, 7 August 1976.
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In order to clear up the confusion concerning
whether it was legal to use the Title I~I. funds for pay
raises, Mayor Jackson telegramed Senator Edmund Muskie,
Chairman of the.Senate Sub-Committee on Intergovernmental
Relations, for clarification of the matter. He asserted
that a decisionon the use of Title II funds for the pur
pose of salary increases was essential to “maintenance of
good labor relations in Atlanta. 68
Senator Muske responded on July 30, 1976, noting that
the legislation in Title II did not address the issue of
salary increases. However, he was of the opinion that,
it certainly does not preclude use of Title II
funds for pay increases to State and local
government workers if those pay increases are
essential for the maintenance of the service
level customarily provided by that State or
local Government.
The principle purpose of Title II is to prevent
State and local governments from taking budget
related actions that hamper national economic
recovery. Certainly, the firing of 300 city
employees would be counterproductive to the
return of the nation to sound economic health.
Thus, if Atlanta uses its Title II funds to
keep employees on the payroll, it will be serving
the principle purpose of the legislation.69
Also on July 30, 1976, the City Attorney gave his opinion
on the legality of using the countercyclical funds for
salary increases.
68Maynard Jackson to HOnorable. Senator Edmund Muskie,
27 July 1976.. (~elegram), AFSCME Southeast Region Files,
Atlanta, GeOrgia.
69Edmund S. Muskie to the Honorable Maynard Jackson,
30 July 1976, City of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations
Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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It is our opinion that funds rec~ived by
the City under Title II. . .could be used
in paying the $500.00 annual increase. In
order to do so, it would be necessary for
Council to amend the Ordinance so as to
eliminate the requirement of identification
and termination of 300 positions.70
Armed with approval from the City Attorney and Senator
Muskie for the case of countercyclical funds for salary in
creases, Councilwoman Panke Bradley introduced a resolution
at the August 3, 1976 Council meeting which would have
given Council approval for the Mayor to continue discus
sions with employee representation on the possible use of
countercycyclical funds for the purpose of salary increases.
However her resolution was for possible salary inceaases
for all employees not for the salary ranges 62 and below
as the Mayor had stated in his letter to the Finance
Committee on July 29, 1976. The Council voted 8-9 with
the vote cast by Council President Wyche Fowler breaking
the tie to defeat the Bradley resolution.71 Thus the
Council refused to assign countercyclical funds for pay
increases. Some members indicated an interest in using
the funds to supplement other city programs particular
ly the LEAA Program. Indicative of their priorities,
7OQuoted in Memorandum from Maynard Jackson to
Finance Committee, 1 December 1976, AFSCME Southeast Region
Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
71-Atlanta, Georgia, “Urging the Mayor to Solicit
Opinions from the Law Department and the U. S. Department
of Treasury as to the Legality of Using Counter-Cyclical
Funds for Supplementary Employee Salaries; and for Other
Purposes: Resolution Adversed. (3 August 1976).
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the Council, at the same meeting, approved 75 million
dollars worth of Public Work projects for items such as
rennovation of the Cyclorama, construction of a community
theater for the Atlanta Civic Center and improvements in
the acoustics: of Maddox Hall at the Civic Center.
During the months of October and November, the union
continued to negotiate with the Mayor’s representative on
the matter of the $500. The union also continued to engage
in end run lobbying tactics with City Council members. The
rest of city government was busy preparing the 1977 budget.
AFSCME, however, was determined to take care of the $500
dispute before moving further. This move the union would
later regret.
The Council re-entered the conflict on October 18, 1976
when Councilman James Howard and John Calhoun proposed an
ordinance to give a $500 salary increase to employees in
salary range 62 and below effective July 1, 1976. Nonethe,
less, within the executive branch, sentiment seemed to be
shifting away from the Mayor’s recommendation to the Finance
Committee on July 29, 1976. The view expressed in an inter
departmental memorandum was that it was neither sound manage
ment policy nor fair to give salary increases to some em
ployees and deny salary increases to others. Further,
management argued that to ignore one group of employees
while giving concessions to those employees who were union
ized, was to invite discontent among mid-level employees
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and encourage unionization at higher levels.72 In Novem
ber, the Mayor made a public statement which indicated
that the countercyclical funds would probably be used for
all employees. The union in a letter to the Mayor de
clared:
It is highly irregular and strikes at the
very heart of honesty andintegrity for
anyone involved in a mutual understanding
between parties, for a single individual to
attempt to undermine and/or change the
original understanding or commitment.73
The union continued to meet with the Mayor’s representative
regarding the $500 raise from the Countercyclical funds at
the July 24, 1976 meeting. However, Mr. Hider the Mayor’s
representative, denied this allegation and stated that
the Mayor had promised to use the funds, if legally possi
ble, for salary increases for all employees. Since there
was no written agreement made at the secret meeting, it was
impossible to determine the truth. Nevertheless, in his
July 29, 1976, letter to the Finance Committee, the Mayor
recommended use of the funds for range 62 and below. The
overwhelming majority of AFSCME’s members fit into this
category.
Amid confusion, the Mayor made his position clear in
a memorandum to the Finance Committee dated December 1,
1976. The first portion of the memo was not good news
for AFSCME.
72lnterdepartmental City Hall memorandu, 29 October
1976, City Hall FilesE, Atlanta, Georgia.
73Cleveland Chappell to Maynard Jackson, 18 November
1976, AFSCME Southeast Region Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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In November 18, 1976, I. transmitted the execu
tive budget recommendations to the Appropria
tions Committee. In that transmittal letter,
I stated that salaries would be addressed under
a separate communication. This is written for
that purpose.74
The Mayor then proceeded to discuss the Countercyclical
funds. After indicating that some of the funds might
need to be used to continue some of the city’s existing
programs such as LEAA, the Mayor then recommended that
the funds could best be used to give salary increases
to all city employees except elected officials and board
members. The union felt this action by the Mayor was the
epitome of dishonesty.
In spite of the fact that AFSCME members packed the
Finance Committee meeting on December 2, 1976, the Committee
approved the Mayor’s recommendation. On December 6, 1976,
the Council met and approved an ordinance to amend Chapter
21.2 which would allow the city to divide the funds received
from the federal government under the authorization con
tained in Title II of the 1976 Public Works Employment
Act equally by the total number of active employees, except
for the chief administrative officer, department heads,
bureau directors, elected officials and members of boards
or commissions. The Council amended the March 15 and
March 26 ordinance removing the section referring to the
74Maynard Jackson to Finance Committee, 1 December
1976, AFSCNE Southeast Region Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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$500 raise contingent upon the Mayor terminating 300 funded-
unfilled positions.
During the debate, some councilmen argued that the
Council was reneging on the promise of $500 to the workers.
It was also stated that the Council had lied to the workers
in 1976.
We passed a paper for $500.00 for city employees.
We knew at that time that we did not have the
money. That’s why they are back here today. If
we had only been honest then and said we can only
give what we got.. .75
The AFSCME membership felt that they had been tricked
by the Council and the Mayor. And, in fact, the workers
had been caught in a political power play within the govern
ment which made it impossible for them to be winners, only
victims. Although the union had conceived of the use of
countercyclical funds for pay increases for the lower paid
city employees and had seen fit to do battle with the Ad
ministration for six months in an attempt to gain the in
crease for their membership, they now saw the monies being
distributed to almost all city employees including many
who had criticized their efforts. This was a bitter pill
to swallow. AFSCME representatives now claimed that they
had been forced to represent all city workers even though
the January 20, 1975 Ordinance did not allow them to. The
75Atlanta (Georgia) City Government, Minutes of
Meetings of the City Council, meeting of 6 December 1976.
(Taped.)
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union in an open letter expressed displeasure with the
Council’s decision.
This is clearly injustice which starts with the
appearance of being just and gets more insane
and grossly unjust with closer observation.
Several hours, perhaps hundreds, have been spent
with representatives of the administration re
garding wages, hours and working conditions.
Yet, we have resolved nothing that can be cited
as a final product of those meetings.76
On December 8, 1976, the union participated in another
work stoppage which accomplished nothing in terms of con
cessions from the city, because the decision makers had
obviously reached a “family understanding” regarding their
position. At the December 9, 1976 membership meeting,
AFSCME workers voted to accept the countercyclical funds
which would probably amount to $361.00, rather than call a
strike. However, the seeds of discontent had been sown lib
erally and a considerable minority of the members were not
satisfied with the majority decision. A previous action
of the membership had also indicated the membership’s con
cern about its vunerability if they ever called a strike.
There was no strike fund. As a result, there was ~greement
to increase the membership dues by $2.00 per person for
the purpose of building a strike fund. Although the Mayor
had threatened to revoke checkoff if the union engaged in
work stoppages, it was now apparent that the Mayor’s words
76City Employees Represented by AFSCME to City Council
Members, 7 December 1976, AFSCME Southeast Region Files,
Atlanta, Georgia.
272
were simply threats. The union had engaged in numerous
work stoppages since receivip~g checkoff and the Mayor had
never made good his threats. It was obvious that he did
not want, at this point, to tarnish his “pro union” image.
Although AFSCME had literally spent all of its ener
gies pushing for a salary increase for 1976, in a letter
to Mayor Jackson dated December 14, 1976, the Union request
ed the right to begin discussions on monetary items affec
ting the employees represented by Local 1644 for fiscal
year 1977-1978.
While discussion usually began earlier, the
unresolved 76-77 wage issue did not make it
practical for us to follow that course, and
was agreed to by Mr. Samuel Hider~ Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations.’7
Mr. Hider denied any approval by him of the delayed budget
discussions. The union received no response from the Mayor
regarding their request for input into the budget. Thus,
they appeared before the Finance Committee on January 27,
1977 and stated that the Myor’s representatives had failed
to have budget discussions with them. The Committee de
ma~ded to know why Mr. Hider had been unresponsive to their
request.~8 The Mayor responded with the following explana
tion:
77Cleveland Chappell and James Malone to Honorable
Maynard Jackson, 14 December 1976, AFSCME Southeast Region
Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
78Richard Guthman to Honorable Maynard Jackson, 1
February 1977, City of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations
Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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Input was received from AFSCME on matters per
taining to wages, hours, and working conditions
in fifteen (15) of eighteen (18) separate meet
ings held in 1976. In the last three meetings
(9-29, 10-6, and 12-17) the Bureau of Labor
Relations specifically requested input from
AFSCME into the 1977 budget and was told by Mr.
Leamon Hood that AFSCME preferred to continue
discussions on the issue of a $500 pay raise for
AFSCME members and other concerns that they felt
were tied into the 1976 budget discussions.
At no time has AFSCME been denied input into
budgetary discussions but neither has the Bureau
of Labor Relations insisted that input from
AFSCME be provided when Mr. Hood has declined to
provide said input after being requested to do so.79
For all intents and purposes, AFSCME was fighting a
losing battle. The budget was actually prepared and ready
for Council approval. Once again, the Union had failed to
have any meaningful input into the decision making which
would have an impact on the lives of AFSCME employees.
Summary
Like the Allen and Massell administrations, the Jack
son administration has failed to develop a rational effi
cient way to deal with its labor problems. Although the
Administration appeared, during its early days, to be de
veloping a long-range number three agenda setting process
in the area of labor relations, within a few months the
Administration reverted tb ~previous Administrations’
number one agenda setting process. In fact, the Adminis
tration has continued to make decisions regarding labor ma
79Maynard Jackson to Councilman Richard Guthman, 2
February 1977, City of Atlanta Bureau of Labor Relations
Files, Atlanta, Georgia.
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muddled, incremental manner. Although the Administration
has placed the responsibility for labor negotiations in.’.
the executive branch, with the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations as the primary negotiator, this procedure
has not been successful. The failure of this procedure
is due to the fact that the pre-existing centers of autho
rity, in this case the Council, assumes the task of ne
gotiating when the city is faced with a labor crisis.
This behavior, on the part of the Council was vividly
illustrated during the March 1976 union-city conflict.
In this regard, Burton’s thesis that a bargaining system
when superimposed on the traditional government apparatus
with minor modifications proves to be unstable was once
again borne out. Again as in the Massell administration,
this fragmentation in authority in terms of responsibility
for labor negotiations made bilateral and multilateral
bargaining possible. The fact that the Administration
has failed in some instances to reach a “family under
standing” or a coalesced position on the issues prior to
labor negotiations has allowed the union to utilize end
run tactics in an attempt to get concessions.
The Administration did not reject in theory the pre
vious Administration’s policy of “no policy” regarding
union membership, meaning anyone could join. However,
in the January 20, 1975 Dues Checkoff Ordinance, the
Administration restricted membership when it stated that
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only certain categories of workers were “eligible”for dues
deductions.
Although the Jackson administration’s labor policy
is to have “meet and confer” sessions with employee organi
zations to ascertain their positions on working conditions
and wages and to allow input into decision making, in
reality the Administration’s decisions are arrived at uni
laterally. The unions allege that most labor related
matters discussed with the Mayor’s representative and con
veyed to the Mayor never reached the Council for consid
eration. This alleged inaction is viewed by the unions as
an indication, of the Mayor’s lack of interest in developing
a responsible labor relations program as well as his in
difference toward the demands made by city employees. As
indicated in this chapter, the unions have attempted to
circumvent the Mayor by taking their message directly to
the Council during times of crises.
The unions view the Bureau of Labor as a good idea arid
a very necessary step toward improving labor relations. Yet,
the failure of city government to fund the Bureau so that
it might effectively function is seen to be inexcusable.
The Bureau presently ‘has a permanent staff, consisting of
two, supplemented by several temporary CETA employees. The
permanent staff, according to the 1977 budget report, will
be expanded to three. Presently, the Bureau is expected to:
monitor national, state and local developments in labor
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relations; accommodate any employee interest group by meet
ing with them; address itself to the preparation of cases
to be heard before the Civil Service Board; react to slow
downs, work stoppages and strikes; respond to all employee
complaints and concerns; deal with grievances filed by
union and non-union employees; and respond to a myriad of
labor-related problems that arise among 8,000 municipal em
ployees on a day-to-day basis. Realizing then the dimen
sions of the mission presently assigned to the Bureau and
realizing the contemporary trend toward public employee
unionization, the failure of the present city government
to strengthen the Bureau and develop guidelines to govern
the relationship between the city and employee organiza
tions is nothing short of astonishing.
Epilogue
During the early months of 1977, a series of activi
ties transpired which gives a clearer picture of Mayor
Jackson’s labor policy. Thus, despite the fact that this
study extends from 1966 to 1976, an epilogue has been added.
On January 18 and 19, 1977, sanitation employees,
represented by AFSCIYIE, refused to work because the temp
erature fell below 25 degrees. The Jackson administration
reacted to the work stoppage by docking the strikers for
the nine hours that they refused to work. In February,
the workers reacted to the city’s actions by engaging in
a five-day wildcat strike. After several negotiation
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sessions the city negotiators and the union officials
signed an agreement ending the dispute. According to the
agreement disciplinary actions and pending suspensions
against the strikers would be lifted, the workers would be
paid for four and one-half hours of the nine hours for which
they were docked, and meetings would take place in the
future between union officials and city negotiators to
settle the temperature question.
Between January and March of 1977, AFSCME officials
continued their efforts to negotiate a wage increase to be
included in the 1977 budget for municipal employees. How-~.
ever, all attempts failed. Thus, on March 28, 1977, three
days before the city budget officially closed, approximately
one hundred AFSCME members voted to strike against the city.
The strike vote appeared to be spontaneous, the obvious
results of frustration with the ~city’s failure to include
a salary increase in the budget. The vote took place in
the lobby of the Atlanta City Hall and the strikers de
manded a $ .50 hourly wage increase, liability insurance
protection for employees involved in vehicle mishaps while
on duty and increased hospitalization benefits for employees
and their families. The Jackson administration claimed that
the union demands would cost the city between 8 to 1.0 mil
lion dollars and the city did not have the funds to meet
these demands. The city never presented the union with a
counter offer.
278
The strike whether by accident or design, coincided
with the beginning of a national advertising campaign at
tacking Jackson’s political leadership sponsored by the
national AFSCME headquarters. The campaign was designed
to defeat Jackson in the 1977 mayoral election by tarnishing
his national and local image. The Atlanta business communi
ty, with its traditional anti-union bias, saw the anti-
Jackson advertisements as being anti-Atlanta and in an at
tempt to defeat the union’s efforts they coalesced behind
the Mayor.
After several days of discussions between the Admin
istration and union representatives, the Mayor determined
that the union demands could not be met. He then proceeded
to fire 1,001 striking workers and hired new workers to
replace them. Jackson’s behavior at this juncture began
to conflict with pro-labor positions that he had taken
earlier in his political career. During the 1970 sanita
tion strike, Jackson called for arbitration of the dispute.
However, he now determined that arbitration would be useless.
The Mayor also contended in 1970 that the charter did not
prohibit pay raises after March 31 of any given year, it
merely prohibited changes in base pay but allowed merit
raises. Yet, in 1977 the Mayor quoted the same charter
position as the one of the reasons why the city could not
provide any pay raises for the striking employees. The
Mayor’s actions throughout the strike indicated that he
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recognized the absence of a significant labor block vote in
Atlanta as well as the lack of a mayoral candidate capable
of giving him a serious challenge for his office in the
mayoral election. Thus, the Mayor was free to lean openly
toward the downtown business community for political sup
port. The Mayor’s anti-labor stand buttressed by the
National AFSCME anti-Jackson campaign helped to create an
“unholy alliance.” The “unholy alliance,” supportive of
the Mayor, was made up of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce,
Central Atlanta Progress, the City-widge League of Neighbor
hoods, the City-wide Advisory Council on Public Housing,
the Urban League of Atlanta, the Atlanta Baptist Ministers
Union and the Atlanta Business League. This group issued
a joint statement in support of the Mayor and proclaimed
that the union leaders were involved in a “cynical power
play aimed at taking over city government.80
On April 25, 1977, the local union leaders conceded
defeat and requested that all striking workers return to
their jobs. However, for many workers the timing was late.
They had already been replaced by the new recruits. The
Administration promised the workers a raise next year and
proceeded to implement a program that would dismantle the
union. Although the Mayor did not revoke dues checkoff, the
Administration declared that the dues deduction cards of
strikirzg AFSCME members who were fired and later rthired
80Atlanta ConstitutiOn, 6 April 1977.
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were not valid. Hence, the AFSCME checkoff dropped from
1290 in March 1977 to 734 in May 1977. The Administration
also pushed through the Council an ordinance requiring
AFSCME to show yearly by September 1, that it had 50 percent
plus one of the eligible employees as members or lose dues
checkoff privileges. Thus, the Jackson administration, al
though continuing to verbalize a commitment to labor had by
its actions deserted AFSCNE and displayed a commitement to
getting re-elected.
CHAPTER V
PERCEPTIONS OF THE RANK AND FILE TOWARDS
THE CITY’S LABOR RELATIONS POLICY
The findings in the previous chapters indicate that
the Administrations which governed the city of Atlanta
from 1966-1976 engaged in collective bargaining (as defined
in this study), informally and discreetly, except during
periods of crisis when the bargaining received media cov
erage. None of the Administrations developed a long-range,
rational, holistic labor policy. Rather, these successive
Administrations have utilized a number one agenda setting
policy which has determined the relationship between the
city and two unions. Although the agenda setting patterns
for each Administration have been the same, the mayors have
reacted to labor crises quite differently. Nevertheless,
the decision-making which determines the relationship be
tween the city and the two unions has been reactive, short
run, and sometimes irrationally diffuse. All of the Admin
istrations have appeared to muddle along from one crisis
related decision to the next. One of the concerns of this
chapter will be to determine how the rank and file (the
union members) feel about the city’s unstructured, informal
and sometimes erratic.labor policy. The labor-management
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machinery under each Administration has been unstable and
ambiguous. None of the Administrations has resolved the
question of who is responsible for labor relations. Thus,
as a result of the confusion and instability, the unions
have engaged in bilateral and multilateral discussions with
a perplexing variety of city officials and agencies. An
other concern of this chapter is to determine how the rank
and file feel about the city’s labor machinery. Labor
relations literature and statistics gathered by the United
States Labor Department indicate that the trend among pub
lic employees is toward increased unionization. Therefore,
another concern of this chapter will be to determine if the
Atlanta unionized public employee supports the unionization
of other city employees and parenthetically, whether he
supports the idea of a unionized police department. In
order to address these concerns and ascertain the opinions
and the attitudes of the rank and file members towards the
city of Atlanta, a three month long field study was con
ducted by this writer from November 1976 through January
1977. The field study consisted of both mailed question
naires and follow-up interviews.
Survey researchers agree that the return rate for
mailed questionnaires is unpredictable.1 Therefore, an
1See Don A Dillman, “Increasing Mail Questionnaire
Response in Large Samples of the General Public,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 36 (Summer 1972) :254-257; Arnold S. Linsky,
“Stimulating Responses to Mailed Questionnaires: A Review,”
283
attempt to increase the number of responses was made using
these techniques:
1. A cover letter from the leader of the union
was attached to each questionnaire.
2. Members received prior notice of the question
naire.
3. The self-addressed return envelop displaying a
stamp rather than a business reply marker.
4. A Second mailing was made within a few weeks of
the initial mailing.
Questionnaires were mailed to 100 percent of the rank
and file members of IAFF and AFSCME for whom addresses were
available. AFSCNE Local 1644 provided this writer with the
addresses for 1204 members. Of this number 952 of the ad
dresses were found to be correct and 265 members responded.
In the case of IAFF, Local 134 provided this writer with the
addresses of 348 members. Only 293 of the addresses were
found to be correct and 156 members responded. The 421
responses received were significant enough to allow the re
searchers to draw generalizations and conclusions from the
data about the unions, both individually and in combination.
The findings from the questionnaire and the results from the
45 follow-up inerviews will be combined during the analysis.
Public Opinon Quarterly 39 (Spring 1975):82-101; Stanley D.
Bachrack and Harry M. Scoble, “Mail Questionnaire Efficiency:
Controlled Reduction of Nonresponse,”Public Opinion Quarterly
3l(Sunimer 1967) :265-271.
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Profile of the Unions
Of those persons responding to the questionnaire,
mean number of years as union members was 6.1 for AFSCME
members, 6.51 for IAFF members and 6.279 for the unions
combined. Although IAFF was not a recipient of dues deduc
tion until 1975, 35.9 percent of the respondents have been
members of the union from 1-3 years. Among the AFSCNE
respondents 39.9 percent have been members from 1-2 years.
Thse differences, however, could be a result of the faster
turnover among AFSCME employees and the aggressive recruiting
efforts of the AFSCME leadership. (See Table 6.)
TABLE 6
DISTRIBTUION OF RESPONDENTS BY NUMBER
OF YEARS AS MEMBERS OF UNION
Union Percent Mean
AFSCME
1 — 2 years 39.9 6.1
3- 7years 27
8 - 24 years 33.1
IAFF
1 - 3 years 35.9 6.51
4- 6years 32
7 - 32 years 32
Combined
1 - 2 years 34.4 6.279
3 - 7 years 34.8
8 - 32 years 30.8
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Yet a significant level of stability is shown to exist in
the AFSCME ranks since 33.1 percent of the respondents
have been members of the union from 8-24 years. The data
on IAFF members indicate that 32 percent of the respondents
have been members from 7-32 years.
An evaluation of the distribution of respondents by
age indicates that the mean age for AFSCME employees was
39 while the mean age for IAFF members was 32.7 years. The
mean age for the groups combined was 36.7 years. Further
analysis indicates that 33.5 of AFSCME members were 31
years of age or less while 31.2 percent were between the
ages 46 and 67. On the other hand, th.e IAFF respondents
are slightly younger with 34 percent falling in the age
group of 28 years and younger and 31.4 percent between the
ages of 34 and 56 years. (See Table 7.)
TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY AGE
Union Percent Mean
AFSCME
O - 31 years 33.5 39
32 - 45 years 35.4
46 - 47 years 31.2
IAFF
O - 28 years 34 32.7
29 - 33 years 34.6
34 - 56 years 31.4
Combined
o - 29 years 34.4 36.7
30 -~ 41 years 35.1
42 - 67 years 30.5
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After a careful review of the distribution of re
spondents by work years, it is obvious that in spite of the
high turnover in those areas where most AFSCME respondents
are employed, some respondents have been with the city for
a long time. For example: 32.7 percent of the AFSCME
respondents have worked for the city between 15-45 years,
whereas 29.4 percent of the firefighters have been employed
by the city from 11-33 years. The data also indicate that
36.2 percent of the AFSCME respondents have been with the
city from 7-14 years, whereas 39.2 percent of the IAFF
respondents have been employed by the city from 7-10 years.
The mean years of service for AFSCME and IAFF respondents
combined is 11.14 years. (See Tables 8 and 9.)
TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY NUMBER OF YEARS EMPLOYED
BY THE CITY OF ATLANTA
Union Years Percent Mean
AFSCME 1- 6 31.1 11.77
7-14 36.2
15-45 32.7
IAFF 1- 6 31.4 10.10
7-10 39.2
11-33 30.4





DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEAN FOR THE NUMBER OF YEARS
AS A MEMBER OF THE UNION AGE AND NUMBER OF
YEARS EMPLOYED BY THE CITY OF ATLANTA
Years As a Years
Union Union Member Age Employed
AFSCME 6.1 32.7 11.7
TAFF 6.51 32.7 10.1
Combined 6.27 36.7 11.4
There is a significant difference in the racial com
position of both unions, but there are significant differences
between them in terms of sex. All of the IAFF respondents
were male and 96.6 percent of the AFSCME respondents were
male. (See Table 10.) However, AFSCME respondents were
77.8 percent Black and 22.2 percent white, whereas, TAFF
respondents were 4.6 percent Black and 95.4 percent white.
(See Table 11.)
TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY SEX*
Female
Male 96.6
*Distribution given in percent.
Union





DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY RACE*
Union
Race AFSCME IAFF Combined
Black 77.8 4.6 50.8
White 22.2 95.4 49.2
*Distribution given in percent
The distribution of respondents from the two unions by
Atlanta residency closely corresponds to the distribution by
race. Of the AFSCME respondents 72.7 percent were residents
of the city and 27.3 percent lived outside the city. Among
IAFF respondents 16.4 percentwere residents and 83.6 percent
lived outside the city. (See Table 12.) Obviously the
IAFF opposition to a residency requirement for employment in
the city reflects its concern for the job security of its
members.
TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY ATLANTA
RE S IDENCY*
Union
Atlanta Resident AFSCME IAFF Combined
Yes 72.7 16.4 51.9
No 27.3 83.6 48.1
*Distribution given in percent.
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An analysis of the education and salary levels of the
respondents reveals a major difference between the two groups.
Of the AFSCME respondents 63.1 percent had not completed high
school. However, this level of education achievement was
true for only 7.2 percent of the IAFF respondents. Income
differences between the groups are also stark. (See Table 13.)
TABLE 13
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY EDUCATION
Union
Education AFSCME IAFF Combined
Percent Percent Percent
0- 7 grades 24 0 15.1
8-11 grades 39.1 7.2 27.3
High school 22.5 53.9 34.1
graduate
1- 2 years college 10.1 30.9 17.8
College degree 3.5 7.9 5.1
Graduate school .8 0 .5
Of the AFSCME respondents 83.4 percent earn less than $9,999
yearly, with 32 percent earning less than $6,999 per year.
Only 3.5 percent of the AFSCME respondents earn $21,000 per
year and above. Of the IAFF respondents 9.9 percent earn
less than $9,999 yearly and 32.9 percent earn $12,000 and
above yearly. It is significant to note that thepoverty
level for a non-farm family of 4 in 1975, according to the
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U. S. Census Bureau, was $5,500 per year. Thus, a significant
number of AFSCNE respondents are skirting the edges of
poverty. (See Table 14.)
TABLE 14
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY SALARY
Union
AFSCME IAFF Combined
Salary* Percent Percent Percent
0 - 6,999 32 0 20.2
7,000 - 9,999 51.4 9.9 36.0
10,000 -11,999 13.1 57.2 29.4
12,000 and up 3.5 32.9 14.4
*Salary given in dollars.
Despite the low educational and low income levels of
some respondents, a large percentage of the union members are
home owners and registers voters. Of the AFSCME respondents
44.7 percent are home owners and 80.3 percent are registered
voters. Of the the IAFF respondents 73 percent are home
owners and 89.5 percent are registered voters. (See Tables
15 and 16.) Since an overwhelming majority of the AFSCME
respondents are Atlanta residents, this means that a sizeable
number are property taxpayers and the group has some political
clout if properly mobilized. Although the IAFF respondents
are property owners and registered voters, their political
291
clout is outside the city, because they have chosen to be
commuters. They have denied themselves the privilege of
voting in the city where they are employed, a means common
ly used to express one’s political views, where it could
possibly have an effect on their wages and working conditions.
TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY HOME OWNERSHIP
AND BY ATLANTA RESIDENCY
Atlanta Resident Own Home
Union Yes No Yes No
IAFF 16.4 83.6 73.0 27.0
AFSCME 72.7 27.3 44.7 55.3
Combined 51.9 48.1 55.1 44.9
*Distribution given in percent.
TABLE 16








The major objective of the field study was to ascertain
the opinions and attitudes of the rank and file towards the
municipal government. Based on data analysis, the researcher
can develop generalizations about the support among the rank
and file for further employee unionization. The results
also allow the researcher to make recommendations to enchance
the city-rank and file relationship. In order to determine
these views a questionnaire was developed. (See Table 17.)
Items were included in the questionnaire to provide informa
tion about the respondents’ perceptions of the following con
siderations.
1. What is the nature of the relationship which
exists between the rank and file and the city?
2. What are the opinions of the rank and file
regarding the city’s labor relations machinery?
3. What are the views of the unionized employees
toward the city’s position on collective bargain
ing?
4. What are the sentiments of the unionized employees
toward striking against the city?
5. What is the level of support for labor unity among
the unionized employees?
6. What are the views of the rank and file toward the
idea of a policemen’s union being recognized by
the city?
TABLE 17
INDEX OF RESPONSES TO VARIABLES BY UNION EXPRESSED IN PERCENT
Union
Variables LAi~i~ AFSuNJ~
ho not Do not
Yes No Know # Yes No Know #
Var 3 Do you feel that working conditions have
changed since you joined the union? 43.6 55.8 .6 74.7 24.5 .8
Var 4 Do you think that working conditions
have improved since •you joined the union? 28.8 71.2 0 75.4 23.5 1.1
Var 6 Do you feel that being a member of the
union provides you with better job security? 44.5 54.8 .6 80.6 18.6 .8
Var 7 Do you believe that a person can represent
himself as well as a union can? 9.0 90.4 .6 12.6 85.9 1.5 ~o
L~)
Var 8 Do you feel that being a member of the union
is worth the amount of money that you pay in
union dues? 59.1 39.6 1.3 84.5 14.6 .8
Var )9 Do you feel that you are better off after a
strike than before a strike? 57.2 32.9 9.9 49 40.7 10.3
Var 10 Do you feel that it is more important to
continue work than to stop work because the
union calls a strike? 31.2 63.6~ 5.2 34.9 62 3.1
Var 11 Do you feel that the benefits from a strike
are worth the problems that a strike causes




Do not Do not
~ Yes No Know # Yes No Know #
Var 12 Did you join the union because you feel
that the city does not care about you? 85.3 14,1 .6 68.6 31.4 0
Var 13 Do you feel that the city would treat you
the same if you were not a member of the
union? 57.4 41.3 1.3 31.3 67.2 1.5
Var 14 Do you feel that your union has done a good
job of presenting your complaints and con
cerns to the city? 41.7 55.1 3.2 84 14.4 1.5
Var 15 Do you feel that union settlements cause
taxes in the city to go up? 26.3 69.1 4.6 27.4 69.9 2.7
Var 16 Do you feel that the. city can give workers
a wage increase without increasing taxes? 87 12.3 .6 86 13.6 .4
Var 17 Do you feel that your unions makes ~rea
sonable demands on th.e city? 88,4 11 ~6 85.3 14.3 .4
Var 18 Do you feel that other unions in the city
make reasonable demands on the city? 90.9 8.4 .6 54.6 37.5 7.9
Var 20 Do you think that workers in all city de
partments should form one bing union? 64.5 34.2 1.3 91.3 8.4 .4
Var 21 Do you know anyone who works with you who
is not a member of the union? 99.4 .6 0 80.6 19.4 0
Var 22 Should workers who do not join the union




Variables Db not Do not
~ Yes No Know # Yes No Know #
Var 23 Do you feel that non union members of your
unit should be required to pay union dues? 36.8 62.6 .6 54 44.8 1.1
Var 24 Do you feel that other union ask for too
much from the city? 9.8 88.9 1.3 21.4 73.5 5.1
Var 25 Do you feel that your union is more suc
cessful now than in the past in its dealings
with the city? 30.3 69 .6 80.1 19.2 .8
Var 26 Do you feel that demands made by other unions
on the city have caused grievances presented
by your union to receive less consideration? 41.3 57.4 1.3 52.2 45 2.8
Var 27 Do you feel that the city taxpayers are
tired o.f unions demanding more and more each
year? 38.1 58.7 3.2 34.9 63.2 1.9
Var 28 Do you feel that the city taxpayers are in
favor of more pay and better working con
ditions for union members? 64.9 34.4 .6 82.1 17.2 .8
Var 29 Do you feel that the city taxpayers will
get tired of supporting union members’
demands? 51.6 45.6 2.6 38.4 59.2 2.4
Var 30 Do you feel that policemen should be al
lowed toHunionize? 98.7 1.3 0 80.~3 19.3 .4
Var 31 Would you be willing to support a policemen
union strike? 74.2 23.2 2.6 68.1 27.6 4.3
TABLE 17--continued
Var 32 Do you pay taxes to the city of Atlanta?
Var 33 Do you feel that your union leaders are
paid enough.?
Var 34 Would you be willing to pay more taxes to
increase the salaries and improve the
working conditions for all city employees?
Var 35 Do you feel that you should be represented
by some other union?
Var 36 Do you feel that all the workers in your
unit should be required to join the union?
Var 5 was deleted.
#Do not know means no response.
42.5 51.6 5.9 12,1 85.6
46.4 52.3 1.3 80.1 l8..8
. Union
~ IAFF AFSCNE
Variables Do not Do not
~ Yes No Know ~,& Yes No Know #
23.5 75..8 .7 75 25 0
79.6 16.4 3.9 62.9 31.4 5,7




7. What are the views of the unionized employees
regarding unionization among city employees in
the future?
The variables in the questionnaire were compared to
each other by crosstabulation. Those variables that proved
to be indicators reflecting the same view were collasped
into one variable--clustered. In order to determine whether
a systematic relationship existed between various variables
the Phi statistical test of significance was used. The Phi
test appropriately measures the strength of the relationship
between variables in nominal data which comprise this study.
Thus, the Phi test was used to determine which. variables
relating to the same issue had a strong enough relationship
to allow them to be clustered or reduced to form one
variable. Those variables indicating a Phi statistic of .15
or above to each other were clustered into new variables. A
total of eight cluster variables were created. The clustering
technique allows the researcher to combine several indicators
of the respondents’ perceptions on an issue into one variable
which addrsses a specific issue. Thus, the researcher does
not have to rely on any one indicator to draw a conclusion
about the respondent’s position.2 In order to assess the
2See Charles M. Bonjean, Richard J. Hill and S. Dale
McLemore, Sociological Measurements (San Francisco, California:
Chandler Publishing Company, 1967~ p. 2: Samuel B. Richmond,
Statistical Analysis (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1964),
p. 4; Alvin L. Jacobson and N. N. Lalu, “An Empirical and
Algebraic Analysis of Alternative Techniques for Measuring
Unobserved Variables,” in Measurement in Social Sciences:
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responses of the respondents an index was developed for each
cluster variable.3 The scoring system used in the index
for each cluster variable will be indicated in the study
when each variable is analyzed. However, it should be noted
that a yes response was given 1 point and a no response was
given 2 points. Missing values were not included in the new
cluster variable. If a respondent failed to answer any item
included in the cluster that respondent’s responses were
not included in the analysis.
When the two groups were compared, their responses to
the cluster variables were analyzed by the F distribution
and T-test. The F distribution was used to determine which
clusters could be subjected to statistical comparision.
When comparing the mean responses of two populations and the
variances are not know, the F distribution test can be corn
puted to determine the ratio of the variances of the means
to be tested. The variances between the means responses of
the two groups was considered to bes~equal--that is the
groups were comparable--when the F test indicated a variance
within the 95 percent confidence level. After having deter
mined those groups which could be compared from the analysis
Theories and Strategies, ed. H. M. Blalock, Jr. (New York:
Macmillan, 1974), p. 218.
3The scoring system developed in the index for the clus
ter variables is similar to the scoring system found in
Willis J. Goudy, “Nonresponse Effects on Relationship Between
Variables,” Public Opinion Quarterly 40 ~‘all 1976) :360-369.
299
of the variances the T-test was performed. The purpose of
the T-test was to determine the amount of agreement or dis
agreement between the two groups. The T-test is a statis
tical test used to determine whether or not the differences
between the means of two populations is significant. If
the T score falls within the 95 percent confidence range
this implies that there is no difference between the mean
scores of the two groups. If the T score falls within the
critical region (2.5 percent on each side of the distribu
tion) then the mean scores of the two groups are considered
to be significantly different.
Consideration will now be given to the first question:
1. what is the nature of the relationship which
exists between the rank and file and the city?
In order to ascertain the opinions and attitudes of
the respondents to the above question, variables 6, 7, 11,
12, 13, 15, and 16 were found to have a high level of associ
ation and clustered. (See Table 18.) Each yes response
was given a value of 2 in the index created for the new
variable “Relationship.” According to the index, a score
of 7-9 indicated that the respondent was positive, a score
of 10-11 indicated that the respondent was negative. Of the
221 AFSCME respondents 20.4 percent felt their relationship
with the city was positive, 69~2 percent were undecided
and 10.4 percent felt their relationship with the city was
positive, 70.1 percent were undecided and 4.4 viewed the
TABLE 18
VARIABLES FROM QUESTIONNAIRE TO FORM CLUSTER VARIABLE RELATIONSHIP*
Union
~ IAFF AFSCME
Variables Do not Do not
~ Yes No Know # Yes No Know #
Var 6 Do you feel that being a member of the
union provides you with better job security? 44.5 54.8 .6 80.6 18.6 .8
Var 7 Do you believe that a person can represent
himself as well as a union can? 9.0 90.6 .6 12.6 85.9 1.5
Var 11 Do you feel that the benefits from a strike
are worth the problems that astrike causes
the city? 72.1 24.7 3.2 69.3 27.2 3.5
Var 12 Did you join the union because you feel
that the city does not care about you? 85.3 14.1 .6 68.6 31.4 0
Var 13 Do you feel that the city would treat you
the same if you were not a member of the
union? 57.4 41.3 1.3 31.3 67.2 1.5
Var 15 Do you feel that the union settlements
cause taxes in the city to go up? 26.3 69.1 4.6 27.4 69.9 2.7
Var 16 Do you feel that the city can give workers
a wage increase without increasing taxes? 87 12.3 .6 86 13.6 .4
*Response given in percent.
#Do not know in this table means no response.
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relationship in a negative fashion. When the two groups are
combined, the data reveals 23.3 percent positive, 69.6 per
cent undecided and 8.1 percent negative responses to the
perceived relationship with the city. The F distribution
test indicated no significant difference between the vari
ances of the two groups. Therefore, the T-test was computed
to determine if the mean responses were the same. The T
test indicated no significant differences between the means
of the two groups. (See Table 19.)
TABLE 19
F DISTRIBUTION TEST AND T-~TEST FOR
CLUSTER VARIABLE RELATIONSHIP
No. of
Union Cases x S F Prob. T Prob. df
AFSCME 221 5.9005 .547 1.17 .327 1.94 .053 356
IAFF 137 5,7883 .506
Scoring system - 57-9 points positive, 6=10-11 points un
decided, 7=12-14 points negative.
The following observations can be made about the cluster
variable which indicates the perceived nature of the relation-~
ship that exists between the city and the rank and file. Most
members are undecied about the nature of the relationship.
This high level of uncertainty is possibly indicative of the
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fact that the relationship which has existed over the years
between the two unions and the city has been erratic, piece
meal and unstable. Thus, it has not been possible to know
the status of the union from one year to another because of
the lack of a formal labor policy.
2. What are the opinions of the rank and file re
garding the city’s labor relations machinery?
Variables 13 and 25 were found to have a significant
association and were clustered in order to ascertain the
populations’ view on the above questions. Each yesresponse
was given a value of 1 and each no response was given a
value of 2 in the index created for the new variable “Labor
Machinery.” (See Table 20.) According to the index a score
of 2 indicated that the respondent was positive, a score of
3 indicated that th:e respondent was undecided and a score
of 4 indicated that the respondent was negative. Of the
253 AFSCME respondents, 20.2 percent were positive, 41.9
percent were undecided and 27.9 percent were negative. Of
the 151 IAFF respondents, 15.9 percent were positive, 47.6
percent were undecided, and 26.5 percent were negative.
Total responses for the groups combined were 404. Of this
number 18.6 percent was positive, 66.6 percent was undecided
and 14.9 percent was negative. The F distribution test in
dicated a significant difference between the variances of
the two groups at the 95 percent level and the T-test was
not computed. (See Table 21.)
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TABLE 2Q




Variables Do not Do not
Yes No Know # Yes No Know #
Var 13 Do you feel that
the city would
treat you the
same if you were
not a member of
union? 57.4 41.3 1.3 31.3 67.2 1,5
Var 25 Do you feel that
your union is
more successful
now than in the
past in its
dealings with
• the city? 30.3 69 .6 80.1 19.2 .8
*Response given in percent.
#Do not know in this table means no response.
• TABLE 21
F DISTRIBUTION TEST FOR CLUSTER
VARIABLE LABOR MACHINERY
Union No. of Cases x S F Prob.
AFSCME 253 2.8775 .516 1.56 .002
IAFF 151 3.1060 .644
Scoring system - 2 points positive, 3 points undecided, 4
points negative.
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Again, the da.ta indicate.s much uncertainty and inde
cision in union members’ views of the city’s labor relations
machinery. This is understandable when th.e performance. of
the city’s labor relations machinery over the years under
study is reviewed. Data in the previous chapters indicate
that the city bargaining policy was superimposed on the.
traditional government apparatus with little change in
authority relationships. Thus, a collection of committees
and officials, in the executive and legislative branches,
have dealt whenever they chose with. labor problems. Although.
incomparability of the variances ruled out use of th.e T-test,
it is instructive to look at the percentage distributions of
the reported attitudes of the two groups. The hi.gher level
of satisfaction is expressed by AFSCME members and more un
decided and negative views are expressed byI~F membei~.s.
This is probably due to the fact that the city has spent
some time, over the years, discussing labor matters with the
AFSCME leadership and very little time with. the IAFF leader
ship. Under the Jackson administration less time than be
fore has been spent with the IAFF leadership which is partly
due to the legal battle between the two and partly due to
the limited manpower within the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Another plausible hypothesis as to why the level of positive
ness is higher among the predominantly Black AFSCNE group
could be because they identify and sympathize with the efforts
of the present Administration which happens to be Black.
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3. What are the views of the unionized employees
toward the city’s position on collective bar
gaining?
In order to deduce the opinions and attitudes of the
rank and file toward the city’s position on collective bar
gaining variables 13, 14, 25 and 17, were found to have a
high level of association and were clustered into a new
variable called “Collecting Bargaining.” (See Table 22.)
Each yes response was given a value of 1 and each no re
sponse was given a value of 2 in the index created for the
new cluster variable “Collective Bargaining.” According
to the index, a score of 4-5 indicated that the respondent
was undecided, and a score of 7-8 indicated that the re
spondent was negative. Of the 244 AFSCME respondents,
75.4 percent were positive, 18.4 percent were undecided,
and 6.1 percent were negative. Of the 145 IAFF respondents,
38 percent were positive, 37.9 percent were undecided and
34.2 percent were negative. The total responses, 389, in
dicatéd that 61.4 percent were positive, 27.7 percent were
undecided, and 12.9 percent were negative. The F distri
bution test indicated significant difference in the variances
thus, a T-test was not computed. (See Table 23.)
In order to further analyze the city’s bargaining
position, a second cluster variable was created. A major
position of the city over the years when the issue of pay
306
TABLE 22





Variables Do not Do not
Yes No Know # Yes No Know #
Var 13 Do you feel
that the city
would treat
you the same if
you were not a
member of the
union? 57.4 413 1.3 31.3 67.2 1.5
Var 14 Do you feel
that your
union has done




tO the city? 41.7 55.1 •3~.2 84 14.4 1.5







the city? 30.3 69 .6 80.1 19.2 .8





city? 88.4 11 .6 85.3 14.3 .4
*Responses given in percent.
# Do not know in this table means no response.
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TABLE 23
F DISTRIBUTION TEST FOR CLUSTER VARIABLE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
No. of
Union Cases x 5 F Prob.
AFSCME 244 5.1680 .786 1.49 .006
IAFF 145 5.8069 .960
Scoring System - 4 points very positive, 5 points positive,
6 points undecided, 7 points negative,
8 points very negative.
increases has been discussed with the union is that the city
cannot pay more, because to do so means increasing the taxes
paid by Atlanta residents. They argue that this would create
a taxpayer’s rebellion. A new variable called “Feelcity” was
created by clustering variables 27, 28, and 29 in order to
deduce the union’s perception of the willingness of the tax
payers to pay more taxes in order to improve the salaries and
working conditions of city employees. (See Table 24.) Each
yes response was given a value of 1 and each no response
was given a value of 2 in the index created for the new
variable Feelcity. According to the index a score of 4-5
points indicated that the respondent was positive, and a
score of 6-7 points indicated that the respondent was nega
tive. Of the AFSCME respondents 72.8 percent were positive,
feeling that the taxpayers supported their demands for better wages and
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TABLE 24




Do not Do not
Yes No Know # Yes No Know #





more each. year? 38.1 58.7 3.2 34.9 63.2 1.9







members 64.9 34.4 .6 82.1 17.2 .8






mands? 51.6 45.6 2.6 38.4 59.2 2.4
*Response given in percent.
#Do not know in this table means no response.
were::willing to pay more taxes to make their demands possible.
Only 27.2 percent expressed negative views. Of the 143 IAFF
respondents 58.5 percent felt that the taxpayers supported
their demands and 41.3 percent did not. When the sample
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populations combined, 67.5 percent were positive, and 32.5
percent were negative. The F distribution test indicated
significant difference in variances of the two groups at
the 95 percent confidence level, thus the T-test was not
computed. (See Table 25.)
TABLE 25
F DISTRIBUTION FOR CLUSTER VARIABLE FEELCITY
Union No. of Cases x S F Prob.
AFSC~ 239 3.9121 1.031 1.40 .023
IAFF 143 4,2587 1.220
Scoring system - 3 points positive, 4 points slightly positive,
5 points slightly negative, 6 points negative.
After a review of the data generated from the clusters collec
tive bargaining and feelcity the following inferences may be
made. The highest level of satisfaction with the city’s col
lective bargaining position is found within the AFSCNE group.
Further, those members of the combined sample who are most
satisfied with the city’s position were Black and earn less
than $6,999 yearly and have completed between 0-7 grades.
This sub-group, within AFSCME appears to feel beholden to the
Administration for the jobs they hold in this period of high
unemployment and inflation. They were also impressed posi
tively by the Administration when it approved and included in
their pay checks near Christmas, 1976 a $160.00 one-time only
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increase from the Title 11 public works employment money.
Data presented in the previous chapters indicate, that ove.r
the years AFSCME has won a number of symbolic victories
which have impressed the. membership favorably. Although.
there is a significant level of satisfaction found among
the AFSCME members regarding the city’s policy, this should
not be construed to mean that the membership wishes the city’s
informal bargaining policy to become permanent. Follow-up
interviews indicate that the membership is desirous of a
formal labor relations policy and a written Memorandum of
Understanding. The data from the survey also indicate that
the two groups do not accept the Administration’s position
that taxpayers are not willing to pay more taxes. The in
terviews indicate those workers who have been employed by
the city longest, those workers who are Black, those workers
who earn less than $6,999 yearly, and those workers who are
Atlanta residents believe that the Atlanta taxpayers are
supportive of their efforts. Since the profile of the.
respondents indicate that the lowest paid, Atlanta residents,
and black workers are AFSCME members, this subset who
believe that the taxpayers are on their side no doubt are
AFSCME members. These positive responses coming from AFSCME
members probably shed light on the actions of the union,
There appears to be a strong group within AFSCME that sup
ports the directions in which the city is moving in relation
to bargaining. This group appears to believe the taxpayers
are on their side. This gives one a clearer view as to why
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the union has taken an aggressive stand to improve the wages
and working conditions of its members. Further, race must
be seriously considered. The present Administration is Black
and there is obviously a level of positive satisfaction being
expressed by the Black workers toward the Administration.
However, when discussing the taxpayers, further studyis
needed to ascertain their views. Are they willing to pay
more? When the workers were asked if they-~were willing to
pay more taxes, of the 251 AFSCME respondents 78.5 percent
were positive and 21 percent were negative. Of the 146 IAFF
respondents 89.7 percent were positive and 10.3 percent were
negative. Since the data indicate that 72.7 percent of the
AFSCME repondents are Atlanta residents their responses
should be taken seriously. Ironically, the data reveal that
a meager 27.3 percent of the IAFF respondents live in the
city. Thus, their response must be considered lightly.
4. What are the sentiments of the unionized employees
toward striking against the city?
In order to determine the opinions and attitudes of the
rank and file regarding their views about thestrike, variables
9, 10, and 11 were found to have a high level of association
and clustered into a new variable called “Strike.” (See
Table 26.) Each yes response was given a value of 1 and each
no response was given a value of 2 in the index created for
the new cluster variable Strike. According to the index a
score of 3-4 indicates that the respondent was positive, a
score of 5-6 indicates that the respondent was negative.
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TABLE 26




Variables Do not Do no.t
Yes No Know # Yes~~No Know #




fore a strike? 57.2 32.9 9.9 49 40.7 10.3
Var 10 Do you feel that





strike? 31.2 63.6 5.2 34.9 62 3.1






to the city? 72.1 24.7 3.2 69.3 27.2 3.5
*Response given in percent.
#Do not know in this table means no response.
Of the 210 AFSCME respondei~its 66.1 percent were positive and
33.8 percent were negative toward the question of willingness
to utilize the strike weapon. Of the 130 IAFF respondents,
70 percent were positive and 30 percent were negative. When
combined, the group response was 67.6 percent in support of
utilizing the strike weapon and 33.4 percent opposed. The
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F distribution test indicated that the groups could be com
pared for statistical purposes. The T-test was performe.d
and the scores revealed agreement between the groups re
garding willingness~ to strike. (See Table 27.)
TABLE 27
F DISTRIBUTION TEST AND T-TEST FOR
CLUSTER VARIABLE STRIKE
No, of
Union Cases x S F Prob. T Prob. df
AFSCME 210 4.1143 1.105 1.10 .547 1.09 .275 338
IAFF 130 3.9769 1.158
Scoring system - 3 points positive, 4 points slightly posi
tive, 5 points slightly negative, 6 points
negative.
Based on the data, there is a considerable amount of
support from both groups to strike against the city if they
feel strong enough about the issue. Past actions, by both
groups, indicate that they feel the strike to be a useful
tactic. The unions have, in the past, used the strike to
garner community support for their efforts to improve wages
and working conditions, and were successful except in 1966
and 1977. However, in the future the Administration may be
successful in getting the community to support its position
against the strikers, as was the case in 1966 and 1977.
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5. What is the level of support for labor unity
among the unionized employees?
In order to deduce the opinions of the rank and file
regarding support for other unions, which might be called
labor unity, variables 18, 19, 24,and 26 which relate to
the above question were found to have a significant level
of association and were clustered and renamed “Labor Unity.”
(See Table 28.) Each yes response was given a value of 1
and each no response was given a value of 2 in the index
created for the cluster “Labor Unity.” According to the
index, a score of 4-5 points indicated that the respondent
was positive, a score of 6 indicated that the respondent
was undecided, a score of 7-8 indicated that the respondent
was negative. Of the 194 AFSCME respondents 53.6 percent
were positive, 21.1 percent were undecided and 25.3 per
cent were negative toward the idea . Of the 145 IAFF re
spondents, 82.8 percent were positive, 10.3 percent were
undecided and 6.8 percent were negative. Combined the
group responded 66.1 percent positive, 16.5 percent unde
cided, and 17.4 percent negative. The F distribution test
indicated that the variances between the two groups differed
significantly, thus the T-test was not computed because it
would be meaningless. (See Table 29.)
The distribution analysis seems to indicate a signi
ficant level of support for the causes of other unionized
city workers by each group; however, more negativism, (25.3
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TABLE 28
VARIABLES FROM QUESTIONNAIRE TO FORM
CLUSTER VARIABLE LABOR UNITY*
Union
IAFF AFSCME
Variables Do not Do not
Yes No Know # Yes No Know #





the city? 90.9 8.4 .6 54.6 37.5 7.9





in the city? 81.9 14.2 3.9 57.7 38.3 4.0





city? 9.8 88.9 1.3 21.4 73.5 5.1











eration? 41.3 57.4 1.3 52.2 45 2.8
*Responses given in percent.
#Do not know in this table means no response.
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TABLE 29
F DISTRIBUTION TEST FOR CLUSTER
VARIABLE LABOR UNITY
No. of
Union Cases x S F Prob.
AFSCME 194 5.5670 1.271 1.58 .004
IAFF 145 4.7748 1.012
Scoring system - 4 points very positive, 5 points positive,
6 points undecided, 7 points negative, 8
points-~ very negative.
percent) is found in the AFSCME ranks. AFSCME has actively en
gaged in numerous job actions in an effort to improve wages and
working conditions and the support received from IAFF has been,
to say the least, verbal. Yet, all city employees, including
IAFF members, have received salary increases and other bene
fits won by AFSCME. This lack of active support for the causes
of AFSCME by IAFF members has not been viewed lightly by the
AFSCME membership.
6. What are the views of the rank and file toward the
the idea of a policemen union being recognized by the
city?
In order to infer the opinions and attitudes of the
unionized empoloyees regarding support for the recognition of
other unions specifically a police union, variables 30 and 31




VARIABLES TAKEN FROM QUESTIONNAIRE TO FORM CLUSTER
VARIABLE OTHER UNION RECOGNITION*
Union
IAFF AFSCME
Variables Do not Do not
. Yes No Know ~ Yes No Know #
Var 30 Do you feel that
policemen should
be allowed to
unionize? 98.7 1.3 0 80.3 19.3 .4
Var 31 Would you be will
ing to support a
policemen union
strike? 74.2 23.2 2.6 68.1 27.6 4.3
*Responses given in percent.
#Do not know in this table means no response.
The new variable was named other union recognition. Each yes
response was given a value of 1 and each no response was given
a value of 2 in the index created for the new cluster variable.
According to the index, a score of 2 indicated that the respon
dent was positive, a score of 3 indicated that the respondent
was undecided, and a score of 4 indicated that the respondent
was negative. Of the 235 AFSCME respondents, 67.2 percent
were positive toward the idea, 16.6 percent were undecided,
and 16.2 percent were negative. Of the 147 IAFF respondents,
76.2 percent were positive, 22.4 percent were undecided, and
1.4 percent were negative. The combined population responded
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70.7 percent positive, 18.8 percent were undecided and 10.5
percent were negative. The F distribution test indicates
that the groups cannot be compared for statistical purposes
because of the differences in variances. However, the analysis
of the distribution indicates that both groups were positive
toward the idea of union recognition for policemen. Neverthe
less, the data analysis shows variance scores of the AFSCME
group to be almost 3 times that of the score of IAFF. (See
Table 31.)
TABLE 31
F DISTRIBUTION TEST FOR CLUSTER VARIABLE
UNION RECOGNITION
No. of
Union Cases x S F Prob..
AFSCME 235 2.4894 .759 2.65 .000
IAFF 147 2.2517 .466
Scoring system - 2 points positive, 3 points undecided, 4 points
negative.
The interpretation of this data is that while the majori
ty of the AFSCME members seem to support the idea of a police
men’s union, there are many who do not agree with this posi
tion. In recent years IAFF has vocally supported the police
men’s efforts to be recognized and they have joined together
to criticize the city’s promotion and hiring policies, labeling
them discriminatory in reverse against whites. On the other
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hand, a sizable group within the AFSCME ranks is opposed to
police unionization. Their negative views could be a re
action to the alleged racism claimed by the policemen and
police brutality which has purportedly been displayed by
some members of the police department over the years. Fur
ther, their negative views could be the result of fear that
a unionized police would demand more and thus leave fewer
dollars to be divided for salaries, as well as support for
Mayor Jackson who, in no uncertain terms, opposes unioni
zation of the police.
7. What are the views of the unionized employees
regarding unionization among city employees in
the future?
In order to determine the attitude of the rank and
file as to whether they felt other city workers should
unionize and their willingness to support further unioni
zation, variables 19, 20, 22, 23, 30, 31, 35 and 36 were
found to have a significant level of association and were
collasped into cluster variable “Future.” (See Table 32.)
Each yes response was given a value of 1 and each no
response was given a value of 2 in the scoring system. Ac
cording to the index a score of 8-11 indicated that the
respondent was positive, a score of 12 indicated that the
respondent was undecided, and a score of 13-16 indicated
that the respondent was negative. Of the 201 AFSCNE re
spondents, 79.6 percent were positive, 12.9 percent were
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TABLE 32




Variables Do not Do not
Yes No Know # Yes No Know #




the city? 81.9 14.2 3.9 57.7 38.3 4.0




big union. 64.5 34.2 1.3 91.3 8.4 .4
Var 22 Should workers who
do not join the
union be allowed
to work? 68.8 30~5 .6 44.6 55 .4




to pay union dues? 36.8 62..2 .~6 54 44.8 1.1
Var 30 Do you feel that
policemen should
be allowed to
unionize? 98.7 1.3 0 80.3 19.3 .4
Var 31 Would you be will
ing to support a
policemen union
strike? 74.2 23.2 2.6 68.1 27.6 4.3
Var 35 Do you feel that
you should be
represented by




Variables IAFF AFSCME —
Do not Do not
Yes No Know # Yes No Know #
Var 36 Do you feel that
all the workers
in your unit should
be required to join
the union 46.4 52.3 1.3 80.1 18.8 1.1
*Responses given in percent.
#Do not know in this table means no response.
were decided and 7.5 percent were negative. Of the 134 IAFF
respondents, 76.6 percent were positive, 18.7 percent were un
decided and 5.2 percent were negative. When the two popula
tions were combined, 78.2 percent were positive, 15.2 percent
were undecided and 6.6 percent were negative. The F distri
bution test indicated a variance incompatability between the
groups at the 95 percent confidence level. Therefore, the
T-test was not computed. (See Table 33.)
TABLE 33
F DISTRIBUTION TEST FOR CLUSTER VARIABLE FUTURE
Union No. of Cases x S F Prob.
AFSCIYIE 201 4.9701 .877 1.64 .004
IAFF 134 5.1791 .692
Scoring system - 8-9 points converted to 4 meaning very positive,
10-11 points converted to 5 meaning positive, 12
points converted to 6 meaning undecided, 13-14
points converted to 7 meaning negative, 15-16
points converted to 8 meaning very negative.
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Again an analysis of the distribution shows that the
mean scores of each group appears to be favorable toward
unionization of city employees in the future. However, both
groups show large standard deviations. Moreover, the standard
deviation for AFSCME is considerably higher than that for
IAFF and this explains why the F score does not permit com
parison of the two groups.
Summary
The striking interpretation or observation arising
from the statistical treatment of the field study data is
the lack of comparability existing between the two groups
AFSCME and IAFF. Conventional wisdom might lead one to as
sume that because they are both public unions there would
be a consensus between them on major issues like the ones
raised in this research. However, as has been shown, these
unions appear to agree in only one of eight issues--the
willingness to strike.
In the instance of the perceived relationship between
the union and the city there was statistically compatability,
but the only agreement was the level of uncertainty about
what the relationship might be. The confusion expressed
seems reasonable because in the past ten years, administra
tions have engaged in short-range, reactive and usually
irrationally diffuse, muddled decision-making in the area of
labor relations.
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Moreover, a high percentage of both AFSCME and IAFF
were undecided in their opinions regarding the city’s
labor relations machinery. The confusion here again is
probably an outgrowth of the erratic, piecemeal labor rela
tions policy. It is useful to again high.light the inference
that, at the time this field study was done, AFSCME members
indicated a higher level of satisfaction with the city’s
labor relations machinery than IAFF members. However, sub
sequent to that time the Jackson administration dealt a
severe defeat to the AFSCME union strike effort and it is
certain that AFSCME’s satisfaction with the city has dimin
ished considerably.
The data analyzed so far seem to indicate that the
AFSCME group is more satisfied with the city’s collective
bargaining procedure than the IAFF group. Over the years
the city’s informal collective bargaining procedure had
allowed the union to engage in multilateral bargaining and
end run lobbying tactics. In addition, AFSCME had won a
number of symbolic victories. However, follow-up inter
views indicate that the AFSCME membership prefers a formal,
consistent labor policy. The IAFF membership is also sub
stantially in opposition to the city’s informal collective
bargaining position. Over the years the IAFF membership
has had little success with the various Administrations’ in
formal collective bargaining procedures. Follow-up interviews
with this group also indicated a preference for the develop
ment on the part of the city of a formal, stable labor policy.
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The matter of labor unity or willingness..of the two
unions to support each. other is also highlighted in this
field study. There appears to be a willingness among the
groups to support each other’s efforts. However, between
the groups there are differences in levels of support.
IAFF appears to be more supportive of labor unity. This
could be due to the fact that IAFF is in need of developing
stability. The membership in TAFF is small and because of
this their efforts have been so far largely ineffective.
If they could receive sympathetic support from AFSCME as well
as from a policemen’s organization perhaps they would be able
to realize some symbolic victory that would give them legiti
macy as a bargaining unit. Consequently, their identifica
tion with unionization of others is greater than AFSCME’s.
The city Administrations have been fully aware of the
lack of unity existing between the two unions. They see
AFSCME as a union of unskilled workers and IAFF as a craft
union. They have been able to play upon these differential
perspectives and their piecemeal approach to bargaining is
indicative of this pioy. The failure of these unions to
recognize their commonalities and overcome their cosmetic
differences has been to the city’s advantage. This failure
has contributed to the fact that the public union movement
in Atlanta has been maintained at a controllable level by
the various Administrations.
Both groups indicated a willingness to support a police
men union. However, IAFF more closely identified its position
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with that of policemen and appears to be more supportive of
the concept. On the other hand, AFSCME members appear to
harbor apprehensions about the city’s policemen and are
suspicious that neither the policemen nor firemen would sup
port them if the occasion arose. Consequently, their en
thusiasm for the concept of a policemen’s union is at best
lukewarm. Finally, the matter of race and social status
needs consideration. AFSCME’s membership is predominately
Black and poor. IAFF’s membership is almost exclusively
white and middle class. IAFF’s opposition to compensatory
promotion of Black firemen as well as their preponderance of
legal action alledging reverse discrimination have in no way
engendered good will from the AFSCNE membership.
It appears that while there is general ideological
support for expansion of unionism among all city employees
from AFSCME and IAFF, this process of total unionism will be
protracted because there are several areas of disagreements
and mistrust. Firemen appear not to want to be identified
with sanitation workers. However, because of the large
number of AFSCME members as compared to IAFF members it is
probable that firemen and any other group wishing to unionize
could benefit from the financial resources, the organizing
skills, and the lobbying machinery of AFSCME. Should the
alienation between AFSCME and IAFF continue as is probable,





An analysis of the city of Atlanta’s labor relations
policy indicates that the city’s approach to public union
ism has been piecemeal and unorganized. This is true,
despite the fact that there is a wealth of evidence to
show that an organized labor policy properly conceived
and administered reduces the incident of strikes and work
stoppages, improves cormnunications with employees, and
reduces tensions between the unions and the city.1 The
findings in this study demonstrate that the city of
Atlanta has had involvement with labor organizations
which date back to the turn of the century, yet it has
failed to formalize bargaining procedures. Although the
State Attorney General has ruled that public employers
in Georgia cannot enter into valid collective bargaining
contracts with labor unions, the records of the three
1Research Atlanta, Government Labor Relations in
Atlanta, 1976, reported that after a survey of 18 cities,
9 of which were southern and similar to Atlanta in that
the states in which they were located did not have laws
which permitted collective bargaining for public employees,
indicated that all except Memphis had formalized their
meet and confer union relationship and had found the bene
fits from the relationship to be positive.
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Administrations indicate that between 1966 and 1976, the
city of Atlanta has been engaged in a version of collec—
tive bargaining. This version of bargaining has been
unstructured, crisis oriented and informal, and the end
results have never been written contracts. Instead the
city and union agreements have appeared in amended city
ordinances, resolutions, revisions in the civil service
rules, and sporadic changes in wages and working condi
tions.
The collective bargaining models described in the
literature review chapter--the unilateral model, the
bilateral model, and the multilateral model--do not in
dividually describe the labor relations activities which
have taken place in Atlanta. The Atlanta informal system
of bargaining, during the periods covered in this re
search, is at best a crossbreed or hybrid embodying aspects
of the three models. This hybrid bargaining policy has
allowed end run tactics to be used by the unions when it
has been feasible.
The bargaining procedure has taken this hybrid form
because of the failure of the various administrations to
develop a long-range, holistic labor relations program.
Instead, the three administrations have engaged in what
John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence in Mayor’s in Action
refer to as a number one process of agenda setting. The
number one process of agenda setting is “reactive, short-run
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oriented, individual or part oriented, continuous, and
sometimes ‘irrantionally’ unconnected.
Another reason for the hybrid nature of the bargaining
policy is that the top city administrators over the years
have learned to avoid the shocks of risk-taking policy
innovations in the area of labor relations. According to
Peter A. Lupsha, “reaction and reactive politics are the
essence of urban decision making today and a key aspect
of maintaining the urban crisis.”3 The preservation of
a policy system maintenance and decisional avoidance
rather than leadership and change is rewarded because
according to Lupsha, to institute change creates the pos
sibilities of:
1. disturbing existing arrangements and coalitions
2. upsetting routine operations and procedures
3. threatening certain groups of individuals
2John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, Mayors in
Action, New York: John Wiley and Son, 1974, p. 42. Ironi
cally, Kotter and Lawrence in their analysis of Ivan Allen
found him to be a mayor with a number three agenda process.
Meaning that he had long goals and a holoistic approach.
However, they never considered his labor relations policy
which was tolly crisis oriented and involved short range
planning.
3Peter A. Lupsha, “Constraints on Urban Leadership, or
Why Cities Cannot Be Creatively Governed” 607—623, in Im
proving the Quality of Urban Management by eds. Willis D.
Hawley and David Rogers Vol 8, (Beverly Hills California:
Sage Publications, 1974), p. 610.
329
4. involving immediate cost with no necessary
guaranteed immediate payoff
5. awakening and arousing presently dormant interest
or groups increasing their demand expectations.4
When one reviews the labor relations policy from
1966-1976 in Atlanta, it seems clear that none of the mayors
under study entered office with an agenda for substantive
change in the area of labor relations. Rather, they chose
to take a safe political route and address the variious
labor crises as they came to the fore by using a muddled,
disjointed-incremental decision making process when decisions
were made, and, if at all possible, stuck to the safe main
tenance decisional avoidance policy.
As indicated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the muddled,
disjointed-incremental, and sometimes decisional avoidance
policy has not denied workers the right to be members of
labor organizations. However, it has deprived the over
whelming majority of public employees of the right to be
respresented by a labor organization, which renders use
less the fact that employees have a right to be members.
This policy serves to contain the growth of public union
ism in the city and allows elected officials to maintain
the status quo. Moreover, dues checkoff, which is consid
ered to be the lifeblood of public unionism, has been a
partisan issue in the Atlanta political arena.
4lbid.
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Ivan Allen continued the practice of the Hartsfield
administration. He did not revoke the checkoff from
AFSCME even though the union participated in a strike in
1968, nor did he see fit to fire the AFSCME workers after
they had participated in a strike which was against the
state law. On the other hand, he did fire en masse the
unionized fire fighters when they participated in the
second 1966 strike after his mediation attempts failed.
This inconsistency in Allen’s behavior was not dictated
by love or hatred for public unionism. Rather, he per
sonally felt that firemen, because they were involved in
public safety, had no right to engage in a strike. Also,
he was aware of the fact that there was a readily avail
able labor supply and these men could be replaced without
difficulty. In the case of the garbage workers, the
situation was different. Before the strike, the city
was having extreme difficulty recruiting an adequate
number of workers. The Sanitation Department daily re
sorted to collecting workers by the day off Decatur Street
in order to have a sufficient crew to pick up garbage.
Accordingly, when the sanitation employees decided to
strike, Ivan Allen was willing to do everything in his
power to appease them short of giving any more than he
had to in order to get them back to work and keep them
there. Thus he refused to tamper with the checkoff and
made concessions which were implemented in ordinance form
and developed a grievance procedure.
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Sam Massell, with what appeared to be malice afore
thought and reckless indifference, used the checkoff as a
weapon to try to rid the city of the spectre of public
unionism. After the 1970 sanitation strike and Massell’s
highly publicized confrontation with the Union leadership,
he mobilized the necessary legislative support to revoke
dues checkoff. During the strike, he also fired the
strikers, but he later reversed his decision because of
widespread community support for the workers. Massell
ignored attempts by a small group of aldermen, lead by
Vice-Mayor Maynard Jackson, to restore checkoff for the
duration of his Administration.
Maynard Jackson’s administration, after a year in
office, passed a checkoff ordinance which limited the
groups of employees who could be represented by the
unions. As Vice-Mayor, Jackson had supported dues de
duction for all organized groups; however, when he was
elected Mayor and was in a position to carry out his
“convictions,” Jackson avoided the shocks of risk-taking
policy innovations and returned to the Ivan Allen main
tenance system. The one exception was the fact that he
extended the checkoff to the firemen. However, this was
a safe policy compared to his vociferous support in 1971
and 1972 for the adoption of the Firefighters Mediation
Act. Jackson has sought to present a pro-labor image. Al
though his checkoff Ordinance prohibits strikes and work
stoppages and calls for revocation of dues deduction,
332
Jackson has elected not to enforce that portion of the
Ordinance when the union has participated in such activi
ties. However, this decision-avoidance by no means should
be construed to imply that his labor policy has been in
any way innovative.
The muddler, disjointed-incremental and sometimes
occasional decision-avoidance policy can be observed in
the bargaining practices of the three mayors, and the
machinery used to deal with labor problems. All three
have engaged in the “Meet and Confer” policy recommended
by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations
Commission in 1969. This bargaining practice has been
sub rosa or discreetly engaged in by Allen and Massell
unless there was a crisis, as in the strikes of 1966,
1968, 1970, and the threats of strikes and job actions
under Jackson. During the periods when there were no
visible crisis, discussions with the unions took place
whenever the city or the unions requested that they take
place. The city has stated that it is willing to discuss
any issue with employees or their representatives at any
time. Paul F. Gerhart indicates that the previously
mentioned unstructured policy always exists when bargaining
is not well developed. The city has indicated that it is
free and willing to discuss issues because it knows that
the actual power of the union over the issues is severely
limited. Further, the procedure has allowed the outcome
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of the employer-employee discussions to be dependent on
management’s determinations rather than bilateral decisions
by equals.
Because of the failure of the city to formalize its
relationship, the unions have been faced with a bewildering
array of bureaucratic and fragmented authority. Just who
is responsible for what? Under the Allen and Massell
administrations, a variety of aldermanic committees were
responsible for setting policy which affected unionized
employees. The unions were forced to engage in endless
multilateral discussions with department heads, the Board
of Firemasters, the Public Works Committee, the Water
Works Committee, the Director of Personnel and the Person
nel Board. The unions were forced to use salesmanship
on one or more of these groups in order to get their con—
cerns recommended to the Finance Committee, the most
powerful of the various committees. Because of the frag
mentation of authority, the unions were then able to
resort to end run tactics in an attempt to influence the
Finance Committee to act in their favor. Evidence has
shown that in all three Administrations whatever the
Finance Committee recommends, ultimately was and still
is approved by that legislative body. Thus, the unions
learned the necessity of packing budget hearings with
their members and appealing directly to the Finance
Committee in order to bring about change.
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This fragmentation in authority for labor relations
resulted in bilateral and multilateral bargaining discus
sions because of the failure of the administration to
assign the primary responsibility for negotiations to the
executive or legislative branch. Rather, as John F.
Burton indicated, the city, particularly under Allen and
Massell, responded by imposing “a system of collective
bargaining on the existing structures of authority with
little or no modifications.”5 Even after Massell appointed
a Director of Labor Relations, no responsibilities were
given to the director. He was nothing more than a glori
fied ombudsman; thus, the city’s style of negotiating
with the unions was not altered. Both mayors refused to
disturb the existing management structure and instead
utilized the existing expertise within the organization
and preserved the standing authority relationships. The
Aldermanic Committees were allowed to continue to dabble
in labor affairs. The legislative branch and the mayor,
who ultimately had the last word in labor matters, refused
to make any real commitment and engaged in decisional
avoidance. Prime examples of this behavior are the 1969,
1971, 1972 and 1974 Resolutions which give the city’s
statement of policy regarding labor relations. These
resolutions were not law; they were simply the city’s
5John F. Burton, “Local Government Bargaining and
Management Structure,” 123-140 Industrial Relations 11
May 1972, p. 128.
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stated position, which was not binding. Resolutions were
passed, rather than ordinances, in order to continue the
decision-avoidance policy.
Pressures from the labor organizations on all of
the Administrations helped to bring about grievance pro
cedures,: minor changes in working conditions, and
sporadic improvement in wages. However, all of these
changes were piecemeal. The Administrations have refused
to commit themselves to a binding labor policy and have
thus maintained an amount of flexibility which allows
them to engage in short, reactive planning whenever the
union pressure is heaviest. Vivid examples of these piece
meal concessions are the pay raises which resulted from
the 1966 and 1968 strikes and the threat of a 1976 strike,
and the grievance procedure which grew out of the 1968
strike.
A new charter was implemented under the Jackson
administration which allowed for governmental reorgani
zation. Although a Bureau of Labor Relations was estab
lished, the muddler, informal labor relations policy was
continued despite the appointment of a labor expert to
direct the bureau. Before appointing the bureau direc
tor, the Mayor allowed various persons with no labor
experience to engage in labor negotiations. The supposed
new change in policy was attributed to the fact that the
responsibility for labor relations was now in the hands
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of the executive branch. However, this change appeared not
to be the case when in the March 1976 labor crisis the
Council and the Mayor appeared to be separately engaged
in solving the crisis. The Council agreed to a $500 raise
for all employees, placing the responsibility on the mayor’s
shoulders to abolish a number of positions in order to make
the raise possible. The Mayor negotiated a $208 raise for
some employees and other benefits with union representa—
tives. Lack of a regularized labor policy made multi
lateral bargaining possible and the union appeared to have
gained a $708 raise, when a few days earlier the city
claimed to have no funds for employee raises. In July and
August of 1976, the legislative branch balked and refused
to fulfill a promise by the Mayor to commit countercyclical
funds from the public works Employment Act to fund wage
increases. This lack of harmony in the Administration
regarding labor relations has not encouraged innovative
change. The Jackson administration has reacted from
crisis to crisis and engaged in incremental decision
making regarding labor. Like the prior Administrations
cited, it has not been agressive nor has it sought to stabi
lize the city’s erratic relationship with the unions by
initiating a local ordinance to formalize the city’s
meet and confer policy., The Jackson administration has
also failed to convince the legislative branch of the need
for a properly staffed Bureau of Labor Relations, which
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would allow it to handle labor problems. Therefore, the
Jackson administration, in terms of its labor policy,
differs little from the •previous Administration except for
the new paper structure.
The results of the survey of rank and file bear out
the conclusions drawn about the nature of the relationship
between the city and the unionS; the fact that the relation
ship has been erratic, muddled, and piecemeal, rather than
the expression of a long-range holistic policy. The over
whelming majority of the rank and file were not sure what
their relationship with the city was. A perceptive group
you might say. A high percentage of the rank and file
also had mixed feelings about the city’s unstable labor
relations machinery. These mixed feelings are probably
due to the unstable labor relation machinery utilized by
the city over the years. As a group, the majority of
the AFSCME members support the city’s informal collective
bargaining procedure which has allowed their union to en
gage in multilateral bargaining and end-run lobbying tac
tics. On the other hand, the IAFF members are in sub
stantial opposition to the city’s collective bargaining
procedures. The IAFF membership has had little success
with the various administrations in the bargaining sphere.
Follow-up interviews indicate~ that they feel that they
would be in a better bargaining position if the city
adopted a formal collective bargaining procedure. Data
presented in the previous chapters indicate that over the
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years AFSCME has won a number of symbolic victories which
undoubtedly impressed the membership favorably. Neverthe
less, the level of satisfaction expressed by the AFSCME
membership should not be construed to mean that the mem-~
bership is desirous of the city’s informal policy becoming
permanent. The follow-up interviews indicated that the
group wants the city to adopt a formal labor relations
policy and a written Memorandum of Understanding.
The evidence shows that the unions have sometimes
gotten concessions from the city when strikes and threats
of strikes were used: thus it was to be expected that
despite the fact that it is illegal to strike, there was
a significant amount of support for the use of the tactic.
This is true despite the fact that participation in a
strike could mean the end of the dues deduction privilege.
Within the two groups, there is a willingness to
support each other’s efforts. However, the variables race
and socio-economic status are likely to be divisive fac
tors which could prevent or hinder the achivement of
labor unity among the two existing unions. The Administra
tions have been cognizant of the fact that unity between
the two unions has been lacking and this knowledge has
encouraged them to pursue a piecemeal, informal labor
policy. In order to force the present city Administration
to change, the two unions will have to unite and push for
the. implementation of a formal policy which the follow-up
interviews indicate they want.
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In terms of support for a unionized police force,
there is a level of advocacy from both groups. Neverthe
less, there is a variation in the level of support between
the groups according to race and income. The supportive
group are IAFF members who are white. and earn $10,000 or
more yearly. Those most negative are AFSCNE members who
are Black and earn less than $10,000 yearly. In this area
the variables race and salary could be devisive factors in
terms of unity among the organized for the support of a
unionized police.
For the efforts of all city employees to organize
in the future, there is philosophical support from AFSCME
and IAFF. Unionization of public employees is the present
trend in the United States and there is little evidence to
indicate that Atlanta will escape this movement., In fact,
the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations has indi
cated that the movement is taking place and the city needs
to get guidelines for dealing with the seemingly inevitable.
The Executive Branch must exercise leadership in this area
and do more than simply verbalize a commitment to labor.
Rather, there will haveto.’béanactive effort to move Atlanta
from its nineteenth century, reactive, short-range, primi
tive, informal labor policy into a twentieth century,
holistic long-range formal policy.
Re commendations
The findings in this study indicate a need to revamp
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the city’s labor policy in order to establish a stable
formal policy. The following recommendations should
prove useful:
1. Although the state of Georgia prohibits cities
from entering into binding collective bargaining contracts
with labor unions, it does not specifically prohibit lo
cal legislation which would allow for non-binding agree
ments bilaterally arrived at and regular labor negotiations.
The city of Atlanta has chosen a “meet and confer” system
which needs to be formalized, This could be done by a
locally adopted ordinance which would establish the guide
lines for the city’s relationship with labor unions. Such
an ordinance should be drawn up, with union input, and
include; management rights of the city, scope of the
agreement, designation of the official city negotiating
team, statement concerning when negotiations should begin
and end, and statement of the methods to be used to re
solve an impasse.
2. Research studies indicate that stability in a
city’s labor policy will emerge as tension within the manage
ment structure is reduced. In Atlanta, there is obvious
tension within management,. resulting from the fact that a
bargaining system has been superimposed on the traditional
government apparatus without substantive change in authority
relationships. Management needs to restructure the existing
authority relations in order to clearly define the responsibility
341
for labor relations. This could be done by centralizing
the authority for dealing with labor issues within the
Executive Branch. Centralization of authority would also
allow for a coordinated management position on labor issues
which the city has usually lacked.
3. It will be necessary to educate and expose top
level administrators and elected officials to the advantages
that accrue from having a regularized labor relations policy.
Over the years, many of the grievances which have sparked
work slowdowns and employees unrest could have been brought
to management’s attention and solved without fanfare if a
formal grievance procedure, which would be part of a regu
larized labor policy, had been part of an agreem~at between
the unions and the city. In order to educate the city’s
management, formal seminars and orientations programs on
labor relations should be initiated.
Further Research
Several issues remain unresolved by this research
effort. Some of those which merit further investigation
follow:
1. The Atlanta public unions have constantly
questioned the city’s spending priorities and one of their
major demands has been the need for increased wages and
better working conditions for city employees. While the
city usually admits that raises are deserved and needed
by employees, it is impossible for it to do so without
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raising taxes. Atlanta has a low property tax, when com
pared to other cities its size, which is •supported by the
downtown business district. This group argues that a low
property tax is good for the city. For years this interest
group has enjoyed a positional advantage over other interest
groups in the city because their leaders have had informal
ties with Atlanta’s major office holders. According to
Clarence N. Stone in Economic Growth and Neighborhood Dis
content, “system bias” is a result of positional advantage
and disadvantage.6 A positional advantage exists when on
the part of public officials there is a predisposition to
favor the interest of a given group more than the interest
of another. An area for further research would be the
testing of the “system bias” theory to determine what if
any influence has the traditional positional advantage in
politics exercised by the downtown business interest had
on the development and maintenance of the muddled, dis
jointed-incremental and decisional avoidance labor re
lations policy practiced by the city.
2. This research was limited to the nature of the
relationship existing between the city and AFSCME and IAFF.
However, an analysis is needed of the events and circum
stances surrounding the city’s efforts to contain police
unionization.
6Clarence Stone, Economic Growth and Neighborhood
• Discontent, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1976), p. 18.
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3. Research should be continued on the ongoing
Jackson admininstration and an evaluation done at the end
of his mayoral term to determine his labor policy over a













ATIJ.RTA FIRE DEPA~T GRIEVARcI C0~t~ITIEE
1. Insure continuous peace and harmony ~ng the
members of the Atlanta Department by receiving
complaints from employees who feel that an
injustice has prevailed upon them.
2. To act as a mediator between the aggrieved end
the prepatrator in order to risolva any in-
differences between the parties.
3. To grant an audience to members who seek sane,
either written or oral.
4. To grant a bearing to all parties concerned
that may contribute to the just and peaceful
conclusion to such grievance of employee..
5. The Grievance Comeittee is not empowered to
render punisheent or disciplinary action.
They shall not render any verdict or action
to be taken that would be contrary to the
Rule. and Regulations of the Atlanta Fire
Depar~nt as adopted December 29 • 1969.
6. The Grievance C~ittee shall refer a grievance
to the Chief of the Fire Department upon the
request of the aggrieved.
7. The Grievance Comeittes shall have the power
to eject any person or persons from hearings
who might become unruly or does not adhere
to the manner of conduct as prescribed by the
C~ittee.
8. The Grievance C~itt.e may elect to withhold
any action on a grievance and act upon same
in privacy of the members only.
9. The Grievance Coanittee shall inform the ag
grieved or the perpetrator of the their rights
to appeal to a higher authority should the
decision or actions of the Grievance Ccnnittee
be unsatisfactory to either party.
gow TO HARDLE GRIEVARCES:
A “Grievance” is a condition or e eat of conditions
which individuals dissatisfied. It is very impor
tant to understand that the “stated’ gripe may not
be the real cause of diesetiefactmon.
The disposal of a. many grievances as possible at
your level is one of the most important services
you can render.
To insure the proper mod timely handling of griev
ances • it is advisable to give careful attention
to the procedures suggested below.
RECEIVE THE GRIEVARCE PROPERLY:
This includes giving the aggrieved a calm, atten
tive, and complete hearing without interruption.
“Let him get it all off his cheat.’
Take motes and impress him that you are taking the
complaint seriously.
After you have beard the aggrieved ~loyee, re
peat the essentials in your owo words, asking
him if these are his point. and if you have them
straight.
As the final aspect of reciving the grievance,
tell him when he can expect an answer. Of course,
there are times when you can give a decision in
ediately.
GET THE PACTS:
Operate from the beginning as if you expect this
case to go the the third level (Roard of Fire
Resters.)
Check different angles and views of the etory.
Check Fire Department records which may support or
dispute alleged facts.
Check City personnel regulations.
Chck Rules and Regulations of the Fire Department.
Check with higher line 0? Division Officer, to see
if any new procedures hav, b.en set.
Carefully ezandne the personnel file of the indivi
dual making the c~laint.
Where times or places era important, be eure to re
concile conflicting facts before you make any deci
sion.
tAHE ACTION:
If the Grievance C~itte is in agreement by majority
vote that the aggrieved ~loy.e has a valid griev
ance • don’t be afraid “to got to bat” for the ~1oyee.
If the employee is wrong, maintain ycer position but
make a full mod considerate explanation to the me
ploy...
Pass on all facts to the mxt level in a dated, writ
ten morandus.
DVFIES
1. The Grievance C~ittee shall render their
verdict, recoonendations, or opinions in the
matter within tan (10) days after the grievance
is heard provided, however, that if the matter
is such that higher authority than the i~ediate
Grievance Conittee can rule on. the grievance
will be referred to the Chief of the Fire
Department.
2. The Grievance Coonittee members shall refrain
from getting personnaly involved in griecance..
They should hear and evaluate the circunstances
surrounding a grievance with en impartial mind,
dim tregerding one’s reputation, personality,
race, color, or national origin.
3. The Grievance C~ittee shall explore every
method in order to resolve grievances at this
Coonittee’s level.
4. The Grievance Coenitt.e chill mot permit the
aggrieved or perpetrator to be represented by
anyone except the aggrieved or perpetrator
himself. The aggrived or perpetrator has the
right to legal council or union representation
only at the Rosxd of Fire hastars level.
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APPENDIX B
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GREIVANCE COMMITTEE
OF THE ATLANTA FIRE ~PARThENT
AND PROVISIONS FOR APPEALS
THEREFROM
There is hereby created the GREIVANCE COMMITTEE of
the Atlanta Fire Department which shall function generally for
the purpose of contributing to the harmony and good relations
among and between all members of the Atlanta Fire Department
by receiving, and acting upon, written complaints received from
employees of the Atlanta Fire Department. In its function, it
shall hear from the complainant and any accused, and, when
possible, act as mediator, and shall take such action as here
inafter set out so as to bring to a satisfactory conclusion
any matter of dispute.
1 • OFFICERS AND ELECTIONS:
The Greivance Committee shall consist of seven (7)
members, six (6) of whom shall be non—officer members of the
Atlanta Fire Department, 1and one (1) of whom shall be a citizen
of the city of Atlanta selected from the public at large. All
members shall serve without compensation for a period of two
years, except for those members initially appointed for a term
of one year. The members, at the first meeting of each year,
shall elect a Chairman, a Vice—Chairman and a Secretary.
Should any member be promoted to officer position, be dismissed,
suspended or should he resign during his period of service, he
shall relinquish his position and the remaining members of the





Members of the Greivance Committee shall first be
selected by the Chief of the Atlanta Fire Department and shall
consist of three (3) black firemen and three (3) whit~ firemen.
Three (3) of the initial appointment~s by the Chief of the
Atlanta Fire Department to the Greivance Committee shall be
for a term of one (1) year and three (3) shall he appointed
for terms of two (2) years. Subsequent to the initial appoint—
teent by the Chief of the Atlanta Fire Department, all members
shall be elected by non—officer members of the Atlanta Fire
Department. Prior to any election, a ocoinating committee
shall have been appointed by the Chairman and convened and
shall nominate at least two (2) non—officer firemen for each
vacancy on the said Greivance Committee, and such nominations
shall be posted prominently in each station and division of
the Atlanta Fire Department at least sixty (60) days before
the date of the election~ Additional nominations may be made
by the written petition of at least fifty (50) non—officer
firemen for each nominee, and s.~ch petition(s) shall clearly
specify the particular vacancy so~.ght, shall be delivered to
the Chairman of the Committee at least thirty—five (~5) days
before the election, and the Chairman shall cause such addi
tional nomination(s) to be posted in each station and division
of the Atlanta Fire Department at least twenty—five (25) days
before the election. Nominations shall be made, and elections
held, so that at all times the six (6) non—officer firemen
members of the Committee shall consist of three (3) white and




All initial appolntrTa rits shall be made and subsequent
elections he~d~ so that tho am off~-c’er members of the Committee
commence their terms of service on the first r~n1 t~o.-~ting
of each year. A year is hereby defined as a period of twelve
(12) monthS from the date of the first ~4onday of the first
month immediatelY succeeding the initial anpointfl~ent of the
Committee membership by the Chief of the Atlanta Fire Depart
ment. and each and every twelve (12) month period succeeding
thereafter.
The 1~ltial term of service for the citizen at large
member shall be for two (2) years~ and thereafter such member
shall be selected by the six (6) non—offiCer firemen members
of the Committee for two (2) year terms at the first regular
meeting of the year in which elected.
2~ DUTIES OF OFFICERS;
(a) Chairm~fl. The Chairman of the GreivanCe Committee
shall preside at all meetings~ and shall have the power to call
a special meeting whenever he deems it necessary.
The Chairman shall hold a special meeting of the Grci—
Vance Committee when requested to do so by at least three (3)
members of the Committee. He shall have the power to summon
non—officer members of the Fire Department to greivance hearings
by authorization and in the name of the Chief of the Atlanta
Fire Department whenever such person or persons is known to
possess information needed by the Committee for its investiGatl0~
Officer personnel ~f the Atlanta Fire Department may be required
to appear before the Greivenco Committee on the order of the




The Chairman shall submit a report of any complaint or
greivance to the Chief of the Atlanta Fire Department and the
conclusions and recommendations of the Committee based upon
any hearings or other investic!ation of the said complaint or
greiv once.
(b) V.ce—Cha~rman. The V~ce—Chazrman shall perform
the duties of the Chairman in the Chairman s absence or at the
Chairman’s special request.
(c) Secretary. The Secretary shall keep a record of
all proceedings of the Greivance Committee, In addition,
he shall prepare ballots for any election to the membership
of the Greivance Committee, as well as notices and nominations
concerning any said elections, and shall cause same to be
distributed to each Fire Station and Division.
The Secretary shall receive and count the ballots for
any election held for membershim to the Greivanca Committee,
in the presence of the membership of the Greivance Committee,
ens shall announce the results of any such election to the
Chairman who shall in turn order the same published by the
Secretary.
The Secretary shall perform any other duties as may be
prescribed by the Chairman.
(a) Vacancies in the offices of Chairman and Vice—Chairman
shall be filled in ascending order by the officer(s) remaining.
Any vacancies in the office of Secretary shell be filled by an
election of the membership of the Committee held immediately
after replacing any vacancy(s) in the membership of the Committee.
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3. TIME AND PLACE. OF MEETING:
The GreivanCe Committee shall meet ut ) 0:00 a.m. on the
first Monday of each month at the Atlanta Fire Department Head
quarters Conference Room, 51tuatad at 46 Courtiand Street, S.F.,
Atlanta, Georgia. Any special meeting of the GreivanCe Committee
shall be held as prescribed herein on twenty—four (24) hours
notice of such meeting given by the Secretary. All Greivance
Committee meetings~ rccjuler or speciai, shall be held at the
aforesaid location or at any other station or division of the
Atlanta Fire Department.
Four (4) men~ers o~ the Greivance Committee shall con—
5titute a quorum for the transaction of business at any regular
or special meeting.
4. GREIVANCE PROCEDURE:
As an orderly process~ or procedure, for the presentment
of any greivariCe or complaint to the Committee, and any sub—
sequent action recommended by the Committee based upon a hearing
or other investigation of such groivance or complaints the fol
lowing procedural steps sha3..i be followed by the GrcivaflC~3
Committee, the Chief of the Atlanta Fire Department ~nd the
Board of Fire Masters of the Board of Aldermen:
(a) The eggreived shall first make a written request
to the. Chairman of the Greivance Committee for a hearing before
the Greivance Committee, or other form of investigation, within
ten (10) days after the alleged incident constituting the sub-S
jeet matter of the greivance. Such writeen request ~h~li be
referred by the Chairman to the Committee and placed upon its
agenda for hearing or investigation at its next regular meeting,
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if possible, or at the first regular meeting thereafter if time
is needed to summon witnesses and otherwise prepare the Comrnittse
for an adequate hearing or investigation. The hearing or
investigation nay be concluded or continued, in the interest
of justice and fair play, and immediately upon a conclusion of
the hearing or investigation a written roport and recommendation
shall be submitted within ten (10) days to the Chief of the
Atlanta Fire Department.
(b) The Chief of the Atlanta Fire Department shall
render a decision, or make a ruling, upon the investigation,
report and recommendation of the Greivanco Committee within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of such written report, inves~
tigation and recommendation. Should the aggreived, accused,
or any member, person. persons, or other entity or entities
be not satisfied with the decision or ruling of the Chief of
the Atlanta Fire Department, he may appeal such decision or
ruling, in writing, to the Chairman of the Board of Fire Masters
of the Board of Aldermen within ten (10) days of the receipt
of notice of such decision or ruling.
(c) Any such appeal to the Board of Fire Masters shall
be placed on the agenda of the next regular meeting of the
Board of Fire Masters, or at such later meeting if additional
time is needed so as to summon witnesses or to investigate any
appeal, and the party appealing shall be given a full hearing
by the Board of Fire Masters. Any appeal conducted by the said
Board of Fire Masters may ho concluded or continued, in the
interest of justice and fair play, and upon the conclusion of




the Board of Fire Masters shall render its decision or ruling
in the official minutes of its meeting within thirty—five (35)
days from tho conclusion of such appaal hearing or investigation.
The Chief of the Atlanta Fire Department shall immediately
notify the appellant and appellee. and all other interested
parties. of the decision of the Board of Fire Masters. All
decisions or rulings of the Board of Fire Masters shall be final
and binding, subject only to the review of the Mayor and Board
of Aldermen and/or appropriate legal tribunal.
Approved by Board of Firemasters February 16, 1970
Jack Summers. Chairman








The undersigned fout officials of the City of *tJ.anta,
to wit,
Ivan Allen, Jr. 11.9cr
Milton Ferris ~,a1rw,an • finance ~ittsa
Everett $iuican ~aisnen, Public Works
~itt.e
Con T. Sutherland City Pere~el Dis’ecter
have served as a Liaison C~ittee frea the governing authority
of the City of Atlanta to discuss with asployer of the Sanitation
Divieicn of the Public Works Departeent and their representative
certain grievances in connection with their pay end sapley,ent
by the City of Atlanta.
After several discussions with said esployeei and their
representatives, said officials of the City of Atlanta aide
certain stetesents end egreewents with said aeployees end their
representatives as to intent of the City of Atlanta arising
out of said grievances. The plu’poee of this doccoent is to put
is writing end agr.enents and prc.isas mmdc by the City officials
which were as follcus:
1. That effective January 1, 1969, a three-step ealery increase
will be granted to the positions of Waste CoUectcr 1, Waste
Collector XI, and Waste Colloctisa Drivers Sc the Sanitation
Division of the Public Works Depar~nt.
2. That the Penewmel Director will recend to the Personnel
Soerd the reclassification of positions of Waste Collector II to
- the class of Scout ~ Drivers with a salary zenge .~ e~p bW,e,~
then the aalen3r zai$e for Waste Collector XX.
3. That the Public Works Director will sake every effort to
espedite the~ of the field offices located at Hill Street,
Z4ddefl Street, end Worth Menus Substations, sepr.santively, which
~ths already have been approved and are in the proosss of being
c~leted at the present time.
11. That a method will be adopted with end through the Personnel
Director of the City of Atlanta no that individual ~lspe.s or
their representatives shaU have a eystoc of presenting any work
or ~loyment gnievenoes at their respective lob locations and on
thiough the higher levels of city~
S. That the City agrees officially to recognise the Wasp
Stewards officially designated by the onions end that confirm.
tion of recognition will he forniehed by letter *m. the Fe—
ap.ctive department heads to the espervisore with oboe the
Stop Stewards deal.
S. That no ~1cyee who participated in the stAke no
~loyee ~ ~.ked ~‘ing the ecoike will be disormminated
spinet or be disciplined for hi. participation or non participa
tine Sc the eStike.
Such of the ondareip.d has ..~d end agreed to the
foregoing proc.dm’es end wiLl publicly m.ke every effort to see
~t said agneonents are adopted end ~v’iod out by the governing













WHEREAS, certain representatives of th~ City of Atlanta and
representatives of the American Federation of Slate, County and Mun~c~pai
Employees, AFL-CIO have held discus sions over the past several months
and the result of said discussions has been an under standing as to a
Statement of Policy concerning both parties as to rights, privileges and
responsibilities of all City employees including grievance procedures and
~clier conditions of employment:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Mayor ~nd Board
of Aldermen that the attached Statement of ~licy together with the Grievance
Fcocedures attached thereto is hereby approved and aclcpted as a policy of
‘~e City of Atlanta; and the Mayor is hereby authorized and directed to sign
and present the aforesaid Statement of Policy and Procedure to the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
Union, for their acceutarice and approval.
~T~h 1 te~r’ Li .i Jc~rr,.,rii 13,
•~ t rum cr;~ ,-‘ — ..~ ~ 3, I I..”.
I- __~
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1, — — J.J. LITTLE , do creh~’ certify t!at an~
the duly elected t~ Clerk -. of the City of
Atlanta, Gecrgia, and as such ar.~ in charge of keeping the Ninutcs ef t!i~
lloard of Aldcracn of the said City of ~tlanta. I further certify that
the attached i~ atrue and correct copy of a resolution adoptedby the
Board of Aldermen of the City of Atlanta on May ]5, 1969 and anproved
May iS, 1969, adopting official s~àtement of policy relating to griev





all as the san:e a1pcars frcn the
is of record and en fi)e in !T.f said office.
hand and seal of offic.~ tils l~th — — d~y cf —
_____ —
,







The City of Atlanta recognizing the need to communicate to
employees of the City government information as to the rights,
privileges and responsibilities of all City employees and the
procedure to be followed in the event any employee or group of
employees are any recognized organization representing any group
of employoees in making recommendations concerning salaries,
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment and in pre
senting a grievance, hereby adopts the policies outlined below:
1. The Personnel Board and/or the Personnel Director
will entertain formal or informal presentations
or recommendations concerning pay, hours and other
conditions of employment from any employee or group
of employees, The American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO or other
recognized organization representing employees of
the City. It must be understood that the Personnel
Board does not have final authority in these matters
but can and is required to make recommendations to
the Mayor and Board of Aldermen who do have the
final authority in such matters.
2. The City of Atlanta herby adopts a grievance procedure
to he followed by employees who have or think they have
grievances. A copy of this procedure is, attached hereto







To establish an orderly and systematic means of handling appeals of any
employee of the City government of Atlanta who has a grievance or thinks
that he has •a grievance the City of Atlanta hereby prescribes the following
procedures:
Any employee who has a grievance or thinks that he has a
grievance concerning an action, occurrence, or an attitude,
either expressed or implied, resulting in real or imagined
feeling of injustice or of having been oppressed or injured
shall have a right to present his appeal orally to his immediate
supervisor within three (3) days after the alleged cause for
the grievance arises. The immediate supervisor of the
employee shall render his decision in the matter within three
(3) days after the grievance is. presented to him; provided,
however, that if the matter is such that higher authority than
the immediate superivisor must make a decision, the immediate
supervisor shall authorize the employee to proceed directly to
this authority. This authority must render a decision within
three (3) days from the time that the grievance is presented to
him for a decision.
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If the aggrieved employee is not satisfied with the deci~icn made
and desires to carry the matter to still higher authority, he next
may present it to the head of the department in which he is employed.
who shall render his decision within three (3) days, and if the
aggrieved employee is not satisfied with the decision rendered by the
department head, he then shall appeal this decision to the Personnel
Director within three (3) days. If the Personnel Director serving
as a mediator is unable to resolve the matter by conferring with the
employee and department head concerned, the employee may present
his grievance in writing to the Personnel Board which shall afford the
employee the opportunity to appear before it within ten (10) days and
shall render its decision on the matter with three (3) days after the
hearing. The decision of the Personnel Board shall be final.
At any step in the grievance procedure. if the aggrieved employee
is a member of The American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees. AFL-CiO, he may confer with the shop
steward and/or any other representative of the union representing
the department in which he is employed, and the steward or repre
sentative may counsel the crfll)IOYCC and ~.ssist him in presentifl~ his
~no~als in sucCCS~’~’~ stepS Ufltil the matter is resolved.
AIDI AED .~ DO~~J) OF~ IJ.UE~:i~i ?i.iy l~, ~
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